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Case No. 20110136

IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
NERIM JELASHOVIC,
Petitioner/Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF UTAH
Respondent/Appellee.
Brief of Appellant

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Petitioner is appealing the denial of his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
Under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act. Appeal is permitted under U.C.A.
§78B-9-110 and jurisdiction appropriate under §78A-4-103.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
ISSUE # 1; Did the Trial Court err when it held that VanCampen did not
perform deficiently by providing incorrect immigration advice?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "We defer to [the lower courtfs] factual
findings, but determine as a matter of law whether the defendant received
1
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment." State v.
Maestas, 997 P.2d 314,318 (Utah App. 2000)
ISSUE # 2: Did the Trial Court err when it held that Mr. Jelashovic did not
satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

'

"We review an appeal from an order

dismissing or denying a petition for post-conviction relief for correctness without

(

deference to the lower court's conclusions of law." Taylor v. State, 2007 UT 12, f
13, 156 P.3d 739 (quoting Gardner v. Galetka, 2004 UT 42, \ 7, 94 P.3d 263).
ISSUE # 3: Did the Trial Court err when it failed to make a finding
concerning the date at which Mr. Jelashovic discovered the incorrect advice of his
<

attorney, Mr. VanCampen?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Abuse of Discretion. SeeAllredv. Allred, 797
P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah App.1990) (failure to enter detailed findings concerning

<

child support determination constitutes abuse of trial court's discretion).
i

PRESERVATION OF ISSUES
Issues # 1 - 3 were originally raised by Petitioner's Petition for Relief Under
I
the Post-Conviction Remedies Act ("Petition") and the Memorandum in support
thereof. (R. 1-99). An order denying the non-immigration specific aspects of the
2
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Petition was entered on 13 September, 2010 (R. 255-259). An order denying the
remainder of the Petition was entered on 24 January, 2011 (R.295-311).
Petitioner's Notice of Appeal was subsequently filed on 9 February, 2011 (R. 313314). Issue # 3 first arose upon the District Court entering its findings as part of its
final order and as such is first raised on appeal.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following determinative provisions are attached as Addendum A:
INA§ 101;8U.S.C. §§ 1101(b)(1)
INA § 201(b); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(b)
INA§ 212(a)
INA § 236(c); 8 U.S.C. § 1226
INA § 237(a), 8 USC § 1227
INA § 239(a); 8 U.S.C. §1229(a); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.14, 1239.1(a), 1240.30,
1240.55
INA § 240(c)(2); 8 U.S.C. §1229a(c)(2); and 8 C.F.R.§ 1240.8(b)
INA § 240(A)
U.C.A. §78A-4-103
U.C.A. §78B-9-101
U.C.A. §78B-9-110
Padilla v. Kentucky, 599 U.S.

_ , 130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010)

State's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Denying the Petition for
Post-Conviction Relief
Order on the State's Motion to Dismiss
1-589, Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal
3
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case is an Appeal taken after the denial of Nerim Jelashovic's Petition
for Relief Under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, Utah Code Section 78B-9101, et seq. The Petitioner was originally charged with two first degree felony
counts of Aggravated Sexual Assault stemming from an incident that occurred in
December of 2002. At the time of the alleged offense, he was 17 years old, and
charges were filed shortly after his 18th birthday in the Third District Court of Utah.

<

Petitioner's father retained an inexperienced attorney, D. Christopher VanCampen,
to represent his son. Eventually, Mr. VanCampen convinced his client that he
should accept the plea offered by the state of two second degree felonies with a no
prison recommendation. Petitioner was sentenced for the two second degree
felony counts of forcible sexual abuse.
In August of 2009, Petitioner was given documents in anticipation of being
released on parole. At that time, he was informed by a counselor that an
Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") hold had been placed on him and
he should expect to hear from agents about his deportation to his nation of origin,

<

Bosnia. On October 15, 2009, agents from ICE came and saw Petitioner for the
first time.

^
4
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Petitioner filed his Petition for Relief Under the Post-Conviction Remedies
Act ("PCRA") on March 8, 2010. (R. 1-14). In his Petition, Jelashovic alleged
three grounds for relief: That his plea was unlawfully induced, that his counsel was
ineffective, and that his confession was coerced. In response, the State filed a
Motion to Dismiss on June 23, 2010, alleging the PCRA statute of limitations had
run. (R. 120-205). An evidentiary hearing was held on August 25, 2010 on the
State's Motion to Dismiss. At that hearing, the trial court ruled that the Petitioner's
first and third claims were indeed time-barred, but the State's motion as to the
allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel based upon faulty advice regarding
immigration consequences was denied and the Petition allowed to proceed. (R.
255-258).
Another evidentiary hearing was held on October 7, 2010. After that hearing
the parties supplied supplemental briefing and provided proposed orders and
findings of fact to the court. The court adopted the State's Proposed Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law without comment or edit on January 24, 2011,
denying Petitioner's final ground for relief. (R. 295-310). This appeal followed.

5
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On December 8, 2002, Nerim Jelashovic hosted a party attended by, among
others, a female identified in reports only as N.B. (R. 166). At some point during
the evening, N.B. accompanied Mr. Jelashovic to his bedroom where they began to
kiss and eventually they had intercourse (R. 167). Pursuant to a subsequent
investigation, Mr. Jelashovic was charged with two counts of Aggravated Sexual
Assault, 1st degree felonies on January 3, 2003 (R. 166). At the time of filing, Mr.
Jelashovic was 18 years old and had lived in the United States for only five (5)
years, having come to this country as a refugee from Bosnia in 1997 R.
273 [20:24]).
Mr. Jelashovic's father hired an attorney for Mr. Jelashovic by the name of
D. Christopher VanCampen (Bar# 8626) . Mr. VanCampen prepared his
appearance of counsel on January 7, 2003 (R. 21). He also filed at that time an

(

Entry of Plea (R. 24) and a Demand for Jury Trial (R. 26), two pleadings which are
superfluous in a felony criminal case.

(

On the date set for preliminary hearing, March 13, 2003, Mr. VanCampen
instructed his client to waive his right for a preliminary hearing despite the fact that
the victim was extremely reluctant to testify (R. 35: 16-18).
Throughout the pendancy of the case, even after entering his plea, Mr.
<

6
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Jelashovic demonstrated his belief that the sexual contact he had with N.B. was
consensual, a fact used by the court as a basis for giving him the maximum
sanction available: two concurrent 1-15 year terms at the Utah State Prison (R.
51:11 -20). Mr. VanCampen attempted to forge a guilty plea on May 9, 2003.
During the Rule 11 plea colloquy, Judge Timothy Hanson asked Mr. Jelashovic to
describe what had happened (R. 64:10). At this point, Mr. Jelashovic was confused
about whether he should recount the facts his attorney told him to state or to
actually tell the court what he recalled happening. Id. 10:14-19. At this point Mr.
Jelashovic recounted his belief that the encounter was consensual and the court,
upon hearing this stated that it could not accept a guilty plea. Id. 10:22-12:4. At
this point, the unusual situation of defense counsel arguing for guilt with the court
and even the prosecutor pointing out that Mr. Jelashovic had a legitimate defense
occurred. Id. 12:5-16:4. In the end, the court would not take a plea and set the
matter for trial.
Subsequent to this hearing, Mr. VanCampen convinced Mr. Jelashovic and
his family that Mr. Jelashovic needed to plea guilty and that next time he needed to
say it the right way. On July 18, 2003, Mr. Jelashovic entered a guilty plea to the
amended information (R. 89:13-25). After performing a diagnostic at the State
Prison, Mr. Jelashovic was sentenced on February 6, 2004. Critically, at that

7
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hearing, Mr. VanCampen stated to the court that he had discussed the immigration
consequences of the plea, and told him that "as long as he performs well on
probation and doesn't get into further trouble, that at this point, he's not going to be
deported" (R. 46:17-21).
After Sentencing, Mr. Jelashovic began serving his term of incarceration at
the Utah State Penitentiary (R. 273 [19:8]). While at the prison, he was allowed to
complete sex offender treatment, and did work and college classes, all things that
prisoners with INS holds are not allowed to do. (Id. at 21:6-23:16). In August
2009, Mr. Jelashovic received notice that he was to be sent to Bosnia upon
receiving probation. (Id. at 23:18-25:19). Finally, in October 2009 he was visited
by ICE agents and officially informed of this fact. (Id. at 26:20-28:10).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Petitioner, Nerim Jelashovic argues that when his original attorney, David

<

VanCampen stated in response to an inquiry from the bench about immigration
status that, "I've discussed that with him and Ifm told that he's discussed that with yeah, and that as long as he performs well on probation and doesn't get into further
trouble, that at this point, he's not going to be deported" (R. 46:17-21), he gave a
quintessential example of incorrect advice. How wrong this advice was, was not
discovered until several years later when Mr. Jelashovic was informed that upon
i

8
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4

parole that he would be going immediately into deportation proceedings.
Within a year of finding out about his pending deportation, Petitioner filed a
Petition for Relief Under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA). At a hearing
ostensibly to determine when it was that the statute of limitations started running
on his claims, Petitioner introduced evidence that he was unaware of any
immigration detainer until he was about to be paroled in August of 2009. This
evidence was not discredited in any way.
Because Petitioner received faulty advice and filed a timely Petition for
Relief, the District Court erred in denying his petition.
ARGUMENT
I.

Pursuant to Kentucky v. Padilla, VanCampen Gave Constitutionally
Deficient Advice to Mr. Jelashovic.
The trial court erred when it held that "Mr. VanCampen?s advice about the

immigration consequences of the plea was [not] incorrect or otherwise objectively
unreasonable" (R. 308). Traditionally, courts have used the two-pronged
Strickland v. Washington standard to determine whether or not counsel was
constitutionally deficient. First, the movant must show that counsel's
representation fell below an "objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). Second, it must be shown that
the outcome of the proceedings would have been different had it not been for the
9
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deficiency. Id. This test was broadened to cover matters of immigration when the
United States Supreme Court issued the decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, 599 U.S.
, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010). At the very least, Padilla is properly viewed as a
modification of the first prong of the Strickland test. Specifically, Padilla held that
proper advice on immigration consequences is part of what is reasonably expected
from criminal counsel. In sum, the failure of a criminal defense attorney to advise
a non-citizen about the immigration consequences of a plea falls below the
constitutional threshold.
Prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Padilla, the rule in Utah was stated by
the Utah Supreme Court in the case of State v. Rojas-Martinez, 2005 UT 86, 125
P.3d, 930, which held that it was ineffective assistance for counsel to "affirmatively
misrepresent the deportation consequences of a guilty plea." Id. at f20.
Petitioner's original memorandum cited this authority, and Mr. VanCampenfs

<

advice clearly fails that test, but with the issuance of the Padilla decision, the
analysis of this case shifted to incorporate that newly-announced method of dealing
with the intersection of criminal and immigration law.
A,

Because the Immigration Consequences of Mr. Jelashovic?s Plea
Were Clear, Mr. VanCampen Had a Duty to Provide Clear and
Accurate Advice.

<

Under Padilla, when the immigration consequences of a plea are "clear",
i

10
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then the advice given regarding those consequences must be "equally clear".
Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1483. The simplest determination to make is perhaps whether
a crime will trigger deportation proceedings. See generally INA 237, 8 USC §
1227. Simply put, a non-citizen should know whether or not a plea will land the
individual into deportation proceedings. However, the triggering of deportation
proceedings is just the beginning of a lengthy legal process. The true immigration
consequences of a plea come into play only after deportation proceedings have
been initiated.1 Just as proper advice for a criminal defendant in a murder case
would undoubtedly include discussions about potential jail time, the possibility of
parole, probation, and the death penalty, any meaningful advice given to a noncitizen concerning a plea whose collateral immigration consequences are "clear"
requires discussion that goes far beyond the simple fact that a plea will "trigger
deportation".
1. Because Jelashovic Pled to a Crime that Prevents Him from
Stopping Deportation, His Attorney Should Have Counseled
Him Accordingly,
As noted in Padilla, the vast majority of convictions will land a non-citizen
1 Deportation begins with issuance of a Notice to Appear (Form 1-862) in which the alien is summoned to appear
in front of an immigration judge at a specified time and place to begin the process. See INA §239(a); 8 U.S.C.
§1229(a); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.14, 1239.1(a), 1240.30, 1240.55. DHS initially has a low burden of proving alienage
which can be met through hearsay on form 1-213 as federal rules of evidence are not applicable in immigration
court. See e.g., Guerrero-Perez v. INS, 242 F.3d 727, 729 n.2 vehear'g denied256 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2001)
Burden then shifts to the non-citizen to show s/he is "clearly and beyond doubt entitled to be admitted and is not
inadmissible under the section pursuant to federal law. See INA §240(c)(2); 8 U.S.C. §1229a(c)(2); and 8
C.F.R.§ 1240.8(b)

11
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into deportation proceedings. Padilla 130 S.Ct at 1476. However, once
deportability is established, the most import question is whether there is any way
for the non-citizen to fight deportation and stay in the country.
A non-citizen may stop deportation by finding a "form of relief' from
deportation. See generally INA §§240A(a)&(b); Kurzban's Immigration Law
Sourcebook 163 (11th ed. 2008). There is little doubt that Padilla brings advice
regarding the eligibility for relief into the spectrum of consequences that a criminal
defense attorney must discuss. Padilla specifically states that "preserving the
possibility of relief' is one of the principal benefits sought by defendants looking
to negotiate a plea agreement. Padilla, 130 S.Ct at 1483; see also INS v. St. Cyr,
533 U.S. 289 (2001).
In this case, Petitioner, Nerim Jelashovic, was instructed by his counsel to
plea to two counts of forcible sexual abuse, 2nd degree felonies. This charge makes

(

the likelihood of Jelashovic obtaining any relief from deportation extremely slim2.
Competent counsel would have informed him of this, instead of stating, as

{

VanCampen did that, "as long as he performs well on probation and doesn't get into
further trouble, that at this point, hefs not going to be deported." R. 46:17-21.

2 INA §237 (a) states that "Any alien ... shall... be removed if the alien is within one or more of the following
classes of deportable aliens" (emphasis added). Petitioner qualifies under at least subsections (2)(A)(i), (2)(A)
(ii) and (2)(A)(iii) because of the plea he entered.

12
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i

2. Because Petitioner's Plea Subjected Him to Mandatory
Detention, His Attorney Should have Advised Him Accordingly.

Padilla notes the obvious truth that in the criminal context, the potential for
jail time is an important aspect of a plea that every criminal defendant should be
aware of. Padilla, 130 S.Ct at 1483. The potential for jail time that a non-citizen
faces at the hands of immigration officials is an equally important aspect of a plea
which a defendant should understand. Particularly, a non-citizen should be advised
if a conviction will subject him to what is known as "mandatory detention" at the
hands of ICE without the possibility of bail. See INA §236(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226
(aliens subject to mandatory detention for even relatively minor crimes for which
they become ineligible for bail, referred to in immigration proceedings as "bond").
As a general principle, information about mandatory detention is crucial for
a non-citizen because a non-citizen accepting a plea requiring only a weekend in
jail might think he is getting a good deal until he finds out that instead of going
home on Monday morning, ICE will lock him up without possibility of bond for
months or even years before ultimately being deported. Because of the lengthy
deportation process, detention considerations are every bit as crucial as jail
sentences for the non-citizen defendant.
Pursuant to INA §236, Petitioner is not eligible for bond, a fact that effective

13
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counsel would have advised him about.
3, Because Petitioner's Plea Renders Him Inadmissible to the
United States in the Future, His Attorney Should Have Advised
Him Accordingly.
Some crimes will not only get a non-citizen deported, but carry with them a
life-time bar that banishes a person from ever coming back in to the United States.
See e.g., Padilla, 130 S.Ct at 1485; INA §212(a)(9)(A)(i) (regarding lifetime bar
for aggravated felons); In immigration jargon, these are "inadmissibility" crimes
and can render a non-citizen ineligible to ever return to the United States after
being deported. Padilla notes that any "decent attorney" with knowledge that a
client may face "banishment or exile" would surely inform the client of this risk.
Padilla, 130 S.CT at 1484 n. 11. In embracing the prior Supreme Court holding of
INSv. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 294 (2001), the Padilla court specifically recognized
the importance that a non-citizen be informed of whether or not the plea will

<

prevent him from being "admitted" into the country in the future, and not just
whether the conviction will subject him to deportation. Padilla, S.Ct at 1482.
In this case, Petitioner plead to a charge that carries with it a lifetime bar
from reentry. INA §212(a)(9)(A)(i). He is also barred from ever returning because
he plead to a Crime Involving Moral Turpitude ("CIMT"). INA §212(a)(2)(A)(i)
(I). This is another fact competent counsel would have informed him of.

14
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4

The record is incomplete as to what exactly Petitioner's attorney informed
Petitioner of as far as the immigration consequences of the negotiated plea deal.
However some facts are clear: 1) At the February 6, 2004 sentencing hearing, Mr.
VanCampen told court that he had discussed immigration consequences with his
client and specifically informed him that he would not be deported (R. 46:17-21);
2) at the time that he represented petitioner he did not have any particular expertise
in the area of immigration law (R. 273, [56:1-3]); 3) Mr. VanCampen knew that his
client was reliant upon him for knowledge of the law, both criminal and
immigration (R. 273, [56:18-25]); 4) Mr. VanCampen mistakenly believed that the
State of Utah had some input as to whether his client would get deported (R. 273
[39:21-23]); 5) Mr. VanCampen testified that he spoke with "an ICE guy" and an
in-court Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P) officer about immigration
consequences3 (R. 273 [40:21-41:9]); and 6) Mr. VanCampen correctly identified
that length of incarceration can have some impact on immigration status (R, 273
[45:20-24]), yet the deal he negotiated, for incarceration of one year on each of two
counts, was too long to avoid the "aggravated felony" status that he thought he
had, in fact, avoided. Thus, while Mr. VanCampen tried to downplay the level of
his misadvice, the actual consequences of the plea were clear, and the advice that

3 Why the "ICE guy" gave the wrong advice and why an AP&P officer would have anything at all to say about
immigration consequences remains puzzling. If, in fact, any such conversation took place.
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Mr. Jelashovic was entitled to receive from his attorney should have been equally
clear as mandated by Padilla. Padilla, 130 S.Ct at 1483.
Thus, even without the record providing detail as to the depth of Mr.
VanCampenfs knowledge of the intricacies of immigration law, it is certain that his
understanding was limited and it is equally certain that he provided erroneous
advice to his client when he advised him to accept the plea deal offered by the
State.
B.

Because it Would Have Been Rational for Petitioner To Have
Rejected the Plea Offer Had He Been Properly Advised, the Court
Should have Granted His Petition for Post-Conviction Relief,

Under Padilla, the second prong of traditional Strickland analysis is satisfied
when a petitioner shows that after being properly advised, choosing to reject a plea
bargain would have been rational. See Padilla, 130 S.Ct at 1483. Padilla
downplays the nuances of this analysis, noting that lower courts have had plenty of

<

experience with this step of the Strickland analysis. Id. It would, however, be a
mistake to approach this prong in the same manner as might be done with a citizen
defendant. For example, a citizen might be foolish to reject a plea to a
misdemeanor drug charge when the state's evidence is strong and there is little or
(

no risk for jail time. The choice to accept a fine or perhaps some drug treatment
classes in order to avoid trial and jail time is a relatively easy decision for a citizen.
16
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d

For a non-citizen, however, the risk of a few weeks or even years in jail
pales in comparison to the prospect of banishment to a third world country where
he fears torture or death. See Padilla, 130 S.Ct at 1484. Some non-citizens would
prefer a prison term in the United States where there is a roof overhead, three
square meals a day, and weekly visits with loved ones. Others would prefer
waiting things out in jail, hoping for a change in the law or personal circumstances
that might benefit their situation4.
Thus, when analyzing the prejudice prong, it is imperative that the Court
take into account that the stakes simply are not as high for citizens as they are for
non-citizens. For this reason, a seemingly 'irrational' decision by a citizen to take a
weak case to trial might be the only "rational" decision when made by a noncitizen facing the same charge. Non-citizens contemplating a trial and who fully
understand the severe consequences of deportation have more to gain and almost
nothing to lose by taking a gamble that a non-citizen would not even consider.
At the October 7 hearing, the Respondent called Angela Miklos, who was
the assigned prosecutrix for the underlying criminal case5. The attempt was to
illicit testimony from Ms. Miklos about the strength of the State's case to
demonstrate that it would be reasonable to accept the plea offer. Ms. Miklos
4 See e.g., INA §§101(b)(l) & 201(b)(2)(A)(i), 8U.S.C. §§ 1101(b)(1) & 1151 (b)(2XA)(i) (providing that U.S.
citizen children may petition for a parent upon turning 21.
5 Ms. Miklos's testimony is found in R. 273 on pages 67-81
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provided testimony that the complaining witness went to a party at the Petitioner's
apartment attended by a handful of other individuals. She testified that the
Petitioner, who was 17 years old at the time, had racy posters of women on his
bedroom walls. She noted that the complaining witness never actually testified or
was cross-examined in any way and in fact, would have had difficulty testifying.
The complaining witness' story, as told to the police and then presented through the
filter of Ms. Miklos, was that she voluntarily went to the Petitioner's bedroom
where he raped her. According to Ms. Miklos, the Petitioner's story was much the
same as the complaining witness except that his statement was that any sex was
consensual. Ms. Miklos also testified that she couldn't remember details such as
the approximate size or even the ethnicity of the complaining witness. At no time
did Ms. Miklos give an estimation of the likely outcome should the case have gone
to trial.

'

For his part, Mr. VanCampen testified that he was not optimistic about the
case at trial and was looking to negotiate a plea deal from early on. R. 273 [41:9-

i

13]. However, his estimation should perhaps be taken with a grain of salt. He had
only been practicing for approximately four years. R. 273 [37:10]. Nothing in the
record indicates that he interviewed any witnesses or conducted any independent
investigation. Additionally, his lack of experience is clear through the fact that he
<
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filed inapplicable pleadings (R. 24 and 26), had never been in front of then-Judge
Nehring (R. 31) and sought to "waive" his client's right to a full plea colloquy
under Rule 11, so anxious was he to get his client to change his plea. R. 96:5-7.
In reality, it is impossible to determine the likelihood of the outcome at trial
because no evidence was ever tested by anyone. What is certain, however, is that
the plea, as negotiated by Mr. VanCampen, even had the sentence been what he
hoped, had dire and irreversible consequences for his client. As seen by his 1-589
Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal6, Petitioner faces the
potential of torture and death in his country of origin. In light of this, it is quite
reasonable to propose that correct immigration advise would have changed
Petitioner's willingness to accept the plea presented him as some jail, probation and
smooth sailing for the future.
Based upon this, it is clear that but for the faulty legal advice given him by
Mr. VanCampen, Petitioner would not have changed his plea.
C,

Padilla Has Retroactive Applicability,

Because Padilla announced a new rule for the conduct of criminal cases, it
should be applied retroactively to Petitioner. Petitioner filed his original Petition
on March 8, 2010, while the Supreme Court was deliberating Padilla. Once the

6 The 1-589 is also used when petitioning under the Convention Against Torture, as Petitioner is doing in this
instance, due to the fact that his plea in this case prevents himfromobtaining asylum.
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Padilla decision was issued, it immediately became part of the arguments used by
both Petitioner and Respondent in this case. The United State Supreme Court has
held that "a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied
retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review". Griffith v.
Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987), and Padilla has been held to apply
retroactively by several courts, most recently in United States v. Bonilla, where the
9th Circuit Court recognized the retroactivity of Padilla. Bonilla, 09-10307 (9th Cir.
2011)7. While there is not, as of this writing any controlling Utah authority on the
issue, the Petitioner urges the Court to follow the weight of the national precedent
and explicitly apply the Padilla decision retroactively.

II.

The District Court Abused its Discretion in Failing to Make a Finding
Pertaining to the Date When Petitioner Discovered his Counsel's
Deficiency.
Because the District Court mistakenly found that Mr. VanCampenfs advise

was not faulty, it failed to make any findings of fact as to when the clock started
ticking on the PCRA's one year statute of limitations. While it may be that this
issue will be mooted by a finding of retro-activity for Padilla, should this Court

7 Padilla has also been retroactively applied in other cases where convictions were entered before March 31, 2010.
See, e.g., USA v. Chaidez, 2010 WL 2740282 (N.D.I1L, July 8, 2010) United States v. Obonaga, 2010 WL
2629748 (EDNY June 24, 2010); People v. Bennett, 901 N.Y.S.2s 696, 700 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2010).
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not decide to apply Padilla retro-actively, a finding concerning the date at which
the Petitioner knew or should have known about the flaw in his counsel's
performance becomes crucial. As noted above, the standard is abuse of discretion
and because it is, in a way, a challenge to part of the factual rulings of the court,
typically, an Appellant would marshal the facts in support of his position.
However, this case is analogous to Woodward v. Fazzio, where an insufficiency of
factual findings and the court in that case held, "There is, in effect, no need for an
appellant to marshal the evidence when the findings are so inadequate that they
cannot be meaningfully challenged as factual determinations. In other words, the
way to attack findings which appear to be complete and which are sufficiently
detailed is to marshal the supporting evidence and then demonstrate the evidence is
inadequate to sustain such findings. But where the findings are not of that caliber,
appellant need not go through a futile marshaling exercise. Rather, appellant can
simply argue the legal insufficiency of the court's findings as framed." Woodward,
823 P.2d 474, 477-78 (Utah App. 1991).
In this case, at the conclusion of the 25 August hearing on the State's Motion
to Dismiss, Judge Trease noted that based upon the information presented she had
no "information as to when it was that Mr. Jelashovic became aware" (R. 272
[34:8-14]). She then specifically set the next hearing to address that issue. At the
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subsequent hearing on 7 October 2010, Petitioner put on uncontroverted evidence
that he first discovered his immigration problem in August of 2009, and didn't
receive official notification from ICE officials until 15 October, 2009 (R.
273[25:16-27:25]). This evidence was corroborated by a letter from the
Department of Corrections indicating that the only time anyone from ICE visited
with Mr. Jelashovic during his entire stay at the prison was on October 15, 2009
(R. 268). Because the record is clear on this issue, even if this Court finds that
Padilla is not retro-active in applicability, it is clear that Mr. Jelashovicfs PCRA
petition was nevertheless timely filed, having been submitted in March of 2010,
well under a year from the date he found out that VanCampen's immigration advice
was incorrect.
CONCLUSION
In this case, Mr. Jelashovicfs attorney, David VanCampen provided
immigration advice to his client that was patently wrong. Because of this, the plea
entered by Mr. Jelashovic was invalid and the result of ineffective assistance of
counsel. The United States Supreme Court in the landmark case of Kentucky v.
Padilla, clarified how crucial it is for a non-citizen to receive correct advice within
i

the framework of a criminal case.
Because of this erroneous advice, Petitioner prays that this Court overturn
i
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the District Court's denial of his Petition for Relief. Specifically, Petitioner urges
this court to reverse the lower court's findings that the advice given to Petitioner
was not wrong and that it was not prejudicial to the Petitioner.
Finally, should this Court find it necessary, Petitioner prays that this Court
find that the clear evidence in the record shows that the original Petition for Relief
was filed timely, that is to say, within a year of Petitioner's discovery of his
pending deportation.

Edward u. Flint
Attorney for Defendant
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IN A: ACT 101 - DEFINITIONS

Sec. 101. [8 U.S.C. 1101] (a) As used in this Act(1) The term "administrator" means the official designated by the Secretary of State pursuant to
section 104(b) of this Act.
(2) The term "advocates" includes, but is not limited to, advises, recommends, furthers by overt act,
and admits belief in.
(3) The term "alien" means any person not a citizen or national of the United States.
(4) The term "application for admission" has reference to the application for admission into the
United States and not to the application for the issuance of an immigrant or nonimmigrant visa.
(5) The term "Attorney General" means the Attorney General of the United States.
(6) The term "border crossing identification card" means a document of identity bearing that
designation issued to an alien who is lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or to an alien who
is a resident in foreign contiguous territory, by a consular officer or an immigration officer for the
purpose of crossing over the borders between the United States and foreign contiguous territory in
accordance with such conditions for its issuance and use as may be prescribed by regulations.
Such regulati ons shall provide that (A) each such document include a biometric identifier (such as
the fingerprint or handprint of the alien) that is machine readable and (B) an alien presenting a
border crossing identification is not permitted to cross over the border into the United States unless
the biometric identifier contained on the card matches the appropriate biometric characteristic of
the alien. 1/
(7) The term "clerk of court" means a clerk of a naturalization court.
(8) The terms "Commissioner" and "Deputy Commissioner" mean the Commissioner of
Immigration and Naturalization and a Deputy Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization,
respectively.

(9) The term "consular officer" means any consular, diplomatic, or other officer la/ or employee of
the United States designated under regulations prescribed under authority contained in this Act, for
the purpose of issuing immigrant or nonimmigrant visas la/or, when used in title III, for the
purpose of adjudicating nationality.
(10) The term "crewman" means a person serving in any capacity on board a vessel or aircraft.
(11) The term "diplomatic visa" means a nonimmigrant visa bearing that title and issued to a
nonimmigrant in accordance with such regulations as the Secretary of State may prescribe.
(12) The term "doctrine" includes, but is not limited to, policies, practices, purposes, aims, or
procedures.
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(13) 2/_(A) The terms "admission" and "admitted" mean, with respect to an alien, the lawful entry of
the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.
(B) An alien who is paroled under section 212(d)(5) or permitted to land temporarily as an alien
crewman shall not be considered to have been admitted.
(C) An alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States shall not be regarded
as seeking an admission into the United States for purposes of the immigration laws unless the
alien(i) has abandoned or relinquished that status,
(ii) has been absent from the United States for a continuous period in excess of 180 days,
(iii) has engaged in illegal activity after having departed the United States,
(iv) has departed from the United States while under legal process seeking removal of the alien
from the United States, including removal proceedings under this Act and extradition proceedings,
(v) has committed an offense identified in section 212(a)(2), unless since such offense the alien
has been granted relief under section 212(h) or 240A(a), or
(vi) is attempting to enter at a time or place other than as designated by immigration officers or has
not been admitted to the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.

(14) The term "foreign state" includes outlying possessions of a foreign state, but self-governing
dominions and territories under mandate or trusteeship shall be regarded as separate foreign
states.
(15) The term "immigrant" means every alien except an alien who is within one of the following
classes of nonimmigrant aliens
(A) (i) an ambassador, public minister, or career diplomatic or consular officer who has been
accredited by a foreign government recognized de jure by the United States and who is accepted
by the President or by the Secretary of State, and the members of the alien's immediate family;

i

(ii) upon a basis of reciprocity, other officials and employees who have been accredited by a
foreign government recognized de jure by the United States, who are accepted by the Secretary of
State, and the members of their immediate families; and

(iii) upon a basis of reciprocity, attendants, servants, personal employees, and members of their
immediate families, of the officials and employees who have a nonimmigrant status under (i) and
(ii) above;

(B) an alien (other than one coming for the purpose of study or of performing skilled or unskilled
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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labor or as a representative of foreign press, radio, film, or other foreign information media coming
to engage in such vocation) having a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of
abandoning and who is visiting the United States temporarily for business or temporarily for
pleasure;
(C) an alien in immediate and continuous transit through the United States, or an alien who
qualifies as a person entitled to pass in transit to and from the United Nations Headquarters District
and foreign countries, under the provisions of paragraphs (3), (4), and (5) of section 11 of the
Headquarters Agreement with the United Nations (61 Stat. 758);
(D) (i) an alien crewman serving in good faith as such in a capacity required for normal operation
and service on board a vessel, as defined in section 258(a) (other than a fishing vessel having its
home port or an operating base in the United States), or aircraft, who intends to land temporarily
and solely in pursuit of his calling as a crewman and to depart from the United States with the
vessel or aircraft on which he arrived or some other vessel or aircraft;

(ii) an alien crewman serving in good faith as such in any capacity required for normal operations
and service aboard a fishing vessel having its home port or an operating base in the United States
who intends to land temporarily in Guam or the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands
23/ and solely in pursuit of his calling as a crewman and to depart from Guam or the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands 23/ with the vessel on which he arrived;
(E) an alien entitled to enter the United States under and in pursuance of the provisions of a treaty
of commerce and navigation between the United States and the foreign state of which he is a
national, and the spouse and children of any such alien if accompanying or following to join him:
(i) solely to carry on substantial trade, including trade in services or trade in technology, principally
between the United States and the foreign state of which he is a national; 217

(ii) solely to develop and direct the operations of an enterprise in which he has invested, or of an
enterprise in which he is actively in the process of investing, a substantial amount of capital; or

(iii) 21/solely to perform services in a specialty occupation in the United States if the alien is a
national of the Commonwealth of Australia and with respect to whom the Secretary of Labor
determines and certifies to the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of State that the
intending employer has filed with the Secretary of Labor an attestation under section 212(t)(l);

(F) (0 3/_an alien having a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning,
who is a bona fide student qualified to pursue a full course of study and who seeks to enter the
United States temporarily and solely for the purpose of pursuing such a course of study consistent
with section 214(1) at an established college, university, seminary, conservatory, academic high
school, elementary school, or other academic institution or in a language 3/Jraining program in the
United States, particularly designated by him and approved by the Attorney General after
consultation with the Secretary of Education, which institution or place of study shall have agreed
to report to the Attorney General the termination of attendance of each nonimmigrant student, and
3 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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if any such institution of learning or place of study fails to make reports promptly the approval shall
be withdrawn,
(ii) 3d/the alien spouse and minor children of any alien described in clause (i) if accompanying or
following to join such an alien, and

(iii) 3d/an alien who is a national of Canada or Mexico, who maintains actual residence and place
of abode in the country of nationality, who is described in clause (i) except that the alien's
qualifications for and actual course of study may be full or part-time, and who commutes to the
United States institution or place of study from Canada or Mexico;

(G) (i) a designated principal resident representative of a foreign government recognized de jure by
the United States, which foreign government is a member of an international organization entitled
to enjoy privileges, exemptions, and immunities as an international organization under the
International Organizations Immunities Act (59 Stat. 669) 22 U.S.C. 288, note, accredited resident
members of the staff of such representatives, and members of his or their immediate family;
(ii) other accredited representatives of such a foreign government to such international
organizations, and the members of their immediate families;
(iii) an alien able to qualify under (i) or (ii) above except for the fact that the government of which
such alien is an accredited representative is not recognized de jure by the United States, or that
the government of which he is an accredited representative is not a member of such international
organization, and the members of his immediate family;
(iv) officers, or employees of such international organizations, and the members of their immediate
families;
(v) attendants, servants, and personal employees of any such representative, officer, or employee,
and the members of the immediate families of such attendants, servants, and personal employees;

(H) an alien (i) 3a/ 3b/ (b) subject to section 212(j)(2), who is coming temporarily to the United
States to perform services (other than services described in subclause (a) during the period in
which such subclause applies and other than services described in subclause (H)(3) or in
subparagraph (O) or (P)) in a specialty occupation described in section 214(i)(l) or as a fashion
model, who meets the requirements for the occupation specified in section 214(i)(2) or, in the case
of a fashion model, is of distinguished merit and ability, and with respect to whom the Secretary of
Labor determines and certifies to the Attorney General that the intending employer has filed with
the Secretary an application under section 3b/212(n)(l), or (b1) who is entitled to enter the United
States under and in pursuance of the provisions of an agreement listed in section 214(g)(8)(A),
who is engaged in a specialty occupation described in section 214(i)(3), and with respect to whom
the Secretary of Labor determines and certifies to the Secretary of Homeland Security and the
Secretary of State that the intending employer has filed with the Secretary of Labor an attestation
under section 212(t)(l), or (c) 3b/ who is coming temporarily to the United States to perform
services as a registered nurse, who meets the qualifications described in section 212(m)(l), and
4
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(

with respect to whom the Secretary of Labor determines and certifies to the Attorney General that
an unexpired attestation is on file and in effect under section 212(m)(2)for the facility (as defined in
section 212(m)(6)) for which the alien will perform the services; or

(ii) (a) having a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning who is
coming temporarily to the United States to perform agricultural labor or services, as defined by the
Secretary of Labor in regulations and including agricultural labor defined in section 3121(g) of
3bbb/ the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, agriculture as defined in section 3(f) of the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 203(f)), and the pressing of apples for cider on a farm, of a
temporary or seasonal nature, or

(b) having a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning who is coming
temporarily to the United States to perform other temporary service or labor if unemployed persons
capable of performing such service or labor cannot be found in this country, but this clause shall
not apply to graduates of medical schools coming to the United States to perform services as
members of the medical profession; or

(iii) having a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning who is coming
temporarily to the United States as a trainee, other than to receive graduate medical education or
training, in a training program that is not designed primarily to provide productive employment; and
the alien spouse and minor children of any such alien specified in this paragraph if accompanying
him or following to join him;
(I) upon a basis of reciprocity, an alien who is a bona fide representative of foreign press, radio,
film, or other foreign information media, who seeks to enter the United States solely to engage in
such vocation, and the spouse and children of such a representative if accompanying or following
to join him;
(J) an alien having a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning who is
a bona fide student, scholar, trainee, teacher, professor, research assistant, specialist, or leader in
a field of specialized knowledge or skill, or other person of similar description, who is coming
temporarily to the United States as a participant in a program designated by the Director of the
United States Information Agency, for the purpose of teaching, instructing or lecturing, studying,
observing, conducting research, consulting, demonstrating special skills, or receiving training and
who, if he is coming to the United States to participate in a program under which he will receive
graduate medical education or training, also meets the requirements of section 212(j), and the
alien spouse and minor children of any such alien if accompanying him or following to join him;

(K) 3bb/ subject to subsections (d) and (p) of section 214, an alien who-

(i) is the fiancee or fiance of a citizen of the United States 3bb/ (other than a citizen described in
section 204(a)(l)(A)(viii)(I)) and who seeks to enter the United States solely to conclude a valid
marriage with the petitioner within ninety days after admission;
5 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(ii) has concluded a valid marriage with a citizen of the United States 3bb/ (other than a citizen
described in section 204(a)(l)(A)(viii)(I)) who is the petitioner, is the beneficiary of a petition to
accord a status under section 201(b)(2)(A)(T) that was filed under section 204 by the petitioner, and
seeks to enter the United States to await the approval of such petition and the availability to the
alien of an immigrant visa; or

(iii) is the minor child of an alien described in clause (i) or (ii) and is accompanying, or following to
join, the alien;
(L) 3c/ subject to section 214(c)(2), an alien who, within 3 years preceding the time of his
application for admission into the United States, has been employed continuously for one year by a
firm or corporation or other legal entity or an affiliate or subsidiary thereof and who seeks to enter
the United States temporarily in order to continue to render his services to the same employer or a
subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a capacity that is managerial, executive, or involves specialized
knowledge, and the alie n spouse and minor children of any such alien if accompanying him or
following to join him;

(M) (i) an alien having a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning
who seeks to enter the United States temporarily and solely for the purpose of pursuing a full
course of study at an established vocational or other recognized nonacademic institution (other
than in a language training program) in the United States particularly designated by him and
approved by the Attorney General, after consultation with the Secretary of Education, which
institution shall have agreed to report to the Attorney General the termination of attendance of each
nonimmigrant nonacademic student and if any such institution fails to make reports promptly the
approval shall be withdrawn,

(ii) 3d/the alien spouse and minor children of any alien described in clause (i) if accompanying or
following to join such an alien, and

{

(iii) 3d/an alien who is a national of Canada or Mexico, who maintains actual residence and place
of abode in the country of nationality, who is described in clause (i) except that the alien's course of
study may be full or part-time, and who commutes to the United States institution or place of study
from Canada or Mexico;
i

(N) (i) the parent of an alien accorded the status of special immigrant under paragraph (27)(l)(i) 4/
(or under analogous authority under paragraph (27)(L)), but only if and while the alien is a child, or

(ii) a child of such parent or of an alien accorded the status of a special immigrant under clause (ii),
(iii), or (iv) of paragraph (27)(l) 4/_(or under analogous authority under paragraph (27)(L));
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(O) an alien who:
(i) has extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business, or athletics which has been
demonstrated by sustained national or international acclaim or, with regard to motion picture and
television productions a demonstrated record of extraordinary achievement, and whose
achievements have been recognized in the field through extensive documentation, and seeks to
enter the United States to continue work in the area of extraordinary ability; or

(ii)(l) seeks to enter the United States temporarily and solely for the purpose of accompanying and
assisting in the artistic or athletic performance by an alien who is admitted under clause (i) for a
specific event or events,

(II) is an integral part of such actual performance,

(lll)(a) has critical skills and experience with such alien which are not of a general nature and which
cannot be performed by other individuals, or

(b) in the case of a motion picture or television production, has skills and experience with such
alien which are not of a general nature and which are critical either based on a pre-existing longstanding working relationship or, with respect to the specific production, because significant
production (including pre- and post-production work) will take place both inside and outside the
United States and the continuing participation of the alien is essential to the successful completion
of the production, and
(IV) has a foreign residence which the alien has no intention of abandoning; or
(iii) is the alien spouse or child of an alien described in clause (i) or (ii) and is accompanying, or
following to join, the alien;
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INA: ACT 201 - WORLDWIDE LEVEL OF IMMIGRATION
(b) Aliens Not Subject to Direct Numerical Limitations. - Aliens described in this subsection, who
are not subject to the worldwide levels or numerical limitations of subsection (a), are as follows:
(1) (A) Special immigrants described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of section 101(a)(27).
(B) Aliens who are admitted under section 207 or whose status is adjusted under section 209 .
(C) Aliens whose status is adjusted to permanent residence under section 210 , or 245A .
(D) Aliens whose removal is canceled under section 240A(a).
(E) Aliens provided permanent resident status under section 249 .

I
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INA: ACT 212 - GENERAL CLASSES OF ALIENS INELIGIBLE TO RECEIVE VISAS AND
INELIGIBLE FOR ADMISSION; WAIVERS OF INADMISSIBILITY

Sec. 212. [8U.S.C. 1182]
(a) Classes of Aliens Ineligible for Visas or Admission.-Except as otherwise provided in this Act,
aliens who are inadmissible under the following paragraphs are ineligible to receive visas and
ineligible to be admitted to the United States:
(1) Health-related grounds.(A) In general.-Any alien(i) who is determined (in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services) to have a communicable disease of public health significance; \b[

(ii) 1/ except as provided in subparagraph (C) 1a/who seeks admission as an immigrant, or who
seeks adjustment of status to the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, and
who has failed to present documentation of having received vaccination against vaccinepreventable diseases, which shall include at least the following diseases: mumps, measles,
rubella, polio, tetanus and diphtheria toxoids, pertussis, influenza type B and hepatitis B, and any
other vaccinations against vaccine-pre ventable diseases recommended by the Advisory
Committee for Immunization Practices,

(iii) who is determined (in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services in consultation with the Attorney General)(I) to have a physical or mental disorder and behavior associated with the disorder that may pose,
or has posed, a threat to the property, safety, or welfare of the alien or others, or
(II) to have had a physical or mental disorder and a history of behavior associated with the
disorder, which behavior has posed a threat to the property, safety, or welfare of the alien or others
and which behavior is likely to recur or to lead to other harmful behavior, or
(iv) who is determined (in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services) to be a drug abuser or addict, is inadmissible.
(B) Waiver authorized.-For provision authorizing waiver of certain clauses of subparagraph (A), see
subsection (g).
(C) ^ E X C E P T I O N FROM IMMUNIZATION REQUIREMENT FOR ADOPTED CHILDREN 10
YEARS OF AGE OR YOUNGER.-Clause (ii) of subparagraph (A) shall not apply to a child who(i) is 10 years of age or younger,
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(ii) is described in section l O U b X l X F ) , and
(iii) is seeking an immigrant visa as an immediate relative under section 201(b), if, prior to the
admission of the child, an adoptive parent or prospective adoptive parent of the child, who has
sponsored the child for admission as an immediate relative, has executed an affidavit stating that
the parent is aware of the provisions of subparagraph (A)(ii) and will ensure that, within 30 days of
the child's admission, or at the earliest time that is medically appropriate, the child will receive the
vaccinations identified in such subparagraph.

(2) Criminal and related grounds.(A) Conviction of certain crimes.(i) In general.-Except as provided in clause (ii), any alien convicted of, or who admits having
committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of(I) a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense or an attempt or
conspiracy to commit such a crime), or
(II) a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United
States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the
Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)), is inadmissible.
(ii) Exception.-Clause (i)(l) shall not apply to an alien who committed only one crime if-

(I) the crime was committed when the alien was under 18 years of age, and the crime was
committed (and the alien released from any confinement to a prison or correctional institution
imposed for the crime) more than 5 years before the date of application for a visa or other
documentation and the date of application for admission to the United States, or
(II) the maximum penalty possible for the crime of which the alien was convicted (or which the alien
admits having committed or of which the acts that the alien admits having committed constituted
the essential elements) did not exceed imprisonment for one year and, if the alien was convicted of
such crime, the alien was not sentenced to a term of imprisonment in excess of 6 months
(regardless of the extent to which the sentence was ultimately executed).

<

(B) Multiple criminal convictions.-Any alien convicted of 2 or more offenses (other than purely
political offenses), regardless of whether the conviction was in a single trial or whether the offenses
arose from a single scheme of misconduct and regardless of whether the offenses involved moral
turpitude, for which the aggregate sentences to confinement 2/ were 5 years or more is
inadmissible.
(
(C) 2a/ CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE TRAFFICKERS- Any alien who the consular officer or the
Attorney General knows or has reason to believe10 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(i) is or has been an illicit trafficker in any controlled substance or in any listed chemical (as defined
in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)), or is or has been a knowing
aider, abettor, assister, conspirator, or colluder with others in the illicit trafficking in any such
controlled or listed substance or chemical, or endeavored to do so; or
(ii) is the spouse, son, or daughter of an alien inadmissible under clause (i), has, within the
previous 5 years, obtained any financial or other benefit from the illicit activity of that alien, and
knew or reasonably should have known that the financial or other benefit was the product of such
illicit activity, is inadmissaible.

(D) Prostitution and commercialized vice.-Any alien who-

(i) is coming to the United States solely, principally, or incidentally to engage in prostitution, or has
engaged in prostitution within 10 years of the date of application for a visa, admission, or
adjustment of status,
(ii) directly or indirectly procures or attempts to procure, or (within 10 years of the date of
application for a visa, admission, or adjustment of status) procured or attempted to procure or to
import, prostitutes or persons for the purpose of prostitution, or receives or (within such 10- year
period) received, in whole or in part, the proceeds of prostitution, or
(iii) is coming to the United States to engage in any other unlawful commercialized vice, whether or
not related to prostitution, is inadmissible.
(E) Certain aliens involved in serious criminal activity who have asserted immunity from
prosecution.-Any alien(i) who has committed in the United States at any time a serious criminal offense (as defined in
section 101(h)),
(ii) for whom immunity from criminal jurisdiction was exercised with respect to that offense,
(iii) who as a consequence of the offense and exercise of immunity has departed from the United
States, and
(iv) who has not subsequently submitted fully to the jurisdiction of the court in the United States
having jurisdiction with respect to that offense, is inadmissible.
(F) Waiver authorized.-For provision authorizing waiver of certain subparagraphs of this paragraph,
see subsection (h).

(G) 2b/ 2c/ FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WHO HAVE COMMITTED
PARTICULARLY SEVERE VIOLATIONS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM- Any alien who, while
serving as a foreign government official, was responsible for or directly carried out, at any time,
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particularly severe violations of religious freedom, as defined in section 3 of the International
Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (22 U.S.C. 6402), is inadmissible.

(H) 2bb_/ SIGNIFICANT TRAFFICKERS IN PERSONS-

(i) IN GENERAL- Any alien who commits or conspires to commit human trafficking offenses in the
United States or outside the United States , 42/or who the consular officer, the Secretary of
Homeland Security, the Secretary of State, 42/or the Attorney General knows or has reason to
believe is or has been a knowing aider, abettor, assister, conspirator, or colluder with such a
trafficker in severe forms of trafficking in persons, as defined in the section 103 of such Act, is
inadmissible.

(ii) BENEFICIARIES OF TRAFFICKING- Except as provided in clause (iii), any alien who the
consular officer or the Attorney General knows or has reason to believe is the spouse, or daughter
of an alien inadmissible under clause (i), has, within the previous 5 years, obtained any financial or
other benefit from the illicit activity of that alien, and knew or reasonably should have known that
the financial or other benefit was the product of such illicit activity, is inadmissible.

(iii) EXCEPTION FOR CERTAIN SONS AND DAUGHTERS- Clause (ii) shall not apply to a son or
daughter who was a child at the time he or she received the benefit described in such clause.

(I) 2bbb/ MONEY LAUNDERING- Any alien-

(i) who a consular officer or the Attorney General knows, or has reason to believe, has engaged, is
engaging, or seeks to enter the United States to engage, in an offense which is described in
section 1956 or 1957 of title 18, United States Code (relating to laundering of monetary
instruments); or

(ii) who a consular officer or the Attorney General knows is, or has been, a knowing aider, abettor,
assister, conspirator, or colluder with others in an offense which is described in such section; is
inadmissible.
(
(3) Security and related grounds.(A) In general.-Any alien who a consular officer or the Attorney General knows, or has reasonable
ground to believe, seeks to enter the United States to engage solely, principally, or incidentally in(i) any activity (I) to violate any law of the United States relating to espionage or sabotage or (II) to
violate or evade any law prohibiting the export from the United States of goods, technology, or
sensitive information,
12 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(ii) any other unlawful activity, or
(iii) any activity a purpose of which is the opposition to, or the control or overthrow of, the
Government of the United States by force, violence, or other unlawful means, is inadmissible.
(B) Terrorist activities-

(i) 3/4/4a/IN GENERAL-Any alien who-

(I) has engaged in a terrorist activity,

(II) a consular officer, the Attorney General, or the Secretary of Homeland Security knows, or has
reasonable ground to believe, is engaged in or is likely to engage after entry in any terrorist activity
(as defined in clause (iv));

(III) has, under circumstances indicating an intention to cause death or serious bodily harm, incited
terrorist activity;

(IV) is a representative (as defined in clause (v)) of--

(aa) a terrorist organization (as defined in clause (vi)); or

(bb) a political, social, or other group that endorses or espouses terrorist activity;

(V) is a member of a terrorist organization described in subclause (I) or (II) of clause (vi);

(VI) is a member of a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(lll), unless the alien can
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the alien did not know, and should not
reasonably have known, that the organization was a terrorist organization;
(VII) endorses or espouses terrorist activity or persuades others to endorse or espouse terrorist
activity or support a terrorist organization;
(VIII) has received military-type training (as defined in section 2339D(c)(1) of title 18, United States
Code) from or on behalf of any organization that, at the time the training was received, was a
terrorist organization (as defined in clause (vi)); or
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(IX) is the spouse or child of an alien who is inadmissible under this subparagraph, if the activity
causing the alien to be found inadmissible occurred within the last 5 years, is inadmissible.

4/ (ii) EXCEPTION- Subclause (IX) 4d/ of claused) does not apply to a spouse or child-

(I) who did not know or should not reasonably have known of the activity causing the alien to be
found inadmissible under this section; or

(II) whom the consular officer or Attorney General has reasonable grounds to believe has renounced
the activity causing the alien to be found inadmissible under this section.

4/_(iii) TERRORIST ACTIVITY DEFINED.-As used in this Act, the term "terrorist activity" means
any activity which is unlawful under the laws of the place where it is committed (or which, if 4/jt
had been committed in the United States, would be unlawful under the laws of the United States or
any State) and which involves any of the following:

(I) The highjacking or sabotage of any conveyance (including an aircraft, vessel, or vehicle).

(II) The seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or continue to detain, another individual
in order to compel a third person (including a governmental organization) to do or abstain from
doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the individual seized or detained.

(Ill) A violent attack upon an internationally protected person (as defined in section 1116(b)(4) of
title 18, United States Code) or upon the liberty of such a person.

(IV) An assassination.

(V) The use of anyi

(aa) biological agent, chemical agent, or nuclear weapon or device, or

(bb) explosive, 4/_firearm, or other weapon or dangerous device (other than for mere personal
monetary gain), with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or more individuals
or to cause substantial damage to property.
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(VI) A threat, attempt, or conspiracy to do any of the foregoing.

(iv) 4/ 4b/ ENGAGE IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY DEFINED- As used in this chapter, the term
"engage in terrorist activity" means, in an individual capacity or as a member of an organization-

(I) to commit or to incite to commit, under circumstances indicating an intention to cause death or
serious bodily injury, a terrorist activity;

(II) to prepare or plan a terrorist activity;

(III) to gather information on potential targets for terrorist activity;

(IV) to solicit funds or other things of value for-

(aa) a terrorist activity;

(bb) a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(l) or (vi)(ll); or

(cc) a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(lll), unless the solicitor can demonstrate by
clear and convincing evidence that he did not know, and should not reasonably have known, that
the organization was a terrorist organization;
(V) to solicit any individual—

(aa) to engage in conduct otherwise described in this subsection;

(bb) for membership in a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(l) or (vi)(ll); or

(cc) for membership in a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(lll) unless the solicitor can
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he did not know, and should not reasonably
have known, that the organization was a terrorist organization; or

(VI) to commit an act that the actor knows, or reasonably should know, affords material support,
including a safe house, transportation, communications, funds, transfer of funds or other material
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financial benefit, false documentation or identification, weapons (including chemical, biological, or
radiological weapons), explosives, or training--

(aa) for the commission of a terrorist activity;

(bb) to any individual who the actor knows, or reasonably should know, has committed or plans to
commit a terrorist activity;

(cc) to a terrorist organization described in subclause (I) or (II) of clause (vi) or to any member of
such an organization; or

(dd) to a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(lll), or to any member of such an
organization, unless the actor can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the actor did
not know, and should not reasonably have known, that the organization was a terrorist
organization.

5/_(v) REPRESENTATIVE DEFINED.-As used in this paragraph, the term "representative" includes
an officer, official, or spokesman of an organization, and any person who directs, counsels,
commands, or induces an organization or its members to engage in terrorist activity.

(vi) 5a/4c TERRORIST ORGANIZATION DEFINED- As used in this section, the term 'terrorist
organization' means an organization-

(I) designated under section 219 ;

(II) otherwise designated, upon publication in the Federal Register, by the Secretary of State in
consultation with or upon the request of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland
Security, as a terrorist organization, after finding that the organization engages in the activities
described in subclauses (I) through (VI) of clause (iv); or
(III) that is a group of two or more individuals, whether organized or not, which engages in, or has a
subgroup which engages in, the activities described in subclauses (I) through (VI) of clause (iv).

(C) Foreign policy.(i) In general.-An alien whose entry or proposed activities in the United States the Secretary of
State has reasonable ground to believe would have potentially serious adverse foreign policy
consequences for the United States is inadmissible.
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(ii) Exception for officials.-An alien who is an official of a foreign government or a purported
government, or who is a candidate for election to a foreign government office during the period
immediately preceding the election for that office, shall not be excludable or subject to restrictions
or conditions on entry into the United States under clause (i) solely because of the alien's past,
current, or expected beliefs, statements, or associations, if such beliefs, statements, or
associations wo uld be lawful within the United States.
(iii) Exception for other aliens.-An alien, not described in clause (ii), shall not be excludable or
subject to restrictions or conditions on entry into the United States under clause (i) because of the
alien's past, current, or expected beliefs, statements, or associations, if such beliefs, statements, or
associations would be lawful within the United States, unless the Secretary of State personally
determines that the alien's admission would compromise a compelling United States foreign policy
interest.
(iv) Notification of determinations.-If a determination is made under clause (iii) with respect to an
alien, the Secretary of State must notify on a timely basis the chairmen of the Committees on the
Judiciary and Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and of the Committees on the
Judiciary and Foreign Relations of the Senate of the identity of the alien and the reasons for the
determination.
(D) Immigrant membership in totalitarian party.(i) In general.-Any immigrant who is or has been a member of or affiliated with the Communist or
any other totalitarian party (or subdivision or affiliate thereof), domestic or foreign, is inadmissible.
(ii) Exception for involuntary membership.-Clause (i) shall not apply to an alien because of
membership or affiliation if the alien establishes to the satisfaction of the consular officer when
applying for a visa (or to the satisfaction of the Attorney General when applying for admission) that
the membership or affiliation is or was involuntary, or is or was solely when under 16 years of age,
by operation of law, or for purposes of obtaining employment, food rations, or other essentials of
living and whethe r necessary for such purposes.
(iii) Exception for past membership.-Clause (i) shall not apply to an alien because of membership
or affiliation if the alien establishes to the satisfaction of the consular officer when applying for a
visa (or to the satisfaction of the Attorney General when applying for admission) that-

(I) the membership or affiliation terminated at least-

(aa) 2 years before the date of such application, or

(bb) 5 years before the date of such application, in the case of an alien whose membership or
affiliation was with the party controlling the government of a foreign state that is a totalitarian
dictatorship as of such date, and
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(II) the alien is not a threat to the security of the United States.

(iv) Exception for close family members.-The Attorney General may, in the Attorney General's
discretion, waive the application of clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the parent, spouse,
son, daughter, brother, or sister of a citizen of the United States or a spouse, son, or daughter of
an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence for humanitarian purposes, to assure family
unity, or when it is otherwise in the public interest if the immigrant is not a threat to the security of
the United States.

(E) 5aaa/PARTICIPANTS IN NAZI PERSECUTION, GENOCIDE, OR THE COMMISSION OF
ANY ACT OF TORTURE OR EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLING
(i) Participation in nazi persecutions.-Any alien who, during the period beginning on March 23,
1933, and ending on May 8, 1945, under the direction of, or in association with(I) the Nazi government of Germany,
(II) any government in any area occupied by the military forces of the Nazi government of
Germany,
(III) any government established with the assistance or cooperation of the Nazi government of
Germany, or
(IV) any government which was an ally of the Nazi government of Germany, ordered, incited,
assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person because of race, religion,
national origin, or political opinion is inadmissible.
(ii) Participation in genocide.-Any alien who 5aaa/ ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise
participated 5ab/ in genocide, as defined in section 1091(a) of title 18, United States Code, is
inadmissible.
(iii) 5aaa/ COMMISSION OF ACTS OF TORTURE OR EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS- Any
alien who, outside the United States, has committed, ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise
participated in the commission of-(I) any act of torture, as defined in section 2340 of title 18, United States Code; or
(II) under color of law of any foreign nation, any extrajudicial killing, as defined in section 3(a) of
the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (28 U.S.C. 1350 note), is inadmissible.

5aa/ (F) ASSOCIATION WITH TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS- Any alien who the Secretary of
State, after consultation with the Attorney General, or the Attorney General, after consultation with
the Secretary of State, determines has been associated with a terrorist organization and intends
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while in the United States to engage solely, principally, or incidentally in activities that could
endanger the welfare, safety, or security of the United States is inadmissible.

(G) 41/RECRUITMENT OR USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS- Any alien who has engaged in the
recruitment or use of child soldiers in violation of section 2442 of title 18, United States Code, is
inadmissible.

(4) Public charge.-

(A) In general.-Any alien who, in the opinion of the consular officer at the time of application for a
visa, or in the opinion of the Attorney General at the time of application for admission or adjustment
of status, is likely at any time to become a public charge is inadmissible. 6/

(B) Factors to be taken into account.- (i) In determining whether an alien is excludable under this
paragraph, the consular officer or the Attorney General shall at a minimum consider the alien's-

(I) age;

(II) health;

(III) family status;

(IV) assets, resources, and financial status; and

(V) education and skills
(ii) In addition to the factors under clause (i), the consular officer or the Attorney General may also
consider any affidavit of support under section 213Afor purposes of exclusion under this
paragraph.
(C) Family-Sponsored immigrants.-Any alien who seeks admission or adjustment of status under a
visa issued under section 201(b)(2) or 203(a) is excludable under this paragraph unless(i) the alien has obtained(I) status as a spouse or a child of a United States citizen pursuant to clause (ii), (iii), or (iv) or
section 204(a)(1)(A), or

(II) classification pursuant to clause (ii) or (iii) of section 204(a)(1)(B); 6aa/
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(Ill) 6aa/ classification or status as a VAWA self-petitioner; or

(ii) the person petitioning for the alien's admission 6a/ (and any additional sponsor required under
section 213A(f) or any alternative sponsor permitted under paragraph (5)(B) of such section) has
executed an affidavit of support described in section 213A with respect to such alien.

(D) Certain employment-based immigrants.-Any alien who seeks admission or adjustment of status
under a visa number issued under section 203(b) by virtue of a classification petition filed by a
relative of the alien (or by an entity in which such relative has a significant ownership interest) is
excludable under this paragraph unless such relative has executed an affidavit of support
described in section 213A with respect to such alien.
(5) Labor certification and qualifications for certain immigrants.(A) Labor certification.(i) In general.-Any alien who seeks to enter the United States for the purpose of performing skilled
or unskilled labor is inadmissible, unless the Secretary of Labor has determined and certified to the
Secretary of State and the Attorney General that(I) there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified (or equally qualified in the case of
an alien described in clause (ii)) and available at the time of application for a visa and admission to
the United States and at the place where the alien is to perform such skilled or unskilled labor, and
(II) the employment of such alien will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of
workers in the United States similarly employed.
(ii) Certain aliens subject to special rule.-For purposes of clause (i)(l), an alien described in this
clause is an alien who(I) is a member of the teaching profession, or
(II) has exceptional ability in the sciences or the arts,
(iii) ^ P R O F E S S I O N A L A T H L E T E S -

(I) In general.-A certification made under clause (i) with respect to a professional athlete shall
remain valid with respect to the athlete after the athlete changes employer, if the new employer is a
team in the same sport as the team which employed the athlete when the athlete first applied for
certification.
(II) Definition.-For purposes of subclause (I), the term "professional athlete" means an individual
who is employed as an athlete byDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
20 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(aa) a team that is a member of an association of 6 or more professional sports teams whose total
combined revenues exceed $10,000,000 per year, if the association governs the conduct of its
members and regulates the contests and exhibitions in which its member teams regularly engage;
or
(bb) any minor league team that is affiliated with such an association.

(iv) 7/.LONG D E L A Y E D A D J U S T M E N T A P P L I C A N T S - A certification made under clause (i) with
respect to an individual whose petition is covered by section 204(j) shall remain valid with respect
to a new job accepted by the individual after the individual changes jobs or employers if the new
job is in the same or a similar occupational classification as the job for which the certification was
issued.

(B) Unqualified physicians.-An alien who is a graduate of a medical school not accredited by a
body or bodies approved for the purpose by the Secretary of Education (regardless of whether
such school of medicine is in the United States) and who is coming to the United States principally
to perform services as a member of the medical profession is inadmissible, unless the alien (i) has
passed parts I and II of the National Board of Medical Examiners Examination (or an equivalent
examination as dete rmined by the Secretary of Health and Human Services) and (ii) is competent
in oral and written English. For purposes of the previous sentence, an alien who is a graduate of a
medical school shall be considered to have passed parts I and II of the National Board of Medical
Examiners if the alien was fully and permanently licensed to practice medicine in a State on
January 9, 1978, and was practicing medicine in a State on that date.
(C) Uncertified foreign health-care workers 7a/ Subject to subsection (r), any alien who seeks to
enter the United States for the purpose of performing labor as a health-care worker, other than a
physician, is excludable unless the alien presents to the consular officer, or, in the case of an
adjustment of status, the Attorney General, a certificate from the Commission on Graduates of
Foreign Nursing Schools, or a certificate from an equivalent independent credentialing organization
approved by the Attorney General in consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, verifying that(i) the alien's education, training, license, and experience(I) meet all applicable statutory and regulatory requirements for entry into the United States under
the classification specified in the application;
(II) are comparable with that required for an American health-care worker of the same type; and

(III) are authentic and, in the case of a license, unencumbered;

(ii) the alien has the level of competence in oral and written English considered by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services, in consultation with the Secretary of Education, to be appropriate for
health care work of the kind in which the alien will be engaged, as shown by an appropriate score
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
21 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

on one or more nationally recognized, commercially available, standardized assessments of the
applicant's ability to speak and write; and
(iii) if a majority of States licensing the profession in which the alien intends to work recognize a
test predicting the success on the profession's licensing or certification examination, the alien has
passed such a test, or has passed such an examination.
For purposes of clause (ii), determination of the standardized tests required and of the minimum
scores that are appropriate are within the sole discretion of the Secretary of Health and Human
Services and are not subject to further administrative or judicial review.
(D) Application of grounds.-The grounds of inadmissibility of aliens under subparagraphs (A) and
(B) shall apply to immigrants seeking admission or adjustment of status under paragraph (2) or (3)
of section 203(b).
(6) Illegal entrants and immigration violators.(A) 8LALIENS PRESENT WITHOUT admission or parole.(i) In general.-An alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who
arrives in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General,
is inadmissible.
(ii) Exception for certain battered women and children.-Clause (i) shall not apply to an alien who
demonstrates that-

(I) the alien is a VAWA self-petitioner; 6aa/

(H)(3) the alien has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by a spouse or parent, or by a
member of the spouse's or parent's family residing in the same household as the alien and the
spouse or parent consented or acquiesced to such battery or cruelty, or (b) the alien's child has
been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by a spouse or parent of the alien (without the active
participation of the alien in the battery or cruelty) or by a member of the spouse's or parent's family
resi ding in the same household as the alien when the spouse or parent consented to or
acquiesced in such battery or cruelty and the alien did not actively participate in such battery or
cruelty, and
(III) there was a substantial connection between the battery or cruelty described in subclause (I) or
(II) and the alien's unlawful entry into the United States.
(B) Failure to attend removal proceeding.-Any alien who without reasonable cause fails or refuses
to attend or remain in attendance at a proceeding to determine the alien's inadmissibility or
deportability and who seeks admission to the United States within 5 years of such alien's
subsequent departure or removal is inadmissible.
(C) Misrepresentation.(i) In general.-Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure
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(or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the
United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.
(ii) 9/FALSELY CLAIMING CITIZENSHIP-

(I) IN GENERAL- Any alien who falsely represents, or has falsely represented, himself or herself to
be a citizen of the United States for any purpose or benefit under this Act (including section 274A)
or any other Federal or State law is inadmissible.

(II) EXCEPTION- In the case of an alien making a representation described in subclause (I), if each
natural parent of the alien (or, in the case of an adopted alien, each adoptive parent of the alien) is
or was a citizen (whether by birth or naturalization), the alien permanently resided in the United
States prior to attaining the age of 16, and the alien reasonably believed at the time of making such
representation that he or she was a citizen, the alien shall not be considered to be inadmissible
under any provision of this subsection based on such representation.
(iii) Waiver authorized.-For provision authorizing waiver of clause (i), see subsection (I).
(D) Stowaways.-Any alien who is a stowaway is inadmissible.

(E) Smugglers.-

(i) In general.-Any alien who at any time knowingly has encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or
aided any other alien to enter or to try to enter the United States in violation of law is inadmissible.
(ii) Special rule in the case of family reunification.-Clause (i) shall not apply in the case of alien who
is an eligible immigrant (as defined in section 301(b)(1) of the Immigration Act of 1990), was
physically present in the United States on May 5, 1988, and is seeking admission as an immediate
relative or under section 203(a)(2) (including under section 112 of the Immigration Act of 1990) or
benefits under section 301(a) of the Immigration Act of 1990 if the alien, before May 5, 1988, has
encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided only the alien's spouse, parent, son, or daughter
(and no other individual) to enter the United States in violation of law.
(iii) Waiver authorized.-For provision authorizing waiver of clause (i), see subsection (d)(11).
(F) Subject of civil penalty.(i) In general.-An alien who is the subject of a final order for violation of section 274C is
inadmissible.
(ii) Waiver authorized.-For provision authorizing waiver of clause (i), see subsection (d)(12). 10/
(G) Student visa abusers.-An alien who obtains the status of a nonimmigrant under section
23 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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101(a)(15)(F)(i) and who violates a term or condition of such status under section 214(1) is
excludable until the alien has been outside the United States for a continuous period of 5 years
after the date of the violation. 11/
(7) Documentation requirements.-

(A) Immigrants.(i) In general.-Except as otherwise specifically provided in this Act, any immigrant at the time of
application for admission-

(I) who is not in possession of a valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry permit, border crossing
identification card, or other valid entry document required by this Act, and a valid unexpired
passport, or other suitable travel document, or document of identity and nationality if such
document is required under the regulations issued by the Attorney General under section 211(a),
or
(II) whose visa has been issued without compliance with the provisions of section 203, is
inadmissible.
(ii) Waiver authorized.-For provision authorizing waiver of clause (i), see subsection (k).
(B) Nonimmigrants.-

(i) In general.-Any nonimmigrant who-

(I) is not in possession of a passport valid for a minimum of six months from the date of the
expiration of the initial period of the alien's admission or contemplated initial period of stay
authorizing the alien to return to the country from which the alien came or to proceed to and enter
some other country during such period, or

(II) is not in possession of a valid nonimmigrant visa or border crossing identification card at the
time of application for admission, is inadmissible.
(ii) General waiver authorized.-For provision authorizing waiver of clause (i), see subsection (d)(4).

(iii) GUAM AND NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS VISA WAIVER- For provision authorizing
waiver of clause (i) in the case of visitors to Guam or the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
Islands, see subsection (1). 38/
(iv) VISA WAIVER 11a/PROGRAM.-For authority to waive the requirement of clause (i) under a
11a/program, see section 217 .
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(8) Ineligible for citizenship.(A) In general.-Any immigrant who is permanently ineligible to citizenship is inadmissible.
(B) Draft evaders.-Any person who has departed from or who has remained outside the United
States to avoid or evade training or service in the armed forces in time of war or a period declared
by the President to be a national emergency is inadmissible, except that this subparagraph shall
not apply to an alien who at the time of such departure was a nonimmigrant and who is seeking to
reenter the United States as a nonimmigrant.
(9) 12/ALIENS PREVIOUSLY REMOVED.(A) Certain aliens previously removed.(i) Arriving aliens.-Any alien who has been ordered removed under section 235(b)(1) or at the end
of proceedings under section 240 initiated upon the alien's arrival in the United States and who
again seeks admission within 5 years of the date of such removal (or within 20 years in the case of
a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated
felony) is inadmissible.
(ii) Other aliens.-Any alien not described in clause (i) who(I) has been ordered removed under section 240 or any other provision of law, or
(II) departed the United States while an order of removal was outstanding, and who seeks
admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal (or within 20 years of
such date in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an alien
convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.
(iii) Exception.-Clauses (i) and (ii) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission within a period if,
prior to the date of the alien's reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be
admitted from foreign contiguous territory, the Attorney General has consented to the alien's
reapplying for admission.
(B) 13/ALIENS UNLAWFULLY PRESENT.(i) In general.-Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who(I) was unlawfully present in the United States for a period of more than 180 days but less than 1
year, voluntarily departed the United States (whether or not pursuant to section 244(e)) prior to the
commencement of proceedings under section 235(b)(1) or section 240 , and again seeks
admission within 3 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal, or
(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks
admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States,is
inadmissible.
(ii) Construction of unlawful presence.-For purposes of this paragraph, an alien is deemed to be
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unlawfully present in the United States if the alien is present in the United States after the
expiration of the period of stay authorized by the Attorney General or is present in the United
States without being admitted or paroled.
(iii) Exceptions.(I) Minors.-No period of time in which an alien is under 18 years of age shall be taken into account
in determining the period of unlawful presence in the United States under clause (I).
(II) Asylees.-No period of time in which an alien has a bona fide application for asylum pending
under section 208 shall be taken into account in determining the period of unlawful presence in the
United States under clause (i) unless the alien during such period was employed without
authorization in the United States.
(III) Family unity.-No period of time in which the alien is a beneficiary of family unity protection
pursuant to section 301 of the Immigration Act of 1990 14/shall be taken into account in
determining the period of unlawful presence in the United States under clause (I).
(IV) Battered women and children.-Clause (i) shall not apply to an alien who would be described in
paragraph (6)(A)(ii) if "violation of the terms of the alien's nonimmigrant visa" were substituted for
"unlawful entry into the United States" in subclause (III) of that paragraph.

(V) 13a/VICTIMS OF A SEVERE FORM OF TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS- Clause (i) shall not
apply to an alien who demonstrates that the severe form of trafficking (as that term is defined in
section 103 of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7102)) was at least one
central reason for the alien's unlawful presence in the United States.

(iv) Tolling for good cause.-In the case of an alien who(I) has been lawfully admitted or paroled into the United States,
(II) has filed a nonfrivolous application for a change or extension of status before the date of
expiration of the period of stay authorized by the Attorney General, and
(III) has not been employed without authorization in the United States before or during the
pendency of such application,the calculation of the period of time specified in clause (i)(l) shall be
tolled during the pendency of such application, but not to exceed 120 days.
(v) Waiver.-The Attorney General has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant
who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the refusal
of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully
resident spouse or parent of such alien. No court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision or
action by the Attorney General regarding a waiver under this clause.
(C) Aliens unlawfully present after previous immigration violations.Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(i) In general.-Any alien who(I) has been unlawfully present in the United States for an aggregate period of more than 1 year, or
(II) has been ordered removed under section 235(b)(1), section 240 , or any other provision of law,
and who enters or attempts to reenter the United States without being admitted is inadmissible.

(ii) Exception.-Clause (i) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission more than 10 years after the
date of the alien's last departure from the United States if, prior to the alien's reembarkation at a
place outside the United States or attempt to be readmitted from a foreign contiguous territory, 14a/
6aa/ the Secretary of Homeland Security has consented to the alien's reapplying for admission.

(iii) 6aa/ WAIVER- The Secretary of Homeland Security may waive the application of clause (i) in
the case of an alien who is a VAWA self-petitioner if there is a connection between-

(I) the alien's battering or subjection to extreme cruelty; and

(II) the alien's removal, departure from the United States, reentry or reentries into the United States;
or attempted reentry into the United States.

(10) 15/MISCELLANEOUS.(A) Practicing polygamists.-Any immigrant who is coming to the United States to practice polygamy
is inadmissible.
(B) Guardian required to accompany helpless alien.-Any alien-

(i) who is accompanying another alien who is inadmissible and who is certified to be helpless from
sickness, mental or physical disability, or infancy pursuant to section 232(c), and
(ii) whose protection or guardianship is determined to be required by the alien described in clause
(I), is inadmissible. IjS/

(C) International child abduction.-

(i) In general.-Except as provided in clause (ii), any alien who, after entry of an order by a court in
the United States granting custody to a person of a United States citizen child who detains or
retains the child, or withholds custody of the child, outside the United States from the person
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granted custody by that order, is inadmissible until the child is surrendered to the person granted
custody by that order.
16a/ (ii) ALIENS SUPPORTING ABDUCTORS AND RELATIVES OF ABDUCTORS. - Any alien
who~
(I) is known by the Secretary of State to have intentionally assisted an alien in the conduct
described in clause (i),
(II) is known by the Secretary of State to be intentionally providing material support or safe haven
to an alien described in clause (i), or
(III) is a spouse (other than the spouse who is the parent of the abducted child), child (other than
the abducted child), parent, sibling, or agent of an alien described in clause (i), if such person has
been designated by the Secretary of State at the Secretary's sole and unreviewable discretion, is
inadmissible until the child described in clause (i) is surrendered to the person granted custody by
the order described in that clause, and such person and child are permitted to return to the United
States or such person's place of residence.
(iii) EXCEPTIONS. - Clauses (i) and (ii) shall not apply(I) to a government official of the United States who is acting within the scope of his or her official
duties;

(II) to a government official of any foreign government if the official has been designated by the
Secretary of State at the Secretary's sole and unreviewable discretion; or
(III) so long as the child is located in a foreign state that is a party to the Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction, done at The Hague on October 25, 1980.
(D) 17/UNLAWFUL VOTERS-

(i) IN GENERAL- Any alien who has voted in violation of any Federal, State, or local constitutional
provision, statute, ordinance, or regulation is inadmissible.

(ii) EXCEPTION- In the case of an alien who voted in a Federal, State, or local election (including
an initiative, recall, or referendum) in violation of a lawful restriction of voting to citizens, if each
natural parent of the alien (or, in the case of an adopted alien, each adoptive parent of the alien) is
or was a citizen (whether by birth or naturalization), the alien permanently resided in the United
States prior to attaining the age of 16, and the alien reasonably believed at the time of such violatio
n that he or she was a citizen, the alien shall not be considered to be inadmissible under any
provision of this subsection based on such violation.
(
(E) Former citizens who renounced citizenship to avoid taxation.-Any alien who is a former citizen
of the United States who officially renounces United States citizenship and who is determined by
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the Attorney General to have renounced United States citizenship for the purpose of avoiding
taxation by the United States is excludable. 18/
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INA: ACT 236 - APPREHENSION AND DETENTION OF ALIENS

(c) Detention of Criminal Aliens.-

(1) Custody.-The Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who-

(A) is inadmissible by reason of having committed any offense covered in section 212(a)(2),

(B) is deportable by reason of having committed any offense covered in section 237(a)(2)(A)(ii)
(A)(iii),(B),(C),or(D),

(C) is deportable under section 237(a)(2)(A)(i) on the basis of an offense for which the alien has
been sentence 2/to a term of imprisonment of at least 1 year, or

(D) is inadmissible under section 212(a)(3)(B) or deportable under section 237(a)(4)(B), when the
alien is released, without regard to whether the alien is released on parole, supervised release, or
probation, and without regard to whether the alien may be arrested or imprisoned again for the
same offense.

(2) Release.-The Attorney General may release an alien described in paragraph (1) only if the
Attorney General decides pursuant to section 3521 of title 18, United States Code, that release of
the alien from custody is necessary to provide protection to a witness, a potential witness, a person
cooperating with an investigation into major criminal activity, or an immediate family member or
close associate of a witness, potential witness, or person cooperating with such an investigation,
and the alien satisfies the Attorney General that the alien will not pose a danger to the safety of
other persons or of property and is likely to appear for any scheduled proceeding. A decision
relating to such release shall take place in accordance with a procedure that considers the severity
of the offense committed by the alien.
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INA: ACT 237 - GENERAL CLASSES OF DEPORTABLE ALIENS

Sec. 237 1/J8U.S.C. 1227]
(a) Classes of Deportable Aliens.-Any alien (including an alien crewman) in and admitted to the
United States shall, upon the order of the Attorney General, be removed if the alien is within one or
more of the following classes of deportable aliens:
(1) Inadmissible at time of entry or of adjustment of status or violates status.(A) Inadmissible aliens.-Any alien who at the time of entry or adjustment of status was within one or
more of the classes of aliens inadmissible by the law existing at such time is deportable.

(B) 2/ Present in violation of law.-Any alien who is present in the United States in violation of this
Act or any other law of the 2b/ United States, or whose nonimmigrant visa (or other documentation
authorizing admission into the United States as a nonimmigrant) has been revoked under section
221(i), is deportable.
(C) Violated nonimmigrant status or condition of entry.-

(i) Nonimmigrant status violators.-Any alien who was admitted as a nonimmigrant and who has
failed to maintain the nonimmigrant status in which the alien was admitted or to which it was
changed under section 248 , or to comply with the conditions of any such status, is deportable.
(ii) Violators of conditions of entry.-Any alien whom the Secretary of Health and Human Services
certifies has failed to comply with terms, conditions, and controls that were imposed under section
212(g) is deportable.

(D) Termination of conditional permanent residence.-

(i) In general.-Any alien with permanent resident status on a conditional basis under section 216
(relating to conditional permanent resident status for certain alien spouses and sons and
daughters) or under section 216A (relating to conditional permanent resident status for certain
alien entrepreneurs, spouses, and children) who has had such status terminated under such
respective section is deportable.

(ii) Exception.-Clause (i) shall not apply in the cases described in section 216(c)(4) (relating to
certain hardship waivers).
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(i) In general.-Any alien who (prior to the date of entry, at the time of any entry, or within 5 years of
the date of any entry) knowingly has encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided any other
alien to enter or to try to enter the United States in violation of law is deportable.
(ii) Special rule in the case of family reunification.-Clause (i) shall not apply in the case of alien who
is an eligible immigrant (as defined in section 301(b)(1) of the Immigration Act of 1990), was
physically present in the United States on May 5, 1988, and is seeking admission as an immediate
relative or under section 203(a)(2) (including under section 112 of the Immigration Act of 1990) or
benefits under section 301 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1990 if the alien, before May 5, 1988, has
en couraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided only the alien's spouse, parent, son, or daughter
(and no other individual) to enter the United States in violation of law.

(iii) Waiver authorized.-The Attorney General may, in his discretion for humanitarian purposes, to
assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public interest, waive application of clause (i) in
the case of any alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if the alien has encouraged,
induced, assisted, abetted, or aided only an individual who at the time of the offense was 3/_the
alien's spouse, parent, son, or daughter (and no other individual) to enter the United States in
violation of law. 4/

(F) [repealed] 5/

(G) Marriage fraud.-An alien shall be considered to be deportable as having procured a visa or
other documentation by fraud (within the meaning of section 212(a)(6)(C)(i)) and to be in the
United States in violation of this Act (within the meaning of subparagraph (B)) if(i) the alien obtains any admission into the United States with an immigrant visa or other
documentation procured on the basis of a marriage entered into less than 2 years prior to such
entry of the alien and which, within 2 years subsequent to any admission of the alien in the United
States, shall be judicially annulled or terminated, unless the alien establishes to the satisfaction of
the Attorney General that such marriage was not contracted for the purpose of evading any
provisions of the imm igration laws, or

(ii) it appears to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the alien has failed or refused to fulfill
the alien's marital agreement which in the opinion of the Attorney General was made for the
purpose of procuring the alien's admission as an immigrant.

(H) WAIVER AUTHORIZED FOR CERTAIN MISREPRESENTATIONS. - The provisions of this
paragraph relating to the removal of aliens within the United States on the ground that they were
inadmissible at the time of admission as aliens described in section 212(a)(6)(C)(i), whether willful
or innocent, may, in the discretion of the Attorney General, be waived for any alien (other than an
alien described in paragraph (4)(D)) who-
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(i) 5a/(I) is the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen of the United States or of an alien
lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence; and

(II) 5a/was in possession of an immigrant visa or equivalent document and was otherwise
admissible to the United States at the time of such admission except for those grounds of
inadmissibility specified under paragraphs (5)(A) and (7)(A) of section 212(a) which were a direct
result of that fraud or misrepresentation.

(ii) 5a/_5aa/_is a VAWA self-petitioner.

A waiver of removal for fraud or misrepresentation granted under this subparagraph shall also
operate to waive removal based on the grounds of inadmissibility directly resulting from such fraud
or misrepresentation.

(2) Criminal offenses.-

(A) General crimes.-

(i) Crimes of moral turpitude.-Any alien who-

(I) is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years (or 10 years in the
case of an alien provided lawful permanent resident status under section 245(i)) after the date of
admission, and

(II) is convicted of a crime for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed.

is deportable

(ii) Multiple criminal convictions.-Any alien who at any time after admission is convicted of two or
more crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct,
regardless of whether confined therefor and regardless of whether the convictions were in a single
trial, is deportable.
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(iii) Aggravated felony.-Any alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after
admission is deportable.

(iv) High Speed Flight-Any alien who is convicted of a violation of section 758 of title 18, United
States Code, (relating to high speed flight from an immigration checkpoint) is deportable.

(v) 5b/_FAILURE TO REGISTER AS A SEX OFFENDER- Any alien who is convicted under
section 2250 of title 18, United States Code, is deportable.

(vi) 5b/_Waiver authorized.-Clauses (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) shall not apply in the case of an alien with
respect to a criminal conviction if the alien subsequent to the criminal conviction has been granted a
foil and unconditional pardon by the President of the United States or by the Governor of any of the
several States.

(B) Controlled substances.-

(i) Conviction.-Any alien who at any time after admission has been convicted of a violation of (or a
conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign
country relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances
Act (21 U.S.C. 802)), other than a single offense involving possession for one's own use of 30
grams or less of marijuana, is deportable.

(ii) Drug abusers and addicts.-Any alien who is, or at any time after admission has been, a drug
abuser or addict is deportable.

(C) Certain firearm offenses.-Any alien who at any time after admission is convicted under any law
of purchasing, selling, offering for sale, exchanging, using, owning, possessing, or carrying, or of
attempting or conspiring to purchase, sell, offer for sale, exchange, use, own, possess, or carry,
any weapon, part, or accessory which is a firearm or destructive device (as defined in section
921(a) of title 18, United States Code) in violation of any law is deportable.

(D) Miscellaneous crimes.-Any alien who at any time has been convicted (the judgment on such
conviction becoming final) of, or has been so convicted of a conspiracy or attempt to violate(i) any offense under chapter 37 (relating to espionage), chapter 105 (relating to sabotage), or
chapter 115 (relating to treason and sedition) of title 18, United States Code, for which a term of
imprisonment of five or more years may be imposed;

(ii) any offense under section 871 or 960 of title 18, United States Code;
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(iii) a violation of any provision of the Military Selective Service Act (50 U.S.C. App. 451 et seq.) or
the Trading With the Enemy Act (50 U.S.C. App. 1 et seq.); or

(iv) a violation of section 215 or 278 of this Act, is deportable.

(E) 6/_Crimes of Domestic violence, stalking, or violation of protection order, crimes against
children and.(i) Domestic violence, stalking, and child abuse.-Any alien who at any time after admission is
convicted of a crime of domestic violence, a crime of stalking, or a crime of child abuse, child
neglect, or child abandonment is deportable. For purposes of this clause, the term "crime of
domestic violence" means any crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of title 18, United States
Code) against a person committed by a current or former spouse of the person, by an individual
with whom the person shares a child in common, by an individual who is cohabiting with or has
cohabited with the person as a spouse, by an individual similarly situated to a spouse of the person
under the domestic or family violence laws of the jurisdiction where the offense occurs, or by any
other individual against a person who is protected from that individual's acts under the domestic or
family violence laws of the United States or any State, Indian tribal government, or unit of local
government.

(ii) Violators of protection orders.-Any alien who at any time after entry is enjoined under a
protection order issued by a court and whom the court determines has engaged in conduct that
violates the portion of a protection order that involves protection against credible threats of
violence, repeated harassment, or bodily injury to the person or persons for whom the protection
order was issued is deportable. For purposes of this clause, the term "protection order" means any
injunction issued fo r the purpose of preventing violent or threatening acts of domestic violence,
including temporary or final orders issued by civil or criminal courts (other than support or child
custody orders or provisions) whether obtained by filing an independent action or as a pendente
lite order in another proceeding.

(F) 13/TRAFFICKING- Any alien described in section 212(a)(2)(H) is deportable.

(3) Failure to register and falsification of documents.(A) Change of address.-An alien who has failed to comply with the provisions of section 265 is
deportable, unless the alien establishes to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that such failure
was reasonably excusable or was not willful.

(B) Failure to register or falsification of documents.- Any alien who at any time has been convictedDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
35 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(i) under section 266(c) of this Act or under section 36(c) of the Alien Registration Act, 1940,

(ii) of a violation of, or an attempt or a conspiracy to violate, any provision of the Foreign Agents
Registration Act of 1938 (22 U.S.C. 611 et seq.), or

(iii) of a violation of, or an attempt or a conspiracy to violate, section 1546 of title 18, United States
Code (relating to fraud and misuse of visas, permits, and other entry documents), is deportable.

(C) 7/_Document fraud.-

(i) In general.-An alien who is the subject of a final order for violation of section 274C is deportable.

(ii) Waiver authorized.-The Attorney General may waive clause (i) in the case of an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence if no previous civil money penalty was imposed against the alien
under section 274C and the offense was incurred solely to assist, aid, or support the alien's spouse
or child (and not another individual). No court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision of the
Attorney General to grant or deny a waiver under this clause.
(D) 8^FALSELY CLAIMING CITIZENSHIP-

(i) IN GENERAL- Any alien who falsely represents, or has falsely represented, himself to be a
citizen of the United States for any purpose or benefit under this Act (including section 274A) or
any Federal or State law is deportable.

(ii) EXCEPTION- In the case of an alien making a representation described in clause (i), if each
natural parent of the alien (or, in the case of an adopted alien, each adoptive parent of the alien) is
or was a citizen (whether by birth or naturalization), the alien permanently resided in the United
States prior to attaining the age of 16, and the alien reasonably believed at the time of making such
representation that he or she was a citizen, the alien shall not be considered to be deportable
under any prov ision of this subsection based on such representation.

(4) Security and related grounds.-

(A) In general.-Any alien who has engaged, is engaged, or at any time after admission engages in-

(i) any activity to violate any law of the United States relating to espionage or sabotage or to violate
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or evade any law prohibiting the export from the United States of goods, technology, or sensitive
information,

(ii) any other criminal activity which endangers public safety or national security, or

(iii) any activity a purpose of which is the opposition to, or the control or overthrow of, the
Government of the United States by force, violence, or other unlawful means, is deportable.

(B) 8a/11/TERRORIST ACTIVITIES- Any alien who is described in subparagraph (B) or (F) of
section 212(a)(3) is deportable.

(C) Foreign policy.-

(i) In general.-An alien whose presence or activities in the United States the Secretary of State has
reasonable ground to believe would have potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences
for the United States is deportable.

(ii) Exceptions.-The exceptions described in clauses (ii) and (iii) of section 212(a)(3)(C) shall apply
to deportability under clause (i) in the same manner as they apply to inadmissibility under section
212(a)(3)(C)(i).

(D) 8c/PARTICIPATED IN NAZI PERSECUTION, GENOCIDE, OR THE COMMISSION OF
ANY ACT OF TORTURE OR EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLING.-Any alien described in M d a u s e (i),
(ii), or (iii) of section 212(a)(3)(E) is deportable.

(E) 8b/ Repealed
(E) 8d/ PARTICIPATED IN THE COMMISSION OF SEVERE VIOLATIONS OF RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM- Any alien described in section 212(a)(2)(G) is deportable.

(F) 8e/RECRUITMENT OR USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS- Any alien who has engaged in the
recruitment or use of child soldiers in violation of section 2442 of title 18, United States Code, is
deportable.

(5) Public charge.-Any alien who, within five years after the date of entry; has become a public
charge from causes not affirmatively shown to have arisen since entry is deportable.
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(6) ^ U N L A W F U L VOTERS-

(A) IN GENERAL- Any alien who has voted in violation of any Federal, State, or local constitutional
provision, statute, ordinance, or regulation is deportable.

(B) EXCEPTION- In the case of an alien who voted in a Federal, State, or local election (including
an initiative, recall, or referendum) in violation of a lawful restriction of voting to citizens, if each
natural parent of the alien (or, in the case of an adopted alien, each adoptive parent of the alien) is
or was a citizen (whether by birth or naturalization), the alien permanently resided in the United
States prior to attaining the age of 16, and the alien reasonably believed at the time of such
violation that he or she was a citizen, the alien shall not be considered to be deportable under any
provision of this subsection based on such violation.

(7) 9a/WAIVER FOR VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE-

(A) IN GENERAL- The Attorney General is not limited by the criminal court record and may waive
the application of paragraph (2)(E)(i) (with respect to crimes of domestic violence and crimes of
stalking) and (ii) in the case of an alien who has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty and
who is not and was not the primary perpetrator of violence in the relationship-

(i) upon a determination that-

(I) the alien was acting is self-defense;

(II) the alien was found to have violated a protection order intended to protect the alien; or

(III) the alien committed, was arrested for, was convicted of, or pled guilty to committing a crime-

(aa) that did not result in serious bodily injury; and
l
(bb) where there was a connection between the crime and the alien's having been battered or
subjected to extreme cruelty.
(
(B) CREDIBLE EVIDENCE CONSIDERED- In acting on applications under this paragraph, the
Attorney General shall consider any credible evidence relevant to the application. The
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determination of what evidence is credible and the weight to be given that evidence shall be within
the sole discretion of the Attorney General.
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INA: ACT 239 - INITIATION OF REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS
Sec. 239. 1/_(a) Notice to Appear.-

(1) In general.-In removal proceedings under section 240 , written notice (in this section referred to
as a "notice to appear") shall be given in person to the alien (or, if personal service is not
practicable, through service by mail to the alien or to the alien's counsel of record, if any) specifying
the following:
(A) The nature of the proceedings against the alien.

(B) The legal authority under which the proceedings are conducted.

(C) The acts or conduct alleged to be in violation of law.

(D) The charges against the alien and the statutory provisions alleged to have been violated.

(E) The alien may be represented by counsel and the alien will be provided (i) a period of time to
secure counsel under subsection (b)(1) and (ii) a current list of counsel prepared under subsection
(b)(2).

(F) (i) The requirement that the alien must immediately provide (or have provided) the Attorney
General with a written record of an address and telephone number (if any) at which the alien may
be contacted respecting proceedings under section 240 .

(ii) The requirement that the alien must provide the Attorney General immediately with a written
record of any change of the alien's address or telephone number.

(iii) The consequences under section 240(b)(5) of failure to provide address and telephone
information pursuant to this subparagraph.

(G) (i) The time and place at which the proceedings will be held.

(ii) The consequences under section 240(b)(5) of the failure, except under exceptional
circumstances, to appear at such proceedings.
(2) Notice of change in time or place of proceedings.Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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(A) In general.-In removal proceedings under section 240, in the case of any change or
postponement in the time and place of such proceedings, subject to subparagraph (B) a written
notice shall be given in person to the alien (or, if personal service is not practicable, through
service by mail to the alien or to the alien's counsel of record, if any) specifying-

(i) the new time or place of the proceedings, and

(ii) the consequences under section 240(b)(5) of failing, except under exceptional circumstances,
to attend such proceedings.

(B) Exception.-In the case of an alien not in detention, a written notice shall not be required under
this paragraph if the alien has failed to provide the address required under paragraph (1)(F).

(3) Central address files.-The Attorney General shall create a system to record and preserve on a
timely basis notices of addresses and telephone numbers (and changes) provided under
paragraph (1)(F).
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INA: ACT 240 - REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS
(c) Decision and Burden of Proof. (1) Decision.-

(A) In general.-At the conclusion of the proceeding the immigration judge shall decide whether an
alien is removable from the United States. The determination of the immigration judge shall be
based only on the evidence produced at the hearing.

(B) Certain medical decisions.-If a medical officer or civil surgeon or board of medical officers has
certified under section 232(b) that an alien has a disease, illness, or addiction which would make
the alien inadmissible under paragraph (1) of section 212(a), the decision of the immigration judge
shall be based solely upon such certification.

(2) Burden on alien.-In the proceeding the alien has the burden of establishing-

(A) if the alien is an applicant for admission, that the alien is clearly and beyond doubt entitled to be
admitted and is not inadmissible under section 212; or

(B) by clear and convincing evidence, that the alien is lawfully present in the United States
pursuant to a prior admission.

In meeting the burden of proof under subparagraph (B), the alien shall have access to the alien's
visa or other entry document, if any, and any other records and documents, not considered by the
Attorney General to be confidential, pertaining to the alien's admission or presence in the United
States.
I

(
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INA: ACT 240A - CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL; ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS

Sec. 240A. 1£(a) Cancellation of Removal for Certain Permanent Residents.-The Attorney General
may cancel removal in the case of an alien who is inadmissible or deportable from the United
States if the alien-

(1) has been an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence for not less than 5 years,

(2) has resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any
status, and

(3) has not been convicted of any aggravated felony.
(b) CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL AND ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS FOR CERTAIN
NONPERMANENT RESIDENTS.-

(1) IN GENERAL.-The Attorney General 2/_may cancel removal of, and adjust to the status of an
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, an alien who is inadmissible or deportable from
the United States if the alien-

(A) has been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than 10
years immediately preceding the date of such application;

(B) has been a person of good moral character during such period;

(C) has not been convicted of an offense under section 212(a)(2), 237(a)(2), or 237(a)(3), subject
to paragraph (5) 2a/ 5/; and

(D) establishes that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the
alien's spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted
for permanent residence.

(2) ^ S P E C I A L RULE FOR BATTERED SPOUSE OR CHILD-

(A) AUTHORITY- The Attorney General may cancel removal of, and adjust to the status of an alien
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lawfully admitted for permanent residence, an alien who is inadmissible or deportable from the
United States if the alien demonstrates that-

(i) (I) the alien has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by a spouse or parent who is or was
a United States citizen (or is the parent of a child of a United States citizen and the child has been
battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by such citizen parent);

(II) the alien has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by a spouse or parent who is or was a
lawful permanent resident (or is the parent of a child of an alien who is or was a lawful permanent
resident and the child has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by such permanent resident
parent); or

(III) the alien has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by a United States citizen or lawful
permanent resident whom the alien intended to marry, but whose marriage is not legitimate because
of that United States citizen's or lawful permanent resident's bigamy;

(ii) the alien has been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than
3 years immediately preceding the date of such application, and the issuance of a charging
document for removal proceedings shall not toll the 3-year period of continuous physical presence
in the United States;

(iii) the alien has been a person of good moral character during such period, subject to the provisions
of subparagraph (C);

(iv) the alien is not inadmissible under paragraph (2) or (3) of section 212(a), is not deportable
under paragraphs (1)(G) or (2) through (4) of section 237(a), 5/_, subject to paragraph (5) and has
not been convicted of an aggravated felony; and

(v) the removal would result in extreme hardship to the alien, the alien's child, or the alien's parent.

(B) PHYSICAL PRESENCE- Notwithstanding subsection (d)(2), for purposes of subparagraph
(A)(ii) 6/or for purposes of section 244(a)(3) (as in effect before the title III-A effective date in
section 309 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996), an alien
shall not be considered to have failed to maintain continuous physical presence by reason of an
absence if the alien demonstrates a connection between the absence and the battering or extreme
cruelty perpetrated against the alien. No absence or portion of an absence connected to the battering
or extreme cruelty shall co unt toward the 90-day or 180-day limits established in subsection (d)(2).
If any absence or aggregate absences exceed 180 days, the absences or portions of the absences will
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not be considered to break the period of continuous presence. Any such period of time excluded
from the 180-day limit shall be excluded in computing the time during which the alien has been
physically present for purposes of the 3-year requirement set forth in section 240A(b)(2)(B) and
section 244(a)(3) (as in effect before the title III-A effective date in section 309 of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996).

(C) GOOD MORAL CHARACTER- Notwithstanding section 101(f), an act or conviction that
does not bar the Attorney General from granting relief under this paragraph by reason of
subparagraph (A)(iv) shall not bar the Attorney General from finding the alien to be of good moral
character under subparagraph 6/ (A)(iii) or section 244(a)(3) (as in effect before the title III-A
effective date in section 309 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996), if the Attorney General finds that the act or conviction was connected to the alien's having
been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty and determines that a waiver is otherwise warranted.

(D) CREDIBLE EVIDENCE CONSIDERED- In acting on applications under this paragraph, the
Attorney General shall consider any credible evidence relevant to the application. The
determination of what evidence is credible and the weight to be given that evidence shall be within
the sole discretion of the Attorney General.

(3) RECORDATION OF DATE. 3/_--With respect to aliens who the Attorney General adjusts to the
status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence under paragraph (1) or (2), the
Attorney General shall record the alien's lawful admission for permanent residence as of the date
of the Attorney General's cancellation of removal under paragraph (1) or (2).

(4) 3a/CHILDREN OF BATTERED ALIENS AND PARENTS OF BATTERED ALIEN CHILDREN-

(A) IN GENERAL- The Attorney General shall grant parole under section 212(d)(5) to any alien
who is a -

(i) child of an alien granted relief under section 240A(b)(2) or 244(a)(3) (as in effect before the title
lll-A effective date in section 309 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996); or

(ii) parent of a child alien granted relief under section 240A(b)(2) or 244(a)(3) (as in effect before
the title lll-A effective date in section 309 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996).
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(B) DURATION OF PAROLE- The grant of parole shall extend from the time of the grant of relief
under section 240A(b)(2) or section 244(a)(3) (as in effect before the title III-A effective date in
section 309 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996) to the
time the application for adjustment of status filed by aliens covered under this paragraph has been
finally adjudicated. Applications for adjustment of status filed by aliens covered under this
paragraph shall be treated as if the applicants were VAWA self-petitioners. 5a/ Failure by the alien
granted relief under section 240A(b)(2) or section 244(a)(3) (as in effect before the title III-A
effective date in section 309 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996) to exercise due diligence in filing a visa petition on behalf of an alien described in clause (i)
or (ii) may result in revocation of parole.

(5) 5/.APPLICATION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE WAIVER AUTHORITY- The authority
provided under section 237(a)(7) may apply under paragraphs (1)(B), (1)(C), and (2)(A)(iv) in a
cancellation of removal and adjustment of status proceeding.
(6) 7/.RELATIVES O F T R A F F I C K I N G VICTIMS(A) IN G E N E R A L - Upon written request by a law enforcement official, the Secretary of Homeland
Security may parole under section 212(d)(5) any alien who is a relative o f an alien granted
continued presence under section 107(c)(3)(A) o f t he Trafficking Victims Protection Act (22 U.S.C.
7105(c)(3)(A)), if the relative(i) was, on the date on which law enforcement applied for such continued p r e s e n c e (I) in the case of an alien granted continued presence who is under 21 years of age, the spouse,
child, parent, or unmarried sibling under 18 years of age, of the alien; or
(II) in the case of an alien granted continued presence who is 21 years of age or older, the spouse
or child of the alien; or
(ii) is a parent or sibling of the alien who the requesting law enforcement official, in consultation
with the Secretary of Homeland Security, as appropriate, determines to be in present danger of
retaliation as a result of the alien's escape from the severe form of trafficking or cooperation with
law enforcement, irrespective of age.
(B) D U R A T I O N O F P A R O L E (i) IN G E N E R A L - The Secretary may extend the parole granted under subparagraph (A) until the
final adjudication of the application filed by the principal alien under section 101(a)(15)(T)(ii).
(ii) O T H E R LIMITS O N D U R A T I O N - If an application described in clause (i) is not filed, the parole
granted under subparagraph (A) may extend until the later o f (I) the date on which the principal alien's authority to remain in the United States under section
107(c)(3)(A) of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (22 U.S.C. 7105(c)(3)(A)) is terminated; or
(II) the date on which a civil action filed by the principal alien under section 1595 of title 18, United
States Code, is concluded.
(iii) D U E D I L I G E N C E - Failure by the principal alien to exercise due diligence in filing a visa petition
on behalf of an alien described in clause (i) or (ii) of subparagraph (A), or in pursuing the civil
action described in clause (ii)(ll) (as determined by the Secretary of Homeland Security in
consultation with the Attorney General), may result in revocation of parole.
(C) O T H E R LIMITATIONS- A relative may not be granted parole under this paragraph if(i) the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General has reason to believe that the
relative was knowingly complicit in the trafficking of an alien permitted to remain in the United
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States under section 107(c)(3)(A) of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (22 U.S.C.
7105(c)(3)(A)); or
(ii) the relative is an alien described in paragraph (2) or (3) of section 212(a) or paragraph (2) or (4)
of section 237(a).

(c) Aliens Ineligible for Relief.-The provisions of subsections (a) and (b)(1) shall not apply to any of
the following aliens:

(1) An alien who entered the United States as a crewman subsequent to June 30, 1964.

(2) An alien who was admitted to the United States as a nonimmigrant exchange alien as defined
in section 101(a)(15)(J), or has acquired the status of such a nonimmigrant exchange alien after
admission, in order to receive graduate medical education or training, regardless of whether or not
the alien is subject to or has fulfilled the two-year foreign residence requirement of section 212(e).
(3) An alien who-

(A) was admitted to the United States as a nonimmigrant exchange alien as defined in section
101(a)(15)(J) or has acquired the status of such a nonimmigrant exchange alien after admission
other than to receive graduate medical education or training,

(B) is subject to the two-year foreign residence requirement of section 212(e), and

(C) has not fulfilled that requirement or received a waiver thereof.

(4) An alien who is inadmissible under section 212(a)(3) or deportable under of section 237(a)(4).

(5) An alien who is described in section 241(b)(3)(B)(i).

(6) An alien whose removal has previously been canceled under this section or whose deportation
was suspended under section 244(a) or who has been granted relief under section 212(c), as
such sections were in effect before the date of the enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996.
(d) Special Rules Relating to Continuous Residence or Physical Presence.-

(1) TERMINATION OF CONTINUOUS PERIOD.- For purposes of this section, any period of
47 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

continuous residence or continuous physical presence in the United States shall be deemed to end
3b/ (A) except in the case of an alien who applies for cancellation of removal under subsection
(b)(2), when the alien is served a notice to appear under section 239(a), or (B) when the alien has
committed an offense referred to in section 212(a)(2) that renders the alien inadmissible to the
United States under section 212(a)(2) or removable from the United States under section 237(a)(2)
or 237(a)(4), whichever is earliest.

(2) Treatment of certain breaks in presence.-An alien shall be considered to have failed to maintain
continuous physical presence in the United States under subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) if the alien
has departed from the United States for any period in excess of 90 days or for any periods in the
aggregate exceeding 180 days.

(3) Continuity not required because of honorable service in armed forces and presence upon entry
into service.-The requirements of continuous residence or continuous physical presence in the
United States under subsections (a) and (b) shall not apply to an alien who-

(A) has served for a minimum period of 24 months in an active-duty status in the Armed Forces of
the United States and, if separated from such service, was separated under honorable conditions,
and

(B) at the time of the alien's enlistment or induction was in the United States.

(e) ANNUAL LIMITATION. 4/_~
(1) AGGREGATE LIMITATION.-Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), the Attorney General may not
cancel the removal and adjust the status under this section, nor suspend the deportation and
adjust the status under section 244(a) (as in effect before the enactment of the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996), of a total of more than 4,000 aliens in any fiscal
year. The previous sentence shall apply regardless of when an alien applied for such cancellation
and adjustment, or such suspension and adjustment, and whether such an alien had previously
applied for suspension of deportation under such section 244(a). The numerical limitation under
this paragraph shall apply to the aggregate number of decisions in any fiscal year to cancel the
removal (and adjust the status) of an alien, or suspend the deportation (and adjust the status) of an
alien, under this section or such section 244(a).
i

(2) FISCAL YEAR 1997.-For fiscal year 1997, paragraph (1) shall only apply to decisions to cancel
the removal of an alien, or suspend the deportation of an alien, made after April 1, 1997.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Attorney General may cancel the removal or
suspend the deportation, in addition to the normal allotment for fiscal year 1998, of a number of
aliens equal to 4,000 less the number of such cancellations of removal and suspensions of
deportation granted in fiscal year 1997 a fter April 1, 1997.
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(3) EXCEPTION FOR CERTAIN ALIENS.-Paragraph (1) shall not apply to the following:
(A) Aliens described in section 309(c)(5)(C)(i) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (as amended by the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American
Relief Act).
(B) Aliens in deportation proceedings prior to April 1, 1997, who applied for suspension of
deportation under section 244(a)(3) (as in effect before the date of the enactment of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996).
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JOSE PADILLA, Petitioner v. KENTUCKY
No. 08-651
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
130 S. Ct. 1473; 176 L. Ed. 2d 284; 2010 U.S. LEXIS 2928; 22 Fla. L. Weekly
Fed. S 211
October 13,2009, Argued
March 31,2010, Decided
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JUDGES: Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and
Sotomayor, JJ., joined. Alito, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Roberts, C. J.,
joined. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined.

OPINION BY: STEVENS

OPINION
Justice Stevens delivered [***6] the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner Jose Padilla, a native of Honduras, has been a lawful permanent resident of the United
States for more than 40 years. Padilla served [**290] this Nation with honor as a member of the U. S.
Armed Forces during the Vietnam War. He now faces deportation after pleading guilty to the
transportation of a large amount of marijuana in his tractor-trailer in the Commonwealth of Kentucky.1

1
Padilla's crime, like virtually every drug offense except for only the most insignificant
marijuana offenses, is a deportable offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).
[*1478] In this postconviction proceeding, Padilla claims that his counsel not only failed to advise
him of this consequence prior to his entering the plea, but also told him that he " 'did not have to worry
about immigration status since he had been in the country so long.1 " 253 S. W. 3d 482, 483 (Ky. 2008).
Padilla relied on his counsel's erroneous advice when he pleaded guilty to the drug charges that made his
deportation virtually mandatory. He alleges that he would have insisted on going to trial if he had not
received incorrect advice from his attorney.
Assuming the truth of his allegations, the Supreme Court of Kentucky [***7] denied Padilla
postconviction relief without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing. The court held that the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee of effective assistance of counsel does not protect a criminal defendant from
erroneous advice about deportation because it is merely a "collateral" consequence of his conviction. Id.,
at 485. In its view, neither counsel's failure to advise petitioner about the possibility of removal, nor
counsel's incorrect advice, could provide a basis for relief.
We granted certiorari, 555 U.S.
, 129 S. Ct. 1317, 173 L. Ed. 2d 582 (2009), to decide whether, as
a matter of federal law, Padilla's counsel had an obligation to advise him that the offense to which he was
pleading guilty would result in his removal from this country. We agree with Padilla that constitutionally
competent counsel would have advised him that his conviction for drug distribution made him subject to
automatic deportation. Whether he is entitled to relief depends on whether he has been prejudiced, a
matter that we do not address.

The landscape of federal immigration law has changed dramatically over the last 90 years. While
once there was only a narrow class of deportable offenses and judges wielded broad discretionary
authority [***8] to prevent deportation, immigration reforms over time have expanded the class of
deportable offenses and limited the authority of judges to alleviate the harsh consequences of deportation.
The "drastic measure" of deportation or removal, Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10, 68 S. Ct. 374,
92 L. Ed. 433 (1948), is now virtually inevitable for a vast number of noncitizens convicted of crimes.
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The Nation's first 100 years was Ma period of unimpeded immigration." C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield,
Immigration Law and Procedure § l.(2)(a), p. 5 (1959). An early effort to empower the President to order
the deportation of those immigrants he "judge[d] dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States,"
Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 571, was short lived and unpopular. Gordon § 1.2, at 5. It was not
until 1875 that Congress first passed a statute barring convicts and prostitutes from entering the country,
Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477. Gordon § 1.2b, at 6. In 1891, Congress added to the list of
excludable persons those "who have been [**291] convicted of a felony or other infamous crime or
misdemeanor involving moral turpitude." Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084.2

2 In 1907, Congress expanded the class [***9] of excluded persons to include individuals who
"admit" to having committed a crime of moral turpitude. Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, 34 Stat.
899.
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1917 (1917 Act) brought "radical changes" [*1479] to our
law. S. Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 54-55 (1950). For the first time in our history, Congress
made classes of noncitizens deportable based on conduct committed on American soil, i d , at 55. Section
19 of the 1917 Act authorized the deportation of "any alien who is hereafter sentenced to imprisonment
for a term of one year or more because of conviction in this country of a crime involving moral turpitude,
committed within five years after the entry of the alien to the United States . . . ." 39 Stat. 889. And § 19
also rendered deportable noncitizen recidivists who commit two or more crimes of moral turpitude at any
time after entry. Ibid. Congress did not, however, define the term "moral turpitude."
While the 1917 Act was "radical" because it authorized deportation as a consequence of certain
convictions, the Act also included a critically important procedural protection to minimize the risk of
unjust deportation: At the time of sentencing [***10] or within 30 days thereafter, the sentencing judge
in both state and federal prosecutions had the power to make a recommendation "that such alien shall not
be deported." Id., at 890.3 This procedure, known as a judicial recommendation against deportation, or
JRAD, had the effect of binding the Executive to prevent deportation; the statute was "consistently . . .
interpreted as giving the sentencing judge conclusive authority to decide whether a particular conviction
should be disregarded as a basis for deportation," Janvier v. United States, 793 F.2d 449, 452 (CA2 1986).
Thus, from 1917 forward, there was no such creature as an automatically deportable offense. Even as the
class of deportable offenses expanded, judges retained discretion to ameliorate unjust results on a caseby-case basis.

3 As enacted, the statute provided:
"That the provision of this section respecting the deportation of aliens convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude shall not apply to one who has been pardoned, nor shall such deportation
be made or directed if the court, or judge thereof, sentencing such alien for such crime shall, at the
time of imposing judgment or passing sentence or within thirty days [***11] thereafter, . . . make
a recommendation to the Secretary of Labor that such alien shall not be deported in pursuance of
this Act." 1917 Act, 39 Stat. 889-890.
This provision was codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1994 ed.) (transferred to § 1227 (2006
ed.)). The judge's nondeportation recommendation was binding on the Secretary of Labor and,
later, the Attorney General after control of immigration removal matters was transferred from the
former to the latter. See Janvier v. United States, 793 F.2d 449, 452 (CA2 1986).
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Although narcotics offenses-such as the offense at issue in this case-provided a distinct basis for
deportation as early as 1922/ the JRAD procedure was generally available [**292] to avoid deportation
in narcotics convictions. See United States v. O'Ronrke, 213 F.2d 759, 762 (CA8 1954). Except for
"technical, inadvertent and insignificant violations of the laws relating to narcotics," ibid., it appears that
courts treated narcotics offenses as crimes involving [* 1480] moral turpitude for purposes of the 1917
Act's broad JRAD provision. See ibid, (recognizing that until 1952 a JRAD in a narcotics case "was
effective to prevent deportation" (citing Dang Nam v. Bryan, 74 F.2d 379, 380-381 (CA9 1934))).

4 Congress [***12] first identified narcotics offenses as a special category of crimes triggering
deportation in the 1922 Narcotic Drug Act. Act of May 26, 1922, ch. 202, 42 Stat. 596. After the
1922 Act took effect, there was some initial confusion over whether a narcotics offense also had to
be a crime of moral turpitude for an individual to be deportable. See Weedin v. Moy Fat, 8 F.2d
488, 489 (CA9 1925) (holding that an individual who committed narcotics offense was not
deportable because offense did not involve moral turpitude). However, lower courts eventually
agreed that the narcotics offense provision was "special," Chung Que Fong v. Nagle, 15 F.2d 789,
790 (CA9 1926); thus, a narcotics offense did not need also to be a crime of moral turpitude (or to
satisfy other requirements of the 1917 Act) to trigger deportation. See United States ex rel
Grimaldi v. Ebey, 12 F2d 922, 923 (CA7 1926); Todaro v. Munster, 62 F.2d 963, 964 (CA10
1933).
In light of both the steady expansion of deportable offenses and the significant ameliorative effect of
a JRAD, it is unsurprising that, in the wake of Strickland v. Washington, 466 US. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052,
80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), the Second Circuit held that the Sixth Amendment right to effective [***13]
assistance of counsel applies to a JRAD request or lack thereof, see Janvier, 793 F.2d 449. See also
United States v. Castro, 26 F.3d 557 (CA5 1994). In its view, seeking a JRAD was "part of the
sentencing" process, Janvier, 793 F.2d, at 452, even if deportation itself is a civil action. Under the
Second Circuit's reasoning, the impact of a conviction on a noncitizen's ability to remain in the country
was a central issue to be resolved during the sentencing process—not merely a collateral matter outside the
scope of counsel's duty to provide effective representation.

(

i

However, the JRAD procedure is no longer part of our law. Congress first circumscribed the JRAD
provision in the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),5 and in 1990 Congress entirely eliminated
it, 104 Stat. 5050. In 1996, Congress also eliminated the Attorney General's authority to grant
discretionary relief from deportation, 110 Stat. 3009-596, an authority that had been exercised to prevent
the deportation of over 10,000 noncitizens during the 5-year period prior to 1996, INS v. St. Cyr, 533 US.
289, 296, 121 S. Ct. 2271, 150 L. Ed. 2d 347 (2001). Under contemporary law, [HNl] [**LEdHRl] [1] if
a noncitizen has committed a removable offense after the 1996 effective [***14] date of these
amendments, his removal is practically inevitable but for the possible exercise of limited remnants of
equitable discretion vested in the Attorney General to cancel removal for noncitizens convicted of
particular classes of offenses.6 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b. Subject to limited exceptions, this discretionary
relief is not available for an offense related to trafficking in a controlled substance. See § 1101 (a)(43)(B);
§ 1228.

5 The Act separately codified the moral turpitude offense provision and the narcotics offense
provision within 8 U.S.C § 1251(a) (1994 ed.) under subsections (a)(4) and (a)(ll), respectively.
See 66 Stat. 201, 204, 206. The JRAD procedure, codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1994 ed),
applied only to the "provisions of subsection (a)(4)," the crimes-of-moral-turpitude provision. 66
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Stat. 208; see United States v. O'Rourke, 213 F.2d 759, 762 (CA8 1954) (recognizing that, under
the 1952 Act, narcotics offenses were no longer eligible for JRADs).
6 The changes to our immigration law have also involved a change in nomenclature; the statutory
text now uses the term "removal" rather than "deportation." See Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 533 U.S.
348, 350, n. 1, 121 S. Ct. 2268, 150 L. Ed. 2d 392 (2001).
These [***15] changes to our immigration law have dramatically raised the stakes of a noncitizen's
criminal conviction. The importance of accurate legal advice for noncitizens accused of [**293] crimes
has never been more important. These changes confirm our view that, [HN2] [**LEdHR2] [2] as a
matter of federal law, deportation is an integral part-indeed, sometimes the most important part7 -of the
penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.

7 See Brief for Asian American Justice Center et al. as Amici Curiae 12-27 (providing real-world
examples).
II
[HN3] [**LEdHR3] [3] Before deciding whether to plead guilty, a defendant is entitled to "the
effective [*1481] assistance of competent counsel." McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, 90 S. Ct.
1441, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1970); Strickland, 466 US, at 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674. The
Supreme Court of Kentucky rejected Padilla's ineffectiveness claim on the ground that the advice he
sought about the risk of deportation concerned only collateral matters, i.e., those matters not within the
sentencing authority of the state trial court.8 253 S. W. 3d, at 483-484 (citing Commonwealth v. Fuartado,
170 S. W. 3d 384 (2005)). In its view, "collateral consequences are outside the scope of representation
required by the Sixth Amendment" [***16] and, therefore, the "failure of defense counsel to advise the
defendant of possible deportation consequences is not cognizable as a claim for ineffective assistance of
counsel." 253 S. W. 3d, at 483. The Kentucky high court is far from alone in this view.9

8 There is some disagreement among the courts over how to distinguish between direct and
collateral consequences. See Roberts, Ignorance is Effectively Bliss: Collateral Consequences,
Silence, and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 Iowa L. Rev. 119, 124, n. 15 (2009).
The disagreement over how to apply the direct/collateral distinction has no bearing on the
disposition of this case because, as even Justice Alito agrees, counsel must, at the very least, advise
a noncitizen "defendant that a criminal conviction may have adverse immigration consequences,"
post, at
, 176 L. Ed. 2d, at 299 (opinion concurring in judgment). See also post, at
, 176 L.
Ed. 2d, at 307 ("I do not mean to suggest that the Sixth Amendment does no more than require
defense counsel to avoid misinformation"). In his concurring opinion, Justice Alito has thus
departed from the strict rule applied by the Supreme Court of Kentucky and in the two federal
cases that he cites, post, at
, 176 L. Ed. 2d, at 300.
9 See, e.g., [***17] United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20 (CA1 2000); United States v. Del
Rosario, 902 F.2d 55, 284 US App. D.C 90 (CADC 1990); United States v. Yearwood, 863 F.2d
6 (CA4 1988); Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 548 F.3d 327 (CA5 2008); Broomes v. Ashcroft,
358 F.3d 1251 (CA10 2004); United States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d 764 (CA11 1985); Oyekoya v.
State, 558 So. 2d 990 (Ala. Ct. Crim. App. 1989); State v. Rosas, 183 Ariz. 421, 904 P.2d 1245
(App. 1995); State v. Montalban, 2000-2739 (La. 2/26/02), 810 So. 2d 1106; Commonwealth v.
Frometa, 520 Pa. 552, 555A.2d92 (1989).
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We, however, have never applied a distinction between direct and collateral consequences to define
the scope of constitutionally "reasonable professional assistance" required under Strickland, 466 U.S., at
689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674. Whether that distinction is appropriate is a question we need not
consider in this case because of the unique nature of deportation.
We have long recognized that [HN4] [**LEdHR4] [4] deportation is a particularly severe "penalty,"
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740, 13 S. Ct. 1016, 37 L. Ed. 905 (1893); but it is not, in a
strict sense, a criminal sanction. Although removal proceedings are civil in nature, see INS v. LopezMendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038, 104 S. Ct. 3479, 82 L. Ed 2d 778 (1984), deportation [***18] is
nevertheless intimately related to the criminal process. Our law has enmeshed criminal convictions and
the penalty of deportation [**294] for nearly a century, see Part I, supra, at
- , 176 L. Ed. 2d, at
290-293. And, importantly, recent changes in our immigration law have made removal nearly an
automatic result for a broad class of noncitizen offenders. Thus, we find it "most difficult" to divorce the
penalty from the conviction in the deportation context. United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 38, 222 U.S.
App. D.C. 313 (CADC 1982). Moreover, we are quite confident that noncitizen defendants facing a risk of
deportation for a particular offense find it even more difficult. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S., at 322, 121 S. Ct.
2271, 150 L. Ed. 2d 347 ("There can be little doubt that, as a general matter, alien defendants considering
whether to enter into a plea agreement are acutely aware of the [*1482] immigration consequences of
their convictions").
[HN5] [**LEdHR5] [5] Deportation as a consequence of a criminal conviction is, because of its
close connection to the criminal process, uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or a collateral
consequence. The collateral versus direct distinction is thus ill-suited to evaluating a Strickland claim
concerning the specific risk of deportation. We conclude that [***19] advice regarding deportation is not
categorically removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. StricklandappliQS to
Padilla's claim.
Ill
[HN6] [**LEdHR6] [6] Under Strickland, we first determine whether counsel's representation "fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness." 466 U.S., at 688, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674. Then
we ask whether "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different." Id, at 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674. The first prong-constitutional deficiency—is necessarily linked to the practice and expectations of the legal community:
"The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms." Id, at 688, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674. We long have recognized that
"[prevailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like . . . are
guides to determining what is reasonable . . . ." Ibid.;Bobby v. Van Hook, 558 U.S.
,
, 130 S. Ct.
13, 175 L. Ed. 2d 255 (2009) (per curiam); Florida v. Nixon, 543 US. 175, 191, and n. 6, 125 S. Ct. 551,
160 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2004); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524, 123 S Ct. 2527, 156 L. Ed. 2d 471
(2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396, 120 S Ct. 1495, 146 L. Ed. 2d 389 (2000). Although they
are "only guides," Strickland, 466 U.S., at 688, 104 S Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, and [***20] not
"inexorable commands," Bobby, 558 U.S., at
, 130 S. Ct. 13, 175 L. Ed. 2d 255, these standards may
be valuable measures of the prevailing professional norms of effective representation, especially as these
standards have been adapted to deal with the intersection of modern criminal prosecutions and
immigration law.
The weight of prevailing professional norms supports the view that [HN7] [**LEdHR7] [7] counsel
must advise her client regarding the risk of deportation. National Legal Aid and Defender Assn.,
Performance Guidelines for Criminal Representation § 6.2 (1995); G. Herman, Plea Bargaining § 3.03,
pp. 20-21 (1997); Chin & Holmes, Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty
Pleas, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 697, 713-718 (2002); A. Campbell, Law of Sentencing [**295] § 13:23, pp.
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555, 560 (3d ed. 2004); Dept. of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 2 Compendium of Standards for
Indigent Defense Systems, Standards for Attorney Performance, pp. D10, H8-H9, J8 (2000) (providing
survey of guidelines across multiple jurisdictions); ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Prosecution
Function and Defense Function 4-5.1(a), p. 197 (3d ed. 1993); ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Pleas
of Guilty 14-3.2(f), p. 116 (3d [***21] ed. 1999). "[Authorities of every stripe-including the American
Bar Association, criminal defense and public defender organizations, authoritative treatises, and state and
city bar publications-universally require defense attorneys to advise as to the risk of deportation
consequences for non-citizen clients . . . ." Brief for Legal Ethics, Criminal Procedure, and Criminal Law
Professors asAmici Curiae 12-14 (footnotes omitted) (citing, inter alia, National Legal Aid and Defender
Assn., Guidelines, supra, §§ 6.2-6.4 (1997); S. Bratton & E. Kelley, Practice Points: Representing a
Noncitizen in a Criminal Case, 31 The Champion 61 (Jan./Feb. 2007); N. Tooby, Criminal Defense of
Immigrants [*1483] § 1.3 (3d ed. 2003); 2 Criminal Practice Manual §§ 45:3, 45:15 (2009)).
We too have previously recognized that" '[preserving the client's right to remain in the United States
may be more important to the client than any potential jail sentence.'" St. Cyr, 533 U.S., at 323, 121 S. Ct.
2271, 150 L. Ed. 2d 347 (quoting 3 Criminal Defense Techniques §§ 60A.01, 60A.02[2] (1999)).
Likewise, we have recognized that "preserving the possibility o f discretionary relief from deportation
under § 212(c) of the 1952 INA, 66 Stat. 187, repealed [***22] by Congress in 1996, "would have been
one of the principal benefits sought by defendants deciding whether to accept a plea offer or instead to
proceed to trial." St Cyr, 533 U.S., at 323, 121 S. Ct. 2271, 150 L. Ed. 2d 347. We expected that counsel
who were unaware of the discretionary relief measures would "follo[w] the advice of numerous practice
guides" to advise themselves of the importance of this particular form of discretionary relief. Ibid., n. 50.
In the instant case, the terms of the relevant immigration statute are succinct, clear, and explicit in
defining the removal consequence for Padilla's conviction. See 8 US.C § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) ([HN8]
[**LEdHR8] [8] "Any alien who at any time after admission has been convicted of a violation of (or a
conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United States or a foreign country
relating to a controlled substance . . . , other than a single offense involving possession for one's own use
of 30 grams or less of marijuana, is deportable"). Padilla's counsel could have easily determined that his
plea would make him eligible for deportation simply from reading the text of the statute, which addresses
not some broad classification of crimes but specifically commands [***23] removal for all controlled
substances convictions except for the most trivial of marijuana possession offenses. Instead, Padilla's
counsel provided him false assurance that his conviction would not result in his removal from this
country. This is not a hard case in which to find deficiency: The consequences of Padilla's plea could
easily be determined from reading the removal statute, his deportation was presumptively mandatory, and
his counsel's advice was incorrect.
Immigration law can be complex, [**296] and it is a legal specialty of its own. Some members of
the bar who represent clients facing criminal charges, in either state or federal court or both, may not be
well versed in it. There will, therefore, undoubtedly be numerous situations in which the deportation
consequences of a particular plea are unclear or uncertain. The duty of the private practitioner in such
cases is more limited. [HN9] [**LEdHR9] [9] When the law is not succinct and straightforward (as it is
in many of the scenarios posited by Justice Alito), a criminal defense attorney need do no more than
advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration
consequences.10 But when the deportation consequence [***24] is truly clear, as it was in this case, the
duty to give correct advice is equally clear.

10 As Justice Alito explains at length, deportation consequences are often unclear. Lack of clarity
in the law, however, does not obviate the need for counsel to say something about the possibility of
deportation, even though it will affect the scope and nature of counsel's advice.
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Accepting his allegations as true, Padilla has sufficiently alleged constitutional deficiency to satisfy
the first prong of Strickland. Whether Padilla is entitled to relief on his claim will depend on whether he
can satisfy Strickland s second prong, prejudice, [*1484] a matter we leave to the Kentucky courts to
consider in the first instance.
IV
The Solicitor General has urged us to conclude that Strickland applies to Padilla's claim only to the
extent that he has alleged affirmative misadvice. In the United States' view, "counsel is not
constitutionally required to provide advice on matters that will not be decided in the criminal case . . . ,"
though counsel is required to provide accurate advice if she chooses to discusses these matters. Brief for
United States as Amicus Curiae 10.
Respondent and Padilla both find the Solicitor [***25] General's proposed rule unpersuasive,
although it has support among the lower courts. See, e.g., United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179, 188 (CA2
2002); United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005 (CA9 2005); Sparks v. Sowders, 852 F.2d 882 (CA6 1988);
United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 222 US App. D.C 313 (CADC 1982); State v. Rojas-Martinez,
2005 UT86, 125 P. 3d 930, 935; In re Resendiz, 25 Cal. 4th 230, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 431, 19 P. 3d 1171
(2001). Kentucky describes these decisions isolating an affirmative misadvice claim as "result-driven,
incestuous . . . [,and] completely lacking in legal or rational bases." Brief for Respondent 31. We do not
share that view, but we agree that there is no relevant difference "between an act of commission and an
act of omission" in this context. Id, at 30; Strickland, 466 U.S., at 690, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674
("The court must then determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions
were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance"); see also State v. Paredez, 2004NMSC-036, 2004NMSC36, 136 N. M. 533, 538-539, 101 P.3d 799.
A holding limited to affirmative misadvice would invite two absurd results. First, it would give
counsel an incentive to remain silent on matters of great importance, even [***26] when answers are
readily available. Silence under these circumstances would be fundamentally at odds with the critical
obligation of counsel to advise the client of "the advantages and disadvantages of a plea agreement."
Libretti [**297] v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 50-51, 116 S Ct. 356, 133 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1995). When
attorneys know that their clients face possible exile from this country and separation from their families,
they should not be encouraged to say nothing at all.11 Second, it would deny a class of clients least able to
represent themselves the most rudimentary advice on deportation even when it is readily available.
[HN10] [**LEdHR10] [10] It is quintessentially the duty of counsel to provide her client with available
advice about an issue like deportation and the failure to do so "clearly satisfies the first prong of the
Strickland analysis:' Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 62, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985) (White, J.,
concurring in judgment).

11 As the Commonwealth conceded at oral argument, were a defendant's lawyer to know that a
particular offense would result in the client's deportation and that, upon deportation, the client and
his family might well be killed due to circumstances in the client's home country, any decent
attorney would inform the client [***27] of the consequences of his plea. Tr. of Oral Arg. 37-38.
We think the same result should follow when the stakes are not life and death but merely
"banishment or exile," Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 390-391, 68 S. Ct. 10, 92 L. Ed. 17
(1947).
We have given serious consideration to the concerns that the Solicitor General, respondent, and amici
have stressed regarding the importance of protecting the finality of convictions obtained through guilty
pleas. We confronted a similar "floodgates" concern in Hill, see id., at 58, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d
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203, but nevertheless applied [*1485] Strickland to a claim that counsel had failed to advise the client
regarding his parole eligibility before he pleaded guilty.12

12 However, we concluded that, even though Strickland applied to petitioner's claim, he had not
sufficiently alleged prejudice to satisfy Strickland^ second prong. Hill, 474 U.S., at 59-60, 106 S.
Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203. This disposition further underscores the fact that it is often quite difficult
for petitioners who have acknowledged their guilt to satisfy Strickland^ prejudice prong.
Justice Alito believes that the Court misreads Hill, post, at
- , 176 L. Ed. 2d, at 305. In
Hill, the Court recognized-for the first time-that Strickland applies to advice respecting a guilty
plea. [***28] 474 U.S., at 58, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 ("We hold, therefore, that the twopart Strickland v. Washington test applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective
assistance of counsel"). It is true that Hill does not control the question before us. But its import is
nevertheless clear. Whether Strickland applies to Padilla's claim follows from Hill, regardless of
the fact that the Hill Court did not resolve the particular question respecting misadvice that was
before it.
A flood did not follow in that decision's wake. Surmounting Strickland^ high bar is never an easy
task. See, e.g., 466 U.S., at 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 ([HN11] [**LEdHRl 1] [11] "Judicial
scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential"); id., at 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d
674 (observing that "[a]ttorney errors . . . are as likely to be utterly harmless in a particular case as they
are to be prejudicial"). Moreover, [HN12] [**LEdHR12] [12] to obtain relief on this type of claim, a
petitioner must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational
under the circumstances. See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 US. 470, 480, 486, 120 S. Ct. 1029, 145 L. Ed.
2d 985 (2000). There is no reason to doubt that lower courts—now quite experienced with applying
Strickland—can effectively and efficiently use its framework to separate [***29] specious claims from
those with substantial merit.
It seems unlikely that our decision today will have a significant effect on those convictions already
obtained as the result of plea bargains. For at [**298] least the past 15 years, professional norms have
generally imposed an obligation on counsel to provide advice on the deportation consequences of a
client's plea. See, supra, at
- , 176 L. Ed. 2d, at 295-296. We should, therefore, presume that
counsel satisfied their obligation to render competent advice at the time their clients considered pleading
guilty. Strickland, 466 U.S., at 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674.
Likewise, although we must be especially careful about recognizing new grounds for attacking the
validity of guilty pleas, in the 25 years since we first applied Strickland to claims of ineffective assistance
at the plea stage, practice has shown that pleas are less frequently the subject of collateral challenges than
convictions obtained after a trial. Pleas account for nearly 95% of all criminal convictions.13 But they
account for only approximately 30% of the habeas petitions filed.14 The nature of relief secured by a
successful collateral challenge to a guilty plea—an opportunity to withdraw the plea and proceed to trial
[***30] -imposes its own significant limiting principle: Those who collaterally attack their guilty pleas
lose the benefit of the bargain obtained as a result of the plea. Thus, a different calculus informs [*1486]
whether it is wise to challenge a guilty plea in a habeas proceeding because, ultimately, the challenge may
result in a less favorable outcome for the defendant, whereas a collateral challenge to a conviction
obtained after a jury trial has no similar downside potential.
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13 See Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics
2003, p. 418 (31st ed. 2005) (Table 5.17) (only approximately 5%, or 8,612 out of 68,533, of
federal criminal prosecutions go to trial); id., at 450 (Table 5.46) (only approximately 5% of all
state felony criminal prosecutions go to trial).
14 See V. Flango, National Center for State Courts, Habeas Corpus in State and Federal Courts
36-38 (1994) (demonstrating that 5% of defendants whose conviction was the result of a trial
account for approximately 70% of the habeas petitions filed).
Finally, informed consideration of possible deportation can only benefit both the State and noncitizen
defendants during the plea-bargaining process. [***31] By bringing deportation consequences into this
process, the defense and prosecution may well be able to reach agreements that better satisfy the interests
of both parties. As in this case, a criminal episode may provide the basis for multiple charges, of which
only a subset mandate deportation following conviction. Counsel who possess the most rudimentary
understanding of the deportation consequences of a particular criminal offense may be able to plea
bargain creatively with the prosecutor in order to craft a conviction and sentence that reduce the
likelihood of deportation, as by avoiding a conviction for an offense that automatically triggers the
removal consequence. At the same time, the threat of deportation may provide the defendant with a
powerful incentive to plead guilty to an offense that does not mandate that penalty in exchange for a
dismissal of a charge that does.
In sum, we have long recognized that [HN13] [**LEdHR13] [13] the negotiation of a plea bargain is
a critical phase of litigation for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.
Hill, 474 U.S., at 57, 106 S Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d203; see also Richardson, 397 US, at 770-771, 771, 90
S. Ct. 1441, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763. The severity of deportation—"the equivalent of [**299] banishment
[***32] or exile," Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 US 388, 390-391, 68 S. Ct. 10, 92 L. Ed. 17 (1947) only underscores how critical it is for counsel to inform her noncitizen client that he faces a risk of
deportation.15

15 To this end, we find it significant that the plea form currently used in Kentucky courts
provides notice of possible immigration consequences. Ky. Admin. Office of Courts, Motion to
Enter Guilty Plea, Form AOC-491 (Rev. 2/2003), http://courts.ky.gov/NR/rdonlyres/55ElF54EED5C-4A30-BlD5-4C43C7ADD63C/0/491.pdf (as visited Mar. 29, 2010, and available in Clerk
of Court's case file). Further, many States require trial courts to advise defendants of possible
immigration consequences. See, e.g., Alaska Rule Crim. Proc. 11(c)(3)(C) (2009-2010); Cal. Penal
Code Ann. § 1016.5 (West 2008); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-Ij (2009); D. C. Code § 16-713 (2001);
Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.172(c)(8) (Supp. 2010); Ga. Code Ann. § 17-7-93(c) (1997); Haw. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 802E-2 (2007); Iowa Rule Crim. Proc. 2.8(2)(b)(3) (Supp. 2009); Md. Rule 4-242
(Lexis 2009); Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 278, § 29D (2009); Minn. Rule Crim. Proc. 15.01 (2009);
Mont. Code Ann. § 46-12-210 (2009); N. M. Rule Crim. Form 9-406 (2009); N. Y. Crim. Proc.
Law Ann. §220.50(7) [***33] (West Supp. 2009); N. C Gen. Stat. Ann. § 15A-1022 (Lexis 2007);
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2943.031 (West 2006); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 135.385 (2007); R. I. Gen. Laws §
12-12-22 (Lexis Supp. 2008); Tex. Code. Ann. Crim. Proc, Art. 26.13(a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 2009);
Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13, § 6565(c)(1) (Supp. 2009); Wash. Rev. Code § 10.40.200 (2008); Wis. Stat. §
971.08(2005-2006).

[HN14] [**LEdHR14] [14] It is our responsibility under the Constitution to ensure that no criminal
defendant-whether a citizen or not-is left to the "mercies of incompetent counsel." Richardson, 397
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U.S., at 771, 90 S Ct. 1441, 25 L. Ed 2d 763. To satisfy this responsibility, we now hold that counsel
must inform her client whether his plea carries a risk of deportation. Our longstanding Sixth Amendment
precedents, the seriousness of deportation as a consequence of a criminal plea, and the concomitant
impact of deportation on families living lawfully in this country demand no less.
Taking as true the basis for his motion for postconviction relief, we have little difficulty [*1487]
concluding that Padilla has sufficiently alleged that his counsel was constitutionally deficient. Whether
Padilla is entitled to relief will depend on whether he can demonstrate prejudice as [***34] a result
thereof, a question we do not reach because it was not passed on below. See Verizon Communs., Inc. v.
FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 530, 122 S. Ct. 1646, 152 L. Ed. 2d 701 (2002).
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Kentucky is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

CONCUR BY: ALITO

CONCUR
Justice Alito, with whom The Chief Justice joins, concurring in the judgment.
I concur in the judgment because a criminal defense attorney fails to provide effective assistance
within the meaning of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984),
if the attorney misleads a noncitizen client regarding the removal consequences of a conviction. In my
view, such an attorney must (1) refrain from unreasonably providing incorrect advice and (2) advise the
defendant that a criminal conviction may have adverse immigration consequences and that, if the alien
wants advice on this issue, the alien should consult an immigration attorney. I do not agree with the Court
that the attorney must attempt [**300] to explain what those consequences may be. As the Court
concedes, M[i]mmigration law can be complex"; "it is a legal specialty of its own"; and "[s]ome members
of the bar who represent clients facing [***35] criminal charges, in either state or federal court or both,
may not be well versed in it." Ante, at
, 176 L. Ed. 2d, at 295. The Court nevertheless holds that a
criminal defense attorney must provide advice in this specialized area in those cases in which the law is
"succinct and straightforward"—but not, perhaps, in other situations. Ante, at
, 176 L. Ed. 2d, at
296. This vague, halfway test will lead to much confusion and needless litigation.
I
Under Strickland, an attorney provides ineffective assistance if the attorney's representation does not
meet reasonable professional standards. 466 U.S., at 688, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674. Until today,
the longstanding and unanimous position of the federal courts was that reasonable defense counsel
generally need only advise a client about the direct consequences of a criminal conviction. See, e.g.,
United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20, 28 (CAl 2000) (ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim fails if
"based on an attorney's failure to advise a client of his plea's immigration consequences"); United States
v. Banda, 1 F.3d 354, 355 (CA5 1993) (holding that "an [***36] attorney's failure to advise a client that
deportation is a possible consequence of a guilty plea does not constitute ineffective assistance of
counsel"); see generally Chin & Holmes, Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty
Pleas, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 697, 699 (2002) (hereinafter Chin & Holmes) (noting that "virtually all
jurisdictions"--including "eleven federal circuits, more than thirty states, and the District of Columbia"-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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"hold that defense counsel need not discuss with their clients the collateral consequences of a conviction,"
including deportation). While the line between "direct" and "collateral" consequences is not always clear,
see ante, at
, n. 8, 176 L. Ed. 2d, at 293, the collateral-consequences rule expresses an important truth:
Criminal defense attorneys have expertise regarding the conduct of criminal proceedings. They are not
expected to possess-and very often do not possess-expertise in other areas of the law, and it is unrealistic
to expect them to provide expert advice on [*1488] matters that lie outside their area of training and
experience.
This case happens to involve removal, but criminal convictions can carry a wide variety of
consequences other than conviction [***37] and sentencing, including civil commitment, civil forfeiture,
the loss of the right to vote, disqualification from public benefits, ineligibility to possess firearms,
dishonorable discharge from the Armed Forces, and loss of business or professional licenses. Chin &
Holmes 705-706. A criminal conviction may also severely damage a defendant's reputation and thus
impair the defendant's ability to obtain future employment or business opportunities. All of those
consequences are "seriou[s],M see ante, at
, 176 L Ed. 2d, at 299, but this Court has never held that a
criminal defense attorney's Sixth Amendment duties extend to providing advice about such matters.
The Court tries to justify its dramatic departure from precedent by pointing to the views of various
professional organizations. See ante, at
, 176 L. Ed. 2d, at 289 ("The weight of prevailing professional
[**301] norms supports the view that counsel must advise her client regarding the risk of deportation").
However, ascertaining the level of professional competence required by the Sixth Amendment is
ultimately a task for the courts. E.g., Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477, 120 S. Ct. 1029, 145 L. Ed.
2d 985 (2000). Although we may appropriately consult standards promulgated by private bar groups, we
cannot [***38] delegate to these groups our task of determining what the Constitution commands. See
Strickland, supra, at 688, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (explaining that "[prevailing norms of
practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards . . . are guides to determining what is
reasonable, but they are only guides"). And we must recognize that such standards may represent only the
aspirations of a bar group rather than an empirical assessment of actual practice.
Even if the only relevant consideration were "prevailing professional norms," it is hard to see how
those norms can support the duty the Court today imposes on defense counsel. Because many criminal
defense attorneys have little understanding of immigration law, see ante, at
, 176 L. Ed. 2d, at 295, it
should follow that a criminal defense attorney who refrains from providing immigration advice does not
violate prevailing professional norms. But the Court's opinion would not just require defense counsel to
warn the client of a general risk of removal; it would also require counsel in at least some cases, to
specify what the removal consequences of a conviction would be. See ante, at
- , 776 L. Ed. 2d, at
296.
The Court's new approach is particularly problematic because providing advice on whether [***39] a
conviction for a particular offense will make an alien removable is often quite complex. "Most crimes
affecting immigration status are not specifically mentioned by the [Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA)], but instead fall under a broad category of crimes, such as crimes involving moral turpitude or
aggravated felonies." M. Garcia & L. Eig, CRS Report for Congress, Immigration Consequences of
Criminal Activity (Sept. 20, 2006) (summary) (emphasis in original). As has been widely acknowledged,
determining whether a particular crime is an "aggravated felony" or a "crime involving moral turpitude
[(CIMT)]" is not an easy task. See R. McWhirter, ABA, The Criminal Lawyer's Guide to Immigration
Law: Questions and Answers 128 (2d ed. 2006) (hereinafter ABA Guidebook) ("Because of the increased
complexity of aggravated felony law, this edition devotes a new [30-page] chapter to the subject"); id., §
5.2, at 146 (stating that the aggravated felony list at 8 U.S.C § 1101(a)(43) is not clear [*1489] with
respect to several of the listed categories, that "the term 'aggravated felonies' can include misdemeanors,"
and that the determination of whether a crime is an "aggravated felony" is made "even [***40] more
difficult" because "several agencies and courts interpret the statute," including Immigration and Customs
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Enforcement, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), and Federal Circuit and district courts
considering immigration-law and criminal-law issues); ABA Guidebook § 4.65, at 130 ("Because nothing
is ever simple with immigration law, the terms 'conviction,' 'moral turpitude,' and 'single scheme of
criminal misconduct' are terms of art"); id, § 4.67, at 130 ("[T]he term 'moral turpitude' evades precise
definition").
[**302] Defense counsel who consults a guidebook on whether a particular crime is an "aggravated
felony" will often find that the answer is not "easily ascertained." For example, the ABA Guidebook
answers the question "Does simple possession count as an aggravated felony?" as follows: "Yes, at least
in the Ninth Circuit." § 5.35, at 160 (emphasis added). After a dizzying paragraph that attempts to explain
the evolution of the Ninth Circuit's view, the ABA Guidebook continues: "Adding to the confusion,
however, is that the Ninth Circuit has conflicting opinions depending on the context on whether simple
drug possession constitutes an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)." [***41] Id., § 5.35, at
161 (citing cases distinguishing between whether a simple possession offense is an aggravated felony "for
immigration purposes" or for "sentencing purposes"). The ABA Guidebook then proceeds to explain that
"attempted possession," id, § 5.36, at 161 (emphasis added), of a controlled substance is an aggravated
felony, while "[cjonviction under the federal accessory after the fact statute is probably not an aggravated
felony, but a conviction for accessory after the fact to the manufacture of methamphetamine is an
aggravated felony," id., § 537, at 161 (emphasis added). Conspiracy or attempt to commit drug trafficking
are aggravated felonies, but "[solicitation is not a drug-trafficking offense because a generic solicitation
offense is not an offense related to a controlled substance and therefore not an aggravated felony." Id., §
5.41, at 162.
Determining whether a particular crime is one involving moral turpitude is no easier. See id., at 134
("Writing bad checks may or may not be a CIMT" (emphasis added)); ibid. ("[RJeckless assault coupled
with an element of injury, but not serious injury, is probably not a CIMT" (emphasis added)); id., at 135
(misdemeanor driving [***42] under the influence is generally not a CIMT, but may be a CIMT if the
DUI results in injury or if the driver knew that his license had been suspended or revoked); id., at 136 ("If
there is no element of actual injury, the endangerment offense may not be a CIMT" (emphasis added));
ibid. ("Whether [a child abuse] conviction involves moral turpitude may depend on the subsection under
which the individual is convicted. Child abuse done with criminal negligence probably is not a CIMT"
(emphasis added)).
Many other terms of the INA are similarly ambiguous or may be confusing to practitioners not versed
in the intricacies of immigration law. To take just a few examples, it may be hard, in some cases, for
defense counsel even to determine whether a client is an alien,1 or whether a [*1490] particular state
disposition will result in a "conviction" for purposes of federal immigration law.2 The task of offering
advice about the immigration [**303] consequences of a criminal conviction is further complicated by
other problems, including significant variations among Circuit interpretations of federal immigration
statutes; the frequency with which immigration law changes; different rules governing the immigration
[***43] consequences of juvenile, first-offender, and foreign convictions; and the relationship between
the "length and type of sentence" and the determination "whether [an alien] is subject to removal, eligible
for relief from removal, or qualified to become a naturalized citizen," Immigration Law and Crimes § 2:1,
at 2-2 to 2-3.

1 Citizens are not deportable, but "[q]uestions of citizenship are not always simple." ABA
Guidebook § 4.20, at 113 (explaining that U.S. citizenship conferred by blood is " 'derivative,' "
and that "[derivative citizenship depends on a number of confusing factors, including whether the
citizen parent was the mother or father, the immigration laws in effect at the time of the parents'
and/or defendant's birth, and the parents' marital status").
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2
"A disposition that is not a 'conviction,1 under state law may still be a 'conviction' for
immigration purposes." Id., § 4.32, at 117 (citing Matter ofSalazar, 23I & N. Dec. 223, 231 (BIA
2002) (en banc)). For example, state law may define the term "conviction" not to include a deferred
adjudication, but such an adjudication would be deemed a conviction for purposes of federal
immigration law. See ABA Guidebook § 4.37; accord, [***44] D. Kesselbrenner & L. Rosenberg,
Immigration Law and Crimes § 2:1, p. 2-2 (2008) (hereinafter Immigration Law and Crimes) ("A
practitioner or respondent will not even know whether the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) or the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) will treat a particular state
disposition as a conviction for immigration purposes. In fact, the [BIA] treats certain state criminal
dispositions as convictions even though the state treats the same disposition as a dismissal").
In short, the professional organizations and guidebooks on which the Court so heavily relies are right
to say that "nothing is ever simple with immigration law"~including the determination whether
immigration law clearly makes a particular offense removable. ABA Guidebook § 4.65, at 130;
Immigration Law and Crimes § 2:1. I therefore cannot agree with the Court's apparent view that the Sixth
Amendment requires criminal defense attorneys to provide immigration advice.
The Court tries to downplay the severity of the burden it imposes on defense counsel by suggesting
that the scope of counsel's duty to offer advice concerning deportation consequences may turn on how
hard it is to determine [***45] those consequences. Where "the terms of the relevant immigration statute
are succinct, clear, and explicit in defining the removal consequence[s]" of a conviction, the Court says,
counsel has an affirmative duty to advise the client that he will be subject to deportation as a result of the
plea. Ante, at
, 176 L. Ed. 2d, at 295. But "[w]hen the law is not succinct and straightforward . . . , a
criminal defense attorney need do no more than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges
may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences." Ante, at
- , 176 L. Ed. 2d, at 296. This
approach is problematic for at least four reasons.
First, it will not always be easy to tell whether a particular statutory provision is "succinct, clear, and
explicit." How can an attorney who lacks general immigration law expertise be sure that a seemingly clear
statutory provision actually means what it seems to say when read in isolation? What if the application of
the provision to a particular case is not clear but a cursory examination of case law or administrative
decisions would provide a definitive answer? See Immigration Law and Crimes § 2:1, at 2-2
("Unfortunately, a practitioner or respondent cannot tell easily whether a conviction [***46] is for a
removable offense. . . . [T]he cautious practitioner or apprehensive respondent will not know [*1491]
conclusively the future immigration consequences of a guilty plea").
Second, if defense counsel must provide advice regarding only one of the many collateral
consequences of a criminal conviction, many defendants are likely to be misled. To take just one
example, a conviction for a particular offense may render an alien excludable but not removable. If an
alien charged [**304] with such an offense is advised only that pleading guilty to such an offense will
not result in removal, the alien may be induced to enter a guilty plea without realizing that a consequence
of the plea is that the alien will be unable to reenter the United States if the alien returns to his or her
home country for any reason, such as to visit an elderly parent or to attend a funeral. See ABA Guidebook
§ 4.14, at 111 ("Often the alien is both excludable and removable. At times, however, the lists are
different. Thus, the oddity of an alien that is inadmissible but not deportable. This alien should not leave
the United States because the government will not let him back in" (emphasis in original)). Incomplete
legal advice [***47] may be worse than no advice at all because it may mislead and may dissuade the
client from seeking advice from a more knowledgeable source.
Third, the Court's rigid constitutional rule could inadvertently head off more promising ways of
addressing the underlying problem—such as statutory or administrative reforms requiring trial judges to
inform a defendant on the record that a guilty plea may carry adverse immigration consequences. As
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amid point out, "28 states and the District of Columbia have already adopted rules, plea forms, or statutes
requiring courts to advise criminal defendants of the possible immigration consequences of their pleas."
Brief for State of Louisiana et al. 25; accord, Chin & Holmes 708 ("A growing number of states require
advice about deportation by statute or court rule"). A nonconstitutional rule requiring trial judges to
inform defendants on the record of the risk of adverse immigration consequences can ensure that a
defendant receives needed information without putting a large number of criminal convictions at risk; and
because such a warning would be given on the record, courts would not later have to determine whether
the defendant was misrepresenting [***48] the advice of counsel. Likewise, flexible statutory procedures
for withdrawing guilty pleas might give courts appropriate discretion to determine whether the interests of
justice would be served by allowing a particular defendant to withdraw a plea entered into on the basis of
incomplete information. Cf. United States v. Russell, 686F.2d35, 39-40, 222 US App. D.C. 313 (CADC
1982) (explaining that a district court's discretion to set aside a guilty plea under the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure should be guided by, among other considerations, "the possible existence of prejudice
to the government's case as a result of the defendant's untimely request to stand trial" and "the strength of
the defendant's reason for withdrawing the plea, including whether the defendant asserts his innocence of
the charge").
Fourth, the Court's decision marks a major upheaval in Sixth Amendment law. This Court decided
Strickland in 1984, but the majority does not cite a single case, from this or any other federal court,
holding that criminal defense counsel's failure to provide advice concerning the removal consequences of
a criminal conviction violates a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. As noted above, the
[***49] Court's view has been rejected by every Federal Court of Appeals to have considered the issue
thus far. See, e.g., Gonzalez, 202 F.3d, at 28; Banda, 1 F.3d, at 355; Chin & Holmes 697, 699. The
majority appropriately acknowledges that the lower courts [*1492] are "now quite experienced with
applying Strickland," ante, at [**305]
, 176 L. Ed. 2d, at 297, but it casually dismisses the
longstanding and unanimous position of the lower federal courts with respect to the scope of criminal
defense counsel's duty to advise on collateral consequences.
The majority seeks to downplay its dramatic expansion of the scope of criminal defense counsel's
duties under the Sixth Amendment by claiming that this Court in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S. Ct.
366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985), similarly "applied Strickland to a claim that counsel had failed to advise the
client regarding his parole eligibility before he pleaded guilty." Ante, at
, 176 L. Ed. 2d, at 297. That
characterization of Hill obscures much more than it reveals. The issue in Hill was whether a criminal
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated where counsel misinformed the client about
his eligibility for parole. The Court found it "unnecessary to determine whether there may be
circumstances under which erroneous [***50] advice by counsel as to parole eligibility may be deemed
constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel, because in the present case we conclude that petitioner's
allegations are insufficient to satisfy the Strickland v. Washington requirement of'prejudice.' 474 U.S., at
60, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203. Given that Hill expressly and unambiguously refused to decide
whether criminal defense counsel must avoid misinforming his or her client as to one consequence of a
criminal conviction (parole eligibility), that case plainly provides no support whatsoever for the
proposition that counsel must affirmatively advise his or her client as to another collateral consequence
(removal). By the Court's strange logic, Hill would support its decision here even if the Court had held
that misadvice concerning parole eligibility does not make counsel's performance objectively
unreasonable. After all, the Court still would have "applied Strickland" to the facts of the case at hand.
II
While mastery of immigration law is not required by Strickland, several considerations support the
conclusion that affirmative misadvice regarding the removal consequences of a conviction may constitute
ineffective assistance.
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First, a rule prohibiting [***51] affirmative misadvice regarding a matter as crucial to the defendant's
plea decision as deportation appears faithful to the scope and nature of the Sixth Amendment duty this
Court has recognized in its past cases. In particular, we have explained that "a guilty plea cannot be
attacked as based on inadequate legal advice unless counsel was not 'a reasonably competent attorney' and
the advice was not 'within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases! "
Strickland, 466 U.S., at 687, 104 S Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S.
759, 770, 771, 90 S Ct. 1441, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1970); emphasis added). As the Court appears to
acknowledge, thorough understanding of the intricacies of immigration law is not "within the range of
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.1' See ante, at
, 176 L. Ed. 2d, at 295
("Immigration law can be complex, and it is a legal specialty of its own. Some members of the bar who
represent clients facing criminal charges, in either state or federal court or both, may not be well versed in
it"). By contrast, reasonably competent attorneys [**306] should know that it is not appropriate or
responsible to hold themselves out as authorities on a difficult and complicated subject matter with which
they are [***52] not familiar. Candor concerning the limits of one's professional expertise, in other
words, is within the range of duties reasonably expected of defense attorneys in criminal cases. As the
dissenting judge on [*1493] the Kentucky Supreme Court put it, "I do not believe it is too much of a
burden to place on our defense bar the duty to say, 'I do not know.'" 253 S. W. 3d 482, 485 (2008).
Second, incompetent advice distorts the defendant's decisionmaking process and seems to call the
fairness and integrity of the criminal proceeding itself into question. See Strickland, 466 U.S., at 686, 104
S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 ("In giving meaning to the requirement [of effective assistance of counsel],
we must take its purpose—to ensure a fair trial—as the guide"). When a defendant opts to plead guilty
without definitive information concerning the likely effects of the plea, the defendant can fairly be said to
assume the risk that the conviction may carry indirect consequences of which he or she is not aware. That
is not the case when a defendant bases the decision to plead guilty on counsel's express misrepresentation
that the defendant will not be removable. In the latter case, it seems hard to say that the plea was entered
[***53] with the advice of constitutionally competent counsel—or that it embodies a voluntary and
intelligent decision to forsake constitutional rights. See ibid. ("The benchmark forjudging any claim of
ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result").
Third, a rule prohibiting unreasonable misadvice regarding exceptionally important collateral matters
would not deter or interfere with ongoing political and administrative efforts to devise fair and reasonable
solutions to the difficult problem posed by defendants who plead guilty without knowing of certain
important collateral consequences.
Finally, the conclusion that affirmative misadvice regarding the removal consequences of a
conviction can give rise to ineffective assistance would, unlike the Court's approach, not require any
upheaval in the law. As the Solicitor General points out, "[t]he vast majority of the lower courts
considering claims of ineffective assistance in the plea context have [distinguished] between defense
counsel who remain silent and defense counsel who give affirmative misadvice." [***54] Brief for
United States as Amicus Curiae 8 (citing cases). At least three Courts of Appeals have held that
affirmative misadvice on immigration matters can give rise to ineffective assistance of counsel, at least in
some circumstances.3 And several other Circuits have held that affirmative [**307] misadvice
concerning nonimmigration consequences of a conviction can violate the Sixth Amendment even if those
consequences might be deemed "collateral."4 By contrast, it appears that [*1494] no court of appeals
holds that affirmative misadvice concerning collateral consequences in general and removal in particular
can never give rise to ineffective assistance. In short, the considered and thus far unanimous view of the
lower federal courts charged with administering Strickland clearly supports the conclusion that that
Kentucky Supreme Court's position goes too far.
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3 See United States v. Kwan, 407 K3d 1005, 1015-1017 (CA9 2005); United States v. Couto, 311
F.3d 179, 188 (CA2 2002); Downs-Morgan v. United States, 765 F.2d 1534, 1540-1541 (CA11
1985) (limiting holding to the facts of the case); see also Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 548 FJd
327, 333-334 (CA5 2008) (concluding that counsel's advice was [***55] not objectively
unreasonable where counsel did not purport to answer questions about immigration law, did not
claim any expertise in immigration law, and simply warned of "possible" deportation consequence;
use of the word "possible" was not an affirmative misrepresentation, even though it could indicate
that deportation was not a certain consequence).
4 See Hill v. Lockhart, 894 F.2d 1009, 1010 (CA8 1990) (en banc) ("[T]he erroneous paroleeligibility advice given to Mr. Hill was ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v.
Washington"); Sparks v. Sowders, 852 FJd 882, 885 (CA6 1988) ("[Gjross misadvice concerning
parole eligibility can amount to ineffective assistance of counsel"); id., at 886 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) ("When the maximum possible exposure is overstated, the defendant might well be
influenced to accept a plea agreement he would otherwise reject"); Strader v. Garrison, 611 F.2d
61, 65 (CA4 1979) ("[T]hough parole eligibility dates are collateral consequences of the entry of a
guilty plea of which a defendant need not be informed if he does not inquire, when he is grossly
misinformed about it by his lawyer, and relies upon that misinformation, he is deprived [***56] of
his constitutional right to counsel").
In concluding that affirmative misadvice regarding the removal consequences of a criminal
conviction may constitute ineffective assistance, I do not mean to suggest that the Sixth Amendment does
no more than require defense counsel to avoid misinformation. When a criminal defense attorney is aware
that a client is an alien, the attorney should advise the client that a criminal conviction may have adverse
consequences under the immigration laws and that the client should consult an immigration specialist if
the client wants advice on that subject. By putting the client on notice of the danger of removal, such
advice would significantly reduce the chance that the client would plead guilty under a mistaken premise.
Ill
In sum, a criminal defense attorney should not be required to provide advice on immigration law, a
complex specialty that generally lies outside the scope of a criminal defense attorney's expertise. On the
other hand, any competent criminal defense attorney should appreciate the extraordinary importance that
the risk of removal might have in the client's determination whether to enter a guilty plea. Accordingly,
unreasonable and incorrect [***57] information concerning the risk of removal can give rise to an
ineffectiveness claim. In addition, silence alone is not enough to satisfy counsel's duty to assist the client.
Instead, an alien defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel is satisfied if defense counsel advises the
client that a conviction may have immigration consequences, that immigration law is a specialized field,
that the attorney is not an immigration lawyer, and that the client should consult an immigration specialist
if the client wants advice on that subject.

DISSENT BY: SCALIA

DISSENT
Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joins, dissenting.
In the best of all possible worlds, criminal defendants contemplating a guilty plea ought to be advised
of all serious collateral consequences of conviction, and surely ought not to be misadvised. The
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Constitution, however, is not an all-purpose tool for judicial construction of a perfect world; and when we
ignore its text in [**308] order to make it that, we often find ourselves swinging a sledge where a tack
hammer is needed.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused a lawyer "for his defense" against a "criminal
prosecutio[n]"-not for sound advice about the collateral consequences of conviction. [***58] For that
reason, and for the practical reasons set forth in Part I of Justice Alito's concurrence, I dissent from the
Court's conclusion that the Sixth Amendment requires counsel to provide accurate advice concerning the
potential removal consequences of a guilty plea.. For the same reasons, but unlike the concurrence, I do
not believe that affirmative misadvice about those consequences renders [*1495] an attorney's assistance
in defending against the prosecution constitutionally inadequate; or that the Sixth Amendment requires
counsel to warn immigrant defendants that a conviction may render them removable. Statutory provisions
can remedy these concerns in a more targeted fashion, and without producing permanent, and legislatively
irreparable, overkill.
***
The Sixth Amendment as originally understood and ratified meant only that a defendant had a right to
employ counsel, or to use volunteered services of counsel. See, United States v. Van Duzee, 140 US. 169,
173, 11 S Ct. 758, 11 S Ct. 941, 35 L. Ed. 399 (1891); W. Beaney, Right to Counsel in American Courts
21, 28-29 (1955). We have held, however, that the Sixth Amendment requires the provision of counsel to
indigent defendants at government expense, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US. 335, 344-345, 83 S. Ct. 792,
9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963), [***59] and that the right to "the assistance of counsel" includes the right to
effective assistance, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674
(1984). Even assuming the validity of these holdings, I reject the significant further extension that the
Court, and to a lesser extent the concurrence, would create. We have until today at least retained the Sixth
Amendment's textual limitation to criminal prosecutions. "[W]e have held that 'defence' means defense at
trial, not defense in relation to other objectives that may be important to the accused." Rothgery v.
Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191,
, 128 S. Ct. 2578, 171 L. Ed. 2d 366 (2008) (Alito, J., concurring)
(summarizing cases). We have limited the Sixth Amendment to legal advice directly related to defense
against prosecution of the charged offense—advice at trial, of course, but also advice at postindictment
interrogations and lineups, Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205-206, 84 S. Ct. 1199, 12 L. Ed. 2d
246 (1964); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-238, 87 S Ct. 1926, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (1967), and
in general advice at all phases of the prosecution where the defendant would be at a disadvantage when
pitted alone against the legally trained agents of the state, see Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 430, 106
S. Ct. 1135, 89 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1986). [***60] Not only have we not required advice of counsel regarding
consequences collateral to prosecution, we have not even required counsel appointed to defend against
one prosecution to be present when the defendant is interrogated in connection with another possible
prosecution arising from the same event. Texas v. Cobb, 532 US. 162, 164, 121 S. Ct. 1335, 149 L. Ed.
2d 321 (2001).
There is no basis in text or in principle [**309] to extend the constitutionally required advice
regarding guilty pleas beyond those matters germane to the criminal prosecution at hand—to wit, the
sentence that the plea will produce, the higher sentence that conviction after trial might entail, and the
chances of such a conviction. Such matters fall within "the range of competence demanded of attorneys in
criminal cases," McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1970). See
id., at 769-770, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763 (describing the matters counsel and client must consider
in connection with a contemplated guilty plea). We have never held, as the logic of the Court's opinion
assumes, that once counsel is appointed all professional responsibilities of counsel-even those extending
beyond defense against the prosecution—become constitutional commands. Cf. Cobb, supra, at 171, n. 2,
121 S. Ct. 1335, 149 L. Ed. 2d 321; [***61] Moran, supra, at 430, 106 S Ct. 1135, 89 L. Ed. 2d 410.
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Because the subject of the misadvice here was not the prosecution for which Jose Padilla was entitled to
effective assistance of counsel, the Sixth Amendment has no application.
[*1496] Adding to counsel's duties an obligation to advise about a conviction's collateral
consequences has no logical stopping-point. As the concurrence observes,

"[A] criminal convictio[n] can carry a wide variety of consequences other than
conviction and sentencing, including civil commitment, civil forfeiture, the loss of the right
to vote, disqualification from public benefits, ineligibility to possess firearms, dishonorable
discharge from the Armed Forces, and loss of business or professional licenses. . . . All of
those consequences are 'serious,' . . . ." Ante, at
- , 176 L. Ed. 2d, at 300 (Alito, J.,
concurring in j udgment).

But it seems to me that the concurrence suffers from the same defect. The same indeterminacy, the
same inability to know what areas of advice are relevant, attaches to misadvice. And the concurrence's
suggestion that counsel must warn defendants of potential removal consequences, see ante, at
- ,
176 L. Ed. 2d, at 307—what would come to be known as the "Padilla warning"—cannot be limited to those
consequences [***62] except by judicial caprice. It is difficult to believe that the warning requirement
would not be extended, for example, to the risk of heightened sentences in later federal prosecutions
pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). We could expect years of elaboration
upon these new issues in the lower courts, prompted by the defense bar's devising of ever-expanding
categories of plea-invalidating misadvice and failures to warn-not to mention innumerable evidentiary
hearings to determine whether misadvice really occurred or whether the warning was really given.
The concurrence's treatment of misadvice seems driven by concern about the voluntariness of
Padilla's guilty plea. See ante, at
, 176 L. Ed. 2d, at 306. But that concern properly relates to the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, not to the Sixth Amendment. See McCarthy v.
United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466, 89 S Ct. 1166, 22 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1969); Brady v. United States, 397
U.S. 742, 748, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747 (1970). Padilla has not argued before us that his guilty
plea was not knowing and voluntary. If that is, however, the true substance of [**310] his claim (and if
he has properly preserved it) the state court can address it on remand.1 But we should not smuggle
[***63] the claim into the Sixth Amendment.

1 I do not mean to suggest that the Due Process Clause would surely provide relief. We have
indicated that awareness of "direct consequences" suffices for the validity of a guilty plea. See
Brady, 397 US, at 755, 90 S Ct. 1463, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747 (internal quotation marks omitted). And
the required colloquy between a federal district court and a defendant required by Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 11(b) (formerly Rule 11(c)), which we have said approximates the due process
requirements for a valid plea, see Libretti v. United States, 516 US. 29, 49-50, 116 S. Ct. 356, 133
L. Ed. 2d 271 (1995), does not mention collateral consequences. Whatever the outcome, however,
the effect of misadvice regarding such consequences upon the validity of a guilty plea should be
analyzed under the Due Process Clause.
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The Court's holding prevents legislation that could solve the problems addressed by today's opinions
in a more precise and targeted fashion. If the subject had not been constitutionalized, legislation could
specify which categories of misadvice about matters ancillary to the prosecution invalidate plea
agreements, what collateral consequences counsel must bring to a defendant's attention, and what
warnings must be given. [***64] 2 Moreover, legislation could provide consequences for the misadvice,
[*1497] nonadvice, or failure to warn, other than nullification of a criminal conviction after the witnesses
and evidence needed for retrial have disappeared. Federal immigration law might provide, for example,
that the near-automatic removal which follows from certain criminal convictions will not apply where the
conviction rested upon a guilty plea induced by counsel's misadvice regarding removal consequences. Or
legislation might put the government to a choice in such circumstances: Either retry the defendant or
forgo the removal. But all that has been precluded in favor of today's sledge hammer.

2 As the Court's opinion notes, ante, at
, n. 15, 176 L. Ed. 2d, at 299, many Statesincluding Kentucky-already require that criminal defendants be warned of potential removal
consequences.
In sum, the Sixth Amendment guarantees adequate assistance of counsel in defending against a
pending criminal prosecution. We should limit both the constitutional obligation to provide advice and the
consequences of bad advice to that well defined area.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

NERIMJELASHOVIC,

STATE'S ESQPO0ED FINDINGS
OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW AND ORDER DENYING
THE PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF

Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF UTAH,

Case No. 100903903
Respondent.
Judge Vernice S. Trease

This matter came before the Court on 7 October 2010 for an evidentiary
hearing on the remaining claim in the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief: that
Petitioner's counsel was ineffective for misadvising him about the immigration
consequences of his guilty pleas. Petitioner was present and was represented by
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counsel, Mr. Jonathon W. Grimes. The State appeared though counsel, Assistant
Attorney General Christopher D. Ballard.
In addition to the testimony and evidence received at the evidentiary
hearing, the Court has reviewed and relied upon the court file in this case, and
the record of the underlying criminal case, number 031900035, including all
transcripts from that case. The Court incorporates the entire record from the
underlying criminal case into this case. Now being fully advised in the premises,
the Court enters the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order
denying the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.

BACKGROUND
Petitioner, Nerim Jelashovic, seeks relief under the Post-Conviction
Remedies Act (PCRA), UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-9-101 to -110, from his
convictions for two counts of forcible sexual abuse, a second degree felony in
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-404. His Petition alleges two claims.
Petition at 9-10. First, he claims that his counsel "threatened/' "berated/' and
"coerced" him into entering his guilty pleas. Petition at 9,10. Second, he claims
that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by misadvising him about the
immigration consequences of his guilty plea. Id. at 9.
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The State moved to dismiss both claims as barred by the PCRA's statute of
limitations, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-107. In an order entered 13 September
2010, the Court granted the State's motion on Jelashovic's first claim, but denied
the motion on his second claim. The Court set the evidentiary hearing to resolve
the second claim.
LEGAL STANDARDS
As petitioner, Jelashovic "has the burden of . . . proving by a
preponderance of the evidence the facts necessary to entitle [him] to relief."
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-105(l). To prevail on an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, Jelashovic must satisfy the two-part test of Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). First, he must show "'that his counsel rendered
a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, which performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment/" Benvenuto v.
State, 2007 UT 53, % 18,165 P.3d 1195 (quoting Bundy v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 805
(Utah 1988)). Second, he must show "'that counsel's performance prejudiced'
him." Id.
To demonstrate deficient performance, Jelashovic must show that his
"'counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.'"
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Id. at f 19 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). Reasonableness is assessed based
on '"prevailing professional norms/" Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688).
To demonstrate prejudice, Jelashovic must do more than simply "'show
that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding/"
Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693). Rather, he "'must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different/" Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at
694).
"When challenging a guilty plea on the grounds of ineffective assistance of
counsel, a petitioner must demonstrate '"a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's errors he . . . would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted
on going to trial/"" Id. at f 24 (quoting Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 525 (Utah
1994) in turn quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). "[A] petitioner must
convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been
rational under the circumstances." Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473,1485 (2010)
(citing Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470,480,486 (2000)).
The prejudice inquiry turns, in large part, on the likelihood that Jelashovic
could have succeeded if he had gone to trial. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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60 (1985).

Indeed, "[C]ourts applying this standard will often review the

strength of the prosecutor's case as the best evidence of whether a defendant in
fact would have changed his plea and insisted on going to trial/7 Miller v.
Champion, 262 F.3d 1066,1072 (10th Cir. 2001).
FINDINGS OF FACT
The criminal charges
1.

In January 2003, the State charged Jelashovic with two counts of

aggravated sexual assault, a first degree felony in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-5-405. Both counts were punishable by minimum mandatory prison sentences
of six, ten, or fifteen years to life. The charges were based on allegations that
Jelashovic had vaginally and anally raped the victim, and that both acts caused
the victim bodily injury.
2.

Jelashovic retained Mr. D. Christopher VanCampen to represent him.

3.

After considering the facts and circumstances of the case, Mr.

VanCampen determined that there was a substantial risk that Jelashovic would
be convicted if the case went to trial. He understood that a conviction would
result in a mandatory prison sentence.
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4.

Mr. VanCampen also understood that Jelashovic is not a citizen of the

United States and therefore a conviction of aggravated sexual assault, or any
other related felony, would make Jelashovic eligible for deportation.
5. Mr. VanCampen's objectives in representing Jelashovic were to avoid
prison and deportation if possible.
6.

Mr. VanCampen spoke with federal officials from United States

Immigration and Customs Enforcement1 (ICE) and agents from Utah's Adult
Probation and Parole (AP&P) about the likelihood that Jelashovic would actually
be deported if he were convicted of a felony. Based on those conversations, Mr.
VanCampen understood that although a felony conviction would make
Jelashovic deportable, Jelashovic might be able to avoid actually being deported
if he was sentenced to probation and successfully completed that probation.
The plea agreement

7.

Mr. VanCampen therefore attempted to negotiate a plea agreement to

charges for which probation would be a sentencing option.

1

The United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), was
formerly known as the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service
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8.

Mr. VanCampen succeeded in negotiating such an agreement. The

plea agreement provided that the State would reduce the original charges to two
counts of forcible sexual abuse, a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-404. Those charges did not require a mandatory prison sentence.
9.

Mr. VanCampen advised Jelashovic to accept the plea offer because he

believed that it gave Jelashovic the best opportunity to avoid prison and actual
deportation.
10. Jelashovic accepted the plea offer and pled guilty to two counts of
forcible sexual abuse, a second degree felony.
11. Judge Hansen initially refused to accept the guilty pleas because
Jelashovic insisted that his sexual contact with the victim was consensual.
12. However, at a second plea hearing, Jelashovic admitted that the sexual
contact was non-consensual. Judge Hansen therefore accepted the pleas.
13. When he entered his guilty pleas, Jelashovic understood that there
was no guarantee that he would be sentenced to probation. The plea affidavit
and both plea colloquies establish that Jelashovic understood that Judge Hansen
could sentence him to prison. Jelashovic also testified at the evidentiary hearing
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that he understood when he entered his pleas that he could be sentenced to
prison.
Sentencing
14. Judge Hansen ordered Jelashovic to undergo a ninety-day diagnostic
evaluation at the Utah State Prison.
15. During that evaluation, Jelashovic admitted to the evaluators that the
victim did not consent. In fact, he eventually admitted to a version of the events
that matched the victim's version. Jelashovic also admitted to the investigator
who prepared the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report that the victim did not
consent.
16. At sentencing, the prosecutor recommended that Jelashovic be
sentenced to probation and serve two years in jail as a condition of that
probation.
17. AP&P also recommended that Jelashovic be sentenced to probation.
18. Judge Hansen mentioned at sentencing that it appeared the federal
government was planning to deport Jelashovic because there was an I.N.S. hold
on him.
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19. Mr. VanCampen responded that, "I've discussed that with him and
I'm told t h a t . . . as long as he performs well on probation and doesn't get into
further trouble, that at this point, he's not going to be deported."

Tr. of 6

February 2004 Sentencing Hearing at 7.
20. Judge Hansen disregarded the recommendations for probation and
sentenced Jelashovic to serve concurrent sentences of one to fifteen years in the
Utah State Prison.
21. Jelashovic now faces deportation proceedings once he is released from
prison.
Mr. VanCampen's advice
22. Mr. VanCampen discussed the immigration consequences of the plea
agreement with Jelashovic before he entered his guilty pleas.
23. Mr. VanCampen testified that he advised Jelashovic that his guilty
plea would make him deportable, but that he might be able to avoid actually
being deported if he were sentenced to probation and successfully completed the
probationary term.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

24. Mr. VanCampen was adamant that he told Jelashovic that nothing was
certain, and therefore there was no guarantee that successfully completing
probation would mean he would not be deported.
25. Jelashovic testified that Mr. VanCampen told him that there would not
be any immigration consequences if he accepted the plea offer.
26. However, Jelashovic's recollection of the alleged advice is unreliable
because it is contrary to Mr. VanCampen's statement at the sentencing hearing.
Mr. VanCampen's recollection of his advice about the immigration consequences
is more consistent with his statement at sentencing.
27. The unreliability of Jelashovic's recollection is also supported by his
difficulty in remembering when he and his counsel discussed the immigration
consequences of his plea. At one point, Jelashovic testified that he and his
counsel did not discuss immigration consequences until the sentencing hearing.
However, he later retracted this statement and testified that the consequences
were discussed before the first plea hearing.
28. Jelashovic's inconsistent statements about whether

the victim

consented also call into question the reliability of his testimony. In his criminal
case, Jelashovic did not merely plead "not guilty."

Rather, he affirmatively
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represented to Judge Hansen that the victim had consented. His subsequent
admissions that she did not consent are inconsistent with his previous statements
and therefore undermine his credibility.
29. Having considered all of the evidence and observed the witnesses'
testimony, the Court finds that Mr. VanCampen provided the more reliable
testimony about his advice to Jelashovic —specifically, that although a guilty plea
would make Jelashovic deportable, it was possible that he would not actually be
deported if he were sentenced to probation and successfully completed it.
30. Jelashovic provided no testimony or evidence that this advice was /
incorrect or otherwise objectively unreasonable based on prevailing professional
norms.
The State's evidence in the criminal case
31. Had this case gone to trial, the State possessed overwhelming evidence
that Jelashovic was guilty of the original aggravated sexual assault charges. That
evidence is detailed in the following findings of fact.
32. On the night of the crime, Jelashovic boasted that he was going to have
sex that night and it did not matter with whom.
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33. The crimes occurred during a party at Jelashovic's home. Jelashovic's
friends were present along with the victim, her best friend, her twin brother, and
her step-sister.
34.

Jelashovic took the victim into his bedroom where he had

pornographic posters on the walls depicting women using sex toys.

The

prosecutor would have sought to introduce the posters to demonstrate
Jelashovic's objectification of women.
35. The victim would have testified that she told Jelashovic that she did
not want to have sex, that she was menstruating, and that she was also using a
tampon at the time.
36. The victim would have also testified that she physically resisted
Jelashovic's attempts to kiss her, remove her clothing, and have sex with her.
37. The victim would have testified that Jelashovic forcibly removed her
clothing and raped her both vaginally and anally. Jelashovic then ejaculated on
her abdomen or stomach and threw her a t-shirt, telling her to wipe herself off.
38. The victim left Jelashovic's bedroom, found her best friend, and
immediately told her that Jelashovic had raped her and that her tampon was lost
inside of her. The victim's hands were covered in blood.
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39. The victim immediately left Jelashovic's house with her friend, her
brother, and her step-sister, and went directly to the hospital.
40. A forensic nurse examined the victim at the hospital. The nurse noted
that the victim was bleeding and had suffered significant injuries to her vagina
and anus. The victim was in severe pain and crying during the exam.
41. The forensic nurse discovered the victim's tampon jammed sideways
under the lip of her cervix.
42. The prosecutor was confident that although the victim had some
anxiety about testifying, she would have been willing and able to testify had the
case gone to trial.
43. Jelashovic admitted to officers that he had had sex with the victim and
that he had ejaculated on her chest. His semen was found on the victim's pants.
44. The prosecutor testified that the witnesses agreed to "ninety percent"
of the facts and the only disputed issue was whether the sexual contact was
consensual.
45. Approximately two weeks before the scheduled trial date, Jelashovic
made inculpatory statements to an investigator who went to measure his home
to diagram it in preparation for the trial. Jelashovic told the investigator that he
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had had sex with the victim and that he was trying to get in touch with his
defense counsel so that he could enter a guilty plea. Jelashovic also admitted to
the investigator that he had done something wrong and that he wanted to move
on.
46. At the evidentiary hearing, Jelashovic presented no evidence that
would have supported a defense that the victim had consented.
47. Jelashovic's subsequent admissions that the victim did not consent
demonstrate that any consent defense would have been a fabrication.
Based on the foregoing findings of fact, the Court enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Jelashovic fails to demonstrate that Mr. VanCampen performed

deficiently.

Jelashovic provided no evidence that Mr. VanCampen's advice

about the immigration consequences of the plea was incorrect or otherwise
objectively unreasonable.
2. Jelashovic also fails to demonstrate prejudice. Even assuming that Mr.
VanCampen's advice amounted to deficient performance, Jelashovic fails to
demonstrate that, had he known that accepting the plea would make him
deportable, he would have rejected the plea offer and insisted on going to trial.
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Jelashovic fails to demonstrate that it"would have been rational under the
circumstances'' to reject the plea bargain. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473,
1485 (2010). Although accepting the plea offer would make him deportable,
being convicted of more serious charges at trial would have also made him
deportable.
Given the evidence that the State possessed, Jelashovic had little, if any
chance of acquittal at trial. It was unlikely that any reasonable juror would have
believed that the victim consented. Jelashovic's admissions to the diagnostic
evaluators and AP&P agents demonstrate that the consent defense was a
fabrication.

A conviction at trial on the more serious charges would have

resulted in a mandatory prison sentence of at least six, and maybe twelve years,
and still subjected Jelashovic to deportation.
However, the plea offer gave Jelashovic an opportunity to avoid prison.
And, based on the evidence before the Court, the plea offer also gave Jelashovic
his best opportunity to avoid actually being deported.

Given these facts,

Jelashovic fails to demonstrate that it would have been rational to reject the plea
offer and go to trial.
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Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Court
enters the following:
ORDER
Petitioner's remaining claim that his counsel provided

ineffective

assistance by misadvising him of the immigration consequences of his guilty
pleas is DENIED.
Whereas this resolves the only remaining claim for relief, the Petition for
Post-Conviction Relief is^also DENIED.
DATED Z_!_-Qctp5aF2010BY THE COURT:

VERNICEXTREA:
Third Judicial Distric^^frrtji

Submitted by counsel for Respondent
21 October 2010

Christopher D. Ballard
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Respondent
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

NERIMJELASHOVIC,
ORDER ON THE STATE'S
MOTION TO DISMISS

Petitioner,
v.

Case No. 100903903

STATE OF UTAH,
Judge Vernice S. Trease
Respondent.

This matter came before the Court on 25 August 2010 for argument on the
State's motion to dismiss the Petition as untimely. Petitioner was present and
was represented by counsel, Mr. Jonathon W. Grimes.

The State appeared

though counsel, Assistant Attorney General Christopher D. Ballard.
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Having

reviewed all of the memoranda filed in relation to the motion and heard
argument from both parties the Court now rules as follows.
ANALYSIS
Although the Utah Supreme Court retains constitutional authority over
post-conviction review, the 2010 amendment to Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, demonstrates that the Utah Supreme Court has adopted the PostConviction Remedies Act (PCRA), including its statute of limitations, UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78B-9-107, as controlling. Based on Rule 65C, and Gardner v. State,
2010 UT 46, | f 58-61, 90-94, 658 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, the Court concludes that it
must apply the PCRA as written and that it cannot read an exception into the
Act's statute of limitations.
Applying the PCRA's statute of limitations, the Court concludes that the
State's motion should be granted in part and denied in part. The State's motion
is granted as to Petitioner's claim that his counsel coerced him into entering his
guilty plea. Petitioner knew of the evidentiary facts supporting that claim after
his 18 July 2003 plea hearing. Therefore, his claim accrued when his conviction
became final on 12 March 2004, and Petitioner then had one year, or until 12
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March 2005, to assert this claim. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-107(l). Because
he did not raise this claim until 8 March 2010, it is untimely.
The State's motion is denied as to Petitioner's claim that his counsel
misrepresented the immigration consequences of his guilty pleas.

A post-

conviction cause of action accrues on "the date on which petitioner knew or
should have known, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts
on which the petition is based/7 See id. § 78B-9-107(2)(e). The State contends that
Petitioner knew of the evidentiary facts supporting this claim when he was
sentenced on 6 February 2004. However, the Court cannot find that Petitioner
knew of sufficient evidentiary facts at the sentencing hearing to cause this claim
to accrue.
Based on the foregoing, the Court enters the following:
ORDER
1. The State's motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.
2. With respect to Petitioner's claim that his guilty plea is invalid because
his counsel "threatened/' "berated," and "coerced" him into entering his guilty
pleas, the State's motion is GRANTED and that claim is DISMISSED.
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3. With respect to Petitioner's claim that his counsel provided ineffective
assistance because he misrepresented the immigration consequences of
Petitioner's guilty plea, the State's motion is DENIED.
DATED (°

^ a f c t 2010
BY THE COURT:

VERN*6B$. IREASE
Third Jucfifija| District Court Judge
••>*o::."

Approved as to form:

Jonathon W. Grimes
Counsel for Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on 26 August 20101 mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of
the foregoing (proposed) ORDER ON THE STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS, to:
Jonathon W. Grimes
FLINT, GRIMES & HULLINGER

455 East 400 South, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ADDENDUM
D

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

OMB No. 1615-0067; Expires 04/30/11

1-589, Application for Asylum
and for Withholding of Removal

U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review

START HERE - Type or print in black ink. See the instructions for information about eligibilty and how to complete and file this
application. There is NO filing fee for this application.
_____
NOTE: Check this box if you also want to apply for withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture.

•

2. U.S. Social Security Number (if any)
647-38-1088

1. Alien Registration Number(s) (A-Number) (if any)
A-071-754-808

5. Middle Name

4. First Name
Nerim

3. Complete Last Name
Jelaskovic

6. What other names have you used (include maiden name and aliases)?
7. Residence in the U.S. (where you physically reside)

Telephone Number
(801 ) 849-8873

Street Number and Name
3710 S. 5600 W.

Apt. Number

City
West Valley City

State
UT

Zip Code
84120

8. Mailing Address in the U.S.
(if different than the address in No. 7)

Telephone Number

In Care Of (if applicable):

(

Apt. Number

Street Number and Name
City

Zip Code

State

9. Gender:

Male

)

LJ Female

10. Marital Status:

|X]

Single

11. Date of Birth (mm/dd/yyyy)
03/27/1984

12. City and Country of Birth
Sarajevo, Yugoslavia

13. Present Nationality (Citizenship)
Bosnia Herzogovina

14. Nationality at Birth
Yugoslavian

LJ

Married

LJ

Divorced

15. Race, Ethnic, or Tribal Group
Bosnian

LJ Widowed

16. Religion
Catholic

17. Check the box, a through c, that applies: a . •
I have never been in Immigration Court proceedings.
c
b. [X] I am now in Immigration Court proceedings.
- LJ I am not now in Immigration Court proceedings, but I have been in the past.
18. Complete 18 a through c.
a. When did you last leave your country? (mmm/dd/yyyy) 01/01/1991
b. What is your current 1-94 Number, if any?
c. List each entry into the U.S. beginning with your most recent entry.
List date (mm/dd/yyyy), place, and your status for each entry.(Attach additional sheets as needed.)
Date

12/11/1997

Place Chicago

Status Refugee

Date

Place

Status

Date

Place

Status

19. What country issued your last
passport or travel document?
Bosnia
22. What is your native language
(include dialect, if applicable)?
Serbo-Croatian

20. Passport #
Travel Document #

Date Status Expires:

21. Expiration Date
(mm/dd/yyyy)
06/11/2005

23. Are you fluent in English? 24. What other languages do you speak fluently?
[X] Yes
• No
English
Action:

For EOIR use only.
Interview Date:

ForUSCIS use only. Decision:
Approval Date:
Denial Date:

Asylum Officer ID#:
Referral Date:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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tart A, II*Infontaatioii About Yjour Spouse and Children
I am not married. (Skip to Your Children below.)

Your spouse

1. Alien Registration Number (A-Number) 2. Passport/ID Card No.
Of any)
(ifany)

3. Date of Birth
(mm/dd/yyyy)

4. U.S. Social Security No. (ifany)

5. Complete Last Name

6. First Name

9. Date of Marriage (mm/dd/yyyy)

10. Place of Marriage

11. City and Country of Birth

12. Nationality (Citizenship)

13. Race, Ethnic, or Tribal Group

14. Gender

8. Maiden Name

7. Middle Name

| | Male

Q

Female

15. Is this person in the U.S.?
| | Yes (Complete Blocks 16 to 24.)
16. Place of last entry into the U.S.

Q ] No (Specify location):
18.1-94 No. (ifany)

17. Date of last entry into the
U.S. (mm/dd/yyyy)

19. Status when last admitted
(Visa type, ifany)

21. What is the expiration date of his/her 22. Is your spouse in Immigration 23. If previously in the U.S., date of
Court proceedings?
authorized stay, if any? (mm/dd/yyyy)
previous arrival (mm/dd/yyyy)
•
Yes
•
No

20. What is your spouse's
current status/

24. If in the U.S., is your spouse to be included in this application? (Check the appropriate box.)
| | Yes (Attach one photograph ofyour spouse in the upper right corner of Page 9 on the extra copy of the application submittedfor this person.)
•

No

Your Children. List all of your children, regardless of age, location, or marital status.
[X] I do not have any children. (Skip to Part A. III., Information about your background.)
| | I have children.

Total number of children:

(NOTE: Use Form 1-589 Supplement A or attach additional sheets of paper and documentation if you have more than four children.)
1. Alien Registration Number (A-Number) 2. Passport/ID Card No. (ifany)
(ifany)

3. Marital Status (Married, Single,
Divorced, Widowed)

5. Complete Last Name

6. First Name

9. City and Country of Birth

10. Nationality (Citizenship) 11. Race, Ethnic, or Tribal Group

4. U.S. Social Security No.
(ifany)

8. Date of Birth (mm/dd/yyyy)

7. Middle Name

12. Gender
[ | Male

Q

Female

13. Is this child in the U.S. ?
| | Yes (Complete Blocks 14 to 21.)
14. Place of last entry in the U.S.

18. What is your child's
current status?

Q No (Specify location.)

15. Date of last entry in the
U.S. (mm/dd/yyyy)

16.1-94 No. (ifany)

17. Status when last admitted
(Visa type, ifany)

19. What is the expiration date of his/her 20. Is your child in Immigration Court proceedings?
authorized stay, if any? (mm/dd/yyyy)

•

Yes

•

No

21. If in the U.S., is this child to be included in this application? (Check the appropriate box.)
| | Yes (Attach one photograph ofyour child in the upper right corner of Page 9 on the extra copy of the application submittedfor this person.)

• No

iiiiiiniiinininyiiniiiuiiini
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|art A. II, Information About Your Spouse and Children (Continue
1. Alien Registration Number (A-Number) 2. Passport/ID Card No.
Of any)

(if any)

5. Complete Last Name

6. First Name

9. City and Country of Birth

10. Nationality (Citizenship)

13.

3. Marital Status (Married, Single,
Divorced, Widowed)

4. U.S. Social Security No.
(ifany)

8. Date of Birth (mm/dd/yyyy)

7. Middle Name

12. Gender
| | Male

11. Race, Ethnic, or Tribal Group

Q

Female

Is this child in the U.S. ?
| | Yes (Complete Blocks 14 to 21.) Q No (Specify location.)

14. Place of last entry into the U.S.

18. What is your child's
current status?

16.1-94 No. (Ifany)

15. Date of last entry into the
U.S. (mm/dd/yyyy)

19. What is the expiration date of his/her
authorized stay, ifany? (mm/dd/yyyy)

17. Status when last admitted
(Visa type, ifany)

20. Is your child in Immigration Court proceedings?

•

Yes

•

No

21. If in the U.S., is this child to be included in this application? (Check the appropriate box.)
| | Yes (Attach one photograph of your child in the upper right corner of Page 9 on the extra copy of the application submittedfor this person.)

• No
1. Alien Registration Number (A-Number) 2. Passport/ID Card No.
(ifany)

(ifany)

3. Marital Status (Married, Single,
Divorced, Widowed)

5. Complete Last Name

6. First Name

7. Middle Name

9. City and Country of Birth

10. Nationality (Citizenship) 11. Race, Ethnic, or Tribal Group

4. U.S. Social Security No.
(ifany)

8. Date of Birth (mm/dd/yyyy)
12. Gender

• Male

| |

Female

13. Is this child in the U.S.?
| | Yes (Complete Blocks 14 to 21.) Q] No (Specify location.)
14. Place of last entry into the U.S.

18. What is your child's
current status?

15. Date of last entry into the
U.S. (mm/dd/yyyy)

16.1-94 No. (Ifany)

17.

Status when last admitted
(Visa type, ifany)

19. What is the expiration date of his/her 20. Is your child in Immigration Court proceedings?
authorized stay, if any? (mm/dd/yyyy)

•

Yes

•

No

21. If in the U.S., is this child to be included in this application? (Check the appropriate box.)
| | Yes (Attach one photograph of your child in the upper right corner ofPage 9 on the extra copy of the application submittedfor this person.)

•

No

1. Alien Registration Number (A-Number) 2. Passport/ID Card No.
(ifany)

(ifany)

3. Marital Status (Married, Single,
Divorced, Widowed)

5. Complete Last Name

6. First Name

9. City and Country of Birth

10. Nationality (Citizenship) 11. Race, Ethnic, or Tribal Group

13.

4. U.S. Social Security No.
(ifany)

8. Date of Birth (mm/dd/yyyy)

7. Middle Name

12. Gender
| | Male

Q

Female

Is this child in the U.S. ? | | Yes (Complete Blocks 14 to 21.) Q] No (Specify location.)

14. Place of last entry into the U.S.

18. What is your child's
current status?

15. Date of last entry into the
U.S. (mm/dd/yyyy)

16.1-94 No. (ifany)

17.

Status when last admitted
(Visa type, ifany)

19. What is the expiration date of his/her 20. Is your child in Immigration Court proceedings?
authorized stay, ifany? (mm/dd/yyyy)

•

Yes

•

No

21. If in the U.S., is this child to be included in this application? (Check the appropriate box.)
| | Yes (Attach one photograph of your child in the upper right corner of Page 9 on the extra copy of the application submittedfor this person.)

• No
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Form T-589 (Rev 04/0V1fh Y Paoe 1

1. List your last address where you lived before coming to the United States. If this is not the country where you fear persecution, also list the last
address in the country where you fear persecution. (List Address, City/Town, Department, Province, or State and Country.)
(1VOTE: Use Form 1-589 Supplement B, or additional sheets of paper, if necessary.)
Number and Street
(Provide if available)

City/Town

Department, Province, or State

Dates
From (Mo/Yr) To (Mo/Yr)

Country
Austria

Sarajevo

Bosnia

2. Provide the following information about your residences during the past 5 years. List your present address first.
(1VOTE: Use Form 1-589 Supplement B, or additional sheets of paper, if necessary.)
Number and Street
3710 South 5600 West

City/Town
West Valley City

Country

Department, Province, or State
Utah

Dates
From (Mo/Yr) To (Mo/Yr)

USA

3. Provide the following information about your education, beginning with the most recent.
(NOTE: Use Form 1-589 Supplement B, or additional sheets of paper, if necessary.)
Name of School

Type of School

Location (Address)

Attended
From (Mo/Yr) To (Mo/Yr)

4. Provide the following information about your employment during the past 5 years. List your present employment first.
(NOTE: Use Form 1-589 Supplement B, or additional sheets of paper, if necessary.)
Your Occupation

Name and Address of Employer

Dates
From (Mo/Yr) To (Mo/Yr)

5. Provide the following information about your parents and siblings (brothers and sisters). Check the box if the person is deceased.
(NOTE: Use Form 1-589 Supplement B, or additional sheets ofpaper, if necessary.)
Full Name

Current Location

City/Town and Country of Birth

Mother Suzana Murfitt

Sarajevo, Yugoslavia

Q

Deceased Salt Lake City

Father Hajrudin Jelaskovic

Sarajevo, Yugoslavia

[ | Deceased Salt Lake City

Sibling Maisa Jelaskovic

Sarajevo, Yugoslavia

•

Deceased Salt Lake City

Sibling

| | Deceased

Sibling

| | Deceased

Sibling

| | Deceased
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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tioa Aboyt Your Application
(1VOTE: Use Form 1-589 Supplement B, or attach additional sheets of paper as needed to complete your responses to the questions contained in
PartB.)
When answering the following questions about your asylum or other protection claim (withholding of removal under 241(b)(3) of the INA or
withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture), you must provide a detailed and specific account of the basis of your claim to
asylum or other protection. To the best of your ability, provide specific dates, places, and descriptions about each event or action described. You
must attach documents evidencing the general conditions in the country from which you are seeking asylum or other protection and the specific facts
on which you are relying to support your claim. If this documentation is unavailable or you are not providing this documentation with your
application, explain why in your responses to the following questions.
Refer to Instructions, Part 1: Filing Instructions, Section II, "Basis of Eligibility," Parts A - D, Section V, "Completing the Form," Part B, and
Section VII, "Additional Evidence That You Should Submit," for more information on completing this section of the form.
1. Why are you applying for asylum or withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3) of the INA, or for withholding of removal under the
Convention Against Torture? Check the appropriate box(es) below and then provide detailed answers to questions A and B below:
I am seeking asylum or withholding of removal based on:

•

Race

•

[X] Religion
•

Political opinion

• Membership in a particular social group

Nationality

[x]

Torture

Convention

A. Have you, your family, or close friends or colleagues ever experienced harm or mistreatment or threats in the past by anyone?
•

No

[x] Yes

If "Yes," explain in detail:
1. What happened;
2. When the harm or mistreatment or threats occurred;
3. Who caused the harm or mistreatment or threats; and
4. Why you believe the harm or mistreatment or threats occurred.
My father is Muslim, but my mother is Catholic, and when they lived in Bosnia, she had to pretend to be Muslim as well. It was dangerous to be
Christian, and especially dangerous to be in a mixed family. My mother was threatened in our apartment when my father was away, and
shortly afterwards, we were able to escape Sarajevo.
Our family friend was a Muslim with a Christian wife, and when he refused to kill people of her religion, the soldiers killed him and two others
who refused to kill Christians.
When my grandmother and uncle tried to leave Sarajevo when the war started, they were stopped with other people at the outskirts of the
city, and held by soldiers in a school for several days without food or bedding. They were threatened every day, but fortunately, the soldiers
received orders to let them go. Eventually, they were able to leave Bosnia.
•

B. Do you fear harm or mistreatment if you return to your home country?
•

No

[X]. Yes

If "Yes," explain in detail:
1. What harm or mistreatment you fear;
2. Who you believe would harm or mistreat you; and
3. Why you believe you would or could be harmed or mistreated.
While Catholics have very few rights, and their complaints are ignored by authorities, the real problem involves my tattoos. Tattoos are not
allowed at all in Islam, and it will be impossible to hide them all. Not only that, I have a large cross on my back. I fear anyone who sees it will
respond with violence and I will not be able to get help from police. Also, because I have a Muslim name, I will be viewed with suspicion from
the Christians, and they will not trust that I am Catholic. My father has told me that if I go back to Bosnia, I will have to pretend to be Muslim,
but I am a Catholic and I don't think I could hide that.
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2. Have you or your family members ever been accused, charged, arrested, detained, interrogated, convicted and sentenced, or imprisoned
in any country other than the United States?
QNo

[X] Yes

If "Yes," explain the circumstances and reasons for the action.
My grandmother and uncle were detained when trying to leave Sarajevo when the war started. They were held for several days with many other
people, but were never told why. As far as I know, there were never any charges, interrogations, or convictions.

3.A. Have you or your family members ever belonged to or been associated with any organizations or groups in your home country, such
as, but not limited to, a political party, student group, labor union, religious organization, military or paramilitary group, civil patrol,
guerrilla organization, ethnic group, human rights group, or the press or media?
[X] No

•

Yes

If "Yes," describe for each person the level of participation, any leadership or other positions held, and the length of time you or your
family members were involved in each organization or activity.

B. Do you or your family members continue to participate in any way in these organizations or groups?
[X] No

•

Yes

If "Yes," describe for each person your or your family members' current level of participation, any leadership or other positions currently
held, and the length of time you or your family members have been involved in each organization or group.

4. Are you afraid of being subjected to torture in your home country or any other country to which you may be returned?

• No

[X] Yes

If "Yes," explain why you are afraid and describe the nature of torture you fear, by whom, and why it would be inflicted.
As I explained before, I am Catholic with a Muslim name. I also have a cross tattooed on my back. In Bosnia, this is like a target. I am in
danger from anyone who sees it, including the police, and possibly from members of my extended family who still live there. I am afraid that I
will be beaten or even killed and nobody will be able to stop it.
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(NOTE: Use Form 1-589 Supplement B, or attach additional sheets of paper as needed to complete your responses to the questions contained in
PartC.)
1. Have you, your spouse, your child(ren), your parents or your siblings ever applied to the U.S. Government for refugee status, asylum, or
withholding of removal?
•

No

[X] Yes

If "Yes," explain the decision and what happened to any status you, your spouse, your child(ren), your parents, or your siblings received as a
result of that decision. Indicate whether or not you were included in a parent or spouse's application. If so, include your parent or spouse's Anumber in your response. If you have been denied asylum by an immigration judge or the Board of Immigration Appeals, describe any change(s)
in conditions in your country or your own personal circumstances since the date of the denial that may affect your eligibility for asylum.
I was included on my parents' Refugee Application from Austria. It was granted in December 1997, and we came to America.

2. A. After leaving the country from which you are claiming asylum, did you or your spouse or child(ren) who are now in the United States travel
through or reside in any other country before entering the United States?
[ 1 No
[x] Yes
B. Have you, your spouse, your child(ren), or other family members, such as your parents or siblings, ever applied for or received any lawful
status in any country other than the one from which you are now claiming asylum?
•
No
[X] Yes
If "Yes" to either or both questions (2 A and/or 2B), provide for each person the following: the name of each country and the length of stay,
the person's status while there, the reasons for leaving, whether or not the person is entitled to return for lawful residence purposes, and
whether the person applied for refugee status or for asylum while there, and if not, why he or she did not do so.
We went to the Czech Republic after leaving Bosnia. We did not need to file any applications, because they just opened the borders to the
refugees. We lived there for about 15 months.
Then we moved to Austria, where we lived for five years. We did not need to file any refugee status there, but every year, the government
renewed work visas for my parents.

Have you, your spouse or your child(ren) ever ordered, incited, assisted or otherwise participated in causing harm or suffering to any person
because of his or her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or belief in a particular political opinion?
[Xj

No

•

Yes

If "Yes," describe in detail each such incident and your own, your spouse's, or your child(ren)'s involvement.
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Part C« Mditloiial Information About Your Application (Continued)
4. After you left the country where you were harmed or fear harm, did you return to that country?

•

No

[X] Yes

If "Yes," describe in detail the circumstances of your visit(s) (for example, the date(s) of the trip(s), the purpose(s) of the trip(s), and the
length of time you remained in that country for the visit(s).)
After the war, my family returned to Sarajevo, Bosnia for three days to say goodbye to my father's family. Most of my mother's family had
already left.

5. Are you filing this application more than 1 year after your last arrival in the United States?

•

No

[X] Yes

If "Yes," explain why you did not file within the first year after you arrived. You must be prepared to explain at your interview or hearing
why you did not file your asylum application within the first year after you arrived. For guidance in answering this question, see
Instructions, Part 1: Filing Instructions, Section V. "Completing the Form," Part C.
Having been granted status as a refugee, and receiving LPR status, there was no reason to apply for asylum. Due to my legal troubles, I am
now in removal proceedings, and may be sent to Bosnia before the Post Conviction Relief proceedings are finished. I am afraid to go back to
Bosnia, which is why I am filing this application.

6. Have you or any member of your family included in the application ever committed any crime and/or been arrested, charged,
convicted, or sentenced for any crimes in the United States?

•

No

[X] Yes

If "Yes," for each instance, specify in your response: what occurred and the circumstances, dates, length of sentence received, location, the
duration of the detention or imprisonment, reason(s) for the detention or conviction, any formal charges that were lodged against you or
your relatives included in your application, and the reason(s) for release. Attach documents referring to these incidents, if they are
available, or an explanation of why documents are not available.
I had sex with a girl in 2002, and was charged with rape in Salt Lake City District Court. I pled guilty to two counts of forcible sexual assault
on my attorney's advice in 2003. I received concurrent sentences of 1 - 15 years. I am now on parole, and am in Post Conviction Relief
proceedings with the Utah Appellate Court.
I don't believe anyone in my family has been charged with any crimes.
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I certify, under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America, that this application and the!
evidence submitted with it are all true and correct. Title 18, United States Code, Section 1546(a), provides in part:
Whoever knowingly makes under oath, or as permitted under penalty of perjury under Section 1746 of Title 28,
United States Code, knowingly subscribes as true, any false statement with respect to a material fact in any
application, affidavit, or other document required by the immigration laws or regulations prescribed thereunder, or
knowingly presents any such application, affidavit, or other document containing any such false statement orl
which fails to contain any reasonable basis in law or fact - shall be fined in accordance with this title or|
imprisoned for up to 25 years. I authorize the release of any information from my immigration record that U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) needs to determine eligibility for the benefit I am seeking.

Staple your photograph here or
the photograph of the family
member to be included on the
extra copy of the application
submitted for that person.

WARNING: Applicants who are in the United States illegally are subject to removal if their asylum or withholding claims are not granted
by an asylum officer or an immigration judge. Any information provided in completing this application may be used as a basis for the
institution of, or as evidence in, removal proceedings even if the application is later withdrawn. Applicants determined to have knowingly
made a frivolous application for asylum will be permanently ineligible for any benefits under the Immigration and Nationality Act. You
may not avoid a frivolous finding simply because someone advised you to provide false information in your asylum application. If filing
with USCIS, unexcused failure to appear for an appointment to provide biometrics (such as fingerprints) and your biographical
information within the time allowed may result in an asylum officer dismissing your asylum application or referring it to an immigration
judge. Failure without good cause to provide DHS with biometrics or other biographical information while in removal proceedings may
result in your application being found abandoned by the immigration judge. See sections 208(d)(5)(A) and 208(d)(6) of the INA and 8 CFR
sections 208.10,1208.10, 208.20,1003.47(d) and 1208.20.
Write your name in your native alphabet.

Print your complete name.

Did your spouse, parent, or child(ren) assist you in completing this application? [ ]
Suzana Murfitt

No |x] YQS (If "Yes," list the name and relationship.)

Mother

(Name)
(Relationship)
Did someone other than your spouse, parent, or child(ren) prepare this application?

(Relationship)

(Name)
P ] No

Asylum applicants may be represented by counsel. Have you been provided with a list of
persons who may be available to assist you, at little or no cost, with your asylum claim?

No

Yes (If "Yes, "complete Part E.)

• Yes

Signature of Applicant (The person in Part A.I.)

Sign your name so it all appears within the brackets

Date (mm/dd/yyyy)

I declare that I have prepared this application at the request of the person named in Part D, that the responses provided are based on all information
of which I have knowledge, or which was provided to me by the applicant, and that the completed application was read to the applicant in his or her
native language or a language he or she understands for verification before he or she signed the application in my presence. I am aware that the
knowing placement of false information on the Form 1-589 may also subject me to civil penalties under 8 U.S.C. 1324c and/or criminal penalties
under 18 U.S.C. 1546(a).
Signature of Preparer

Print Complete Name of Preparer

Daytime Telephone Number
!(

Address of Preparer: Street Number and Name

)

Apt. No.

City

State

Zip Code
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feajrtJF. ToJBe Completed at Asylum Interview, if Applicable
NOTE: Fow w/7/ be asked to complete this part when you appear for examination before an asylum officer of the Department of Homeland
Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS).
I swear (affirm) that I know the contents of this application that I am signing, including the attached documents and supplements, that they are
I I all true or |_J not all true to the best of my knowledge and that correction(s) numbered
to
were made by me or at my request.
Furthermore, I am aware that if I am determined to have knowingly made a frivolous application for asylum I will be permanently ineligible for any
benefits under the Immigration and Nationality Act, and that I may not avoid a frivolous finding simply because someone advised me to provide
false information in my asylum application.
Signed and sworn to before me by the above named applicant on:

Signature of Applicant

Date (mm/dd/yyyy)

Write Your Name in Your Native Alphabet

Signature of Asylum Officer

NOTE: You will be asked to complete this Part when you appear before an immigration judge of the U.S. Department ofJustice, Executive Office
for Immigration Review (EOIR), for a hearing.
I swear (affirm) that I know the contents of this application that I am. signing, including the attached documents and supplements, that they are
| {all true or Q not all true to the best of my knowledge and that correction(s) numbered
to
were made by me or at my request.
Furthermore, I am aware that if I am determined to have knowingly made a frivolous application for asylum I will be permanently ineligible for any
benefits under the Immigration and Nationality Act, and that I may not avoid a frivolous finding simply because someone advised me to provide
false information in my asylum application.

Signed and sworn to before me by the above named applicant on:

Signature of Applicant

Date (mm/dd/yyyy)

Write Your Name in Your Native Alphabet

Signature of Immigration Judge
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Supplement A, Form 1-589
A-Number (If available)

Date

Applicant's Name

Applicant's Signature

iL'ist AH of Your Children* Regardless of Age or Marital Status

1

l^^ffiE: Use this form and attach additional pages and documentation as needed, if you have more thanfour children)
1. Alien Registration Number
(A-Number) (if any)

2. Passport/ID Card Number
(ifany)

3. Marital Status (Married, Single, 4. U.S. Social Security Number
Divorced, Widowed)
(ifany)

5. Complete Last Name

6. First Name

7. Middle Name

8. Date of Birth
(mm/dd/yyyy)

9. City and Country of Birth

10. Nationality (Citizenship)

11. Race, Ethnic, or Tribal Group

12. Gender
1 1 Male

LJ

Female

13. Is this child in the U.S.? EH Yes (Complete blocks 14 to 21.) \Z\ No (Specify location.)

|
17. Status when last admitted
(Visa type, ifany)

14. Place of last entry into the U.S. 15. Date of last entry into the U.S. 16. 1-94 Number (ifany)
(mm/dd/yyyy)

18. What is your child's current
status?

19. What is the expiration date of his/her authorized
stay, if any? (mm/dd/yyyy)

20. Is your child in Immigration Court proceedings?

•

Yes

• No

21. If in the U.S., is this child to be included in this application? (Check the appropriate box.)
11 1 Yes (Attach one photograph of your child in the upper right corner of Page 9 on the extra copy of the application submittedfor this
—'
person.)

n No
1. Alien Registration Number
(A-Number) (if any)

2. Passport/ID Card Number
(ifany)

3. Marital Status (Married, Single, 4. U.S. Social Security Number
Divorced, Widowed)
(ifany)

5. Complete Last Name

6. First Name

7. Middle Name

8. Date of Birth
(mm/dd/yyyy)

9. City and Country of Birth

10. Nationality (Citizenship)

11. Race, Ethnic, or Tribal Group

12. Gender
1 1 Male

13. Is this child in the U.S.? D Yes (Complete blocks 14 to 21.) •
Date of last entry into the U.S.
14. Place of last entry into the U.S. 15. (mm/dd/yyyy)
18. What is your child's current
status?

LJ

Female

No (Specify location.)
16. 1-94 Number (ifany)

19. What is the expiration date of his/her authorized
stay, ifany? (mm/dd/yyyy)

17. Status when last admitted
(Visa type, ifany)

20. Is your child in Immigration Court proceedings?

•

Yes

• No

21. If in the U.S., is this child to be included in this application? (Check the appropriate box.)
11 1 Yes (Attach one photograph of your child in the upper right corner of Page 9 on the extra copy of the application submittedfor this
—' person.)

D No
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Supplement B, Form 1-589
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Additionallnlon nation About Your Claim to Asylum

m
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I^RKi

JBggWWpi^

A-Number (if available)

Date

Applicant's Name

Applicant's Signature

p i 1

NOTE: Use this as a continuation page for any additional information requested. Copy and complete as needed.

Part
Question
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